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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the `gendered' process of international migration in Asia. It 
proposes that gender is one of the principal analytical factors for theoretical 
conceptualisation in the study of international migration. The study examines the 
case of Korea, which has been transformed into one of the major labour receiving 
countries in Asia since the early 1990s, but which has received less attention in the 
English literature on migration. 
The aim of the study is to examine the process of international migration in 
the historical, social and political contexts of Korea, by way of the integration of 
theoretical analyses with a critical gendered lens. A theoretical framework for this 
study is based on the observation that theorising the multifaceted process of 
international migration - which takes place with various interrelated variables - 
requires multidisciplinary and multidimensional approaches. The study therefore 
analyses the social formation of the `gendered' process of international migration 
by looking closely at the three different migratory stages of women migrants: the 
migratory journey; employment; and settlement in the country of destination. The 
primary empirical data used in the study were collected during a six-month period 
of field research - between April and September 2005. Qualitative 
data were 
derived from in-depth interviews with 31 migrant women, as well as employers, 
government officials and NGO workers. 
Based on a feminist standpoint of the outsider-within, the study locates the 
lives of migrant women from the margin to centre of the analysis. The empirical 
study shows that migrant women are `outsiders' who exist `within' the very core of 
international migration system in which they are, nevertheless, marginalised and 
silenced. The study suggests that the ostensibly gender-neutral process of migration 
is gender specific, resulting in different migration experiences between women and 
men. Gendered and racialised social relationships of power are pervasive in the 
structure of international migration and state institutions. At the same time, the 
differently `sedimented' practices of women and men - who strategically draw on 
institutional rules and resources to facilitate migration - become institutionalised in 
a gendered way. This, in turn, influences the gendered process of international 
migration that is reproduced and transformed over time. 
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A NOTE ON KOREAN NAMES 
The official Korean language romanisation system is used throughout this thesis, 
with a number of exceptions for well-known place names (e. g. Seoul and Pusan) 
and personal names (e. g. Park Jung Hee, Kim Young Sam and Park No-Hae), 
which the family name is followed by the given name without a comma. In order to 
avoid the confusion, common Korean family names (e. g. Kim and Park) are 
indicated with initials. 
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Introduction 
Seok-Bok came to South Korea (hereafter Korea) in 1997, a year before the Financial 
Crisis hit the Korean economy. She is 61 years old and working as a live-in domestic 
worker for a middle-class Korean family in Seoul. When I first met her one Sunday 
morning in the summer of 2005, she was looking thin and worn out. She started 
telling me her story with a sigh, "I have lost ten kilograms within four months, since 
I started working for this family. I have to take care of a three-month-old baby while 
doing housework. I am so stressed because the mother of the baby is so demanding. " 
Seok-Bok was born in China to Korean parents who migrated from Japanese 
occupied Korea to Manchuria in the late 1930s and eventually settled in a small 
village in China. She and her husband were poor farmers in China. Leaving their 
newly wedded son and daughter-in-law behind, they decided to come to Korea to 
have a better life, just like Korean-Chinese neighbours in their village who returned 
from Korea with their own success stories. However, after working in Korea for ten 
months her husband was diagnosed with liver cancer and had to return home. Six 
month later, her husband died, but she could not be at his funeral. Being 
undocumented, Seok-Bok could not take the risk of losing a chance to come back to 
Korea once she left for China. With her husband gone, she now has to pay off her 
and her husband's debts to the broker who helped them to enter Korea. She would 
have to work three more years in Korea to clear the debt. 
Seok-Bok is one of the world's 175 million people who reside outside the 
country of their birth (United Nations, 2002) and one of over half a million migrant 
workers in Korea. Castles and Miller (2003: 1) identify international migration as one 
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of the defining features of the post-Cold War era, which constitutes a `key dynamic 
within globalisation'. International migration has emerged as a salient global issue 
that reconfigures socio-economic, political and cultural forms in every corner of the 
world. The pattern of international migration is continuously taking on new forms. 
One of the characteristics of today's international migration is the diversity of 
destinations, origins and types of movements. Most countries are no longer 
categorised as either destinations or origins, but rather as a combination of the two. 
This tendency is most pronounced in Asia where the rapid economic development in 
East Asian countries since the 1970s has stimulated substantial international 
migration. While there are continuous flows of people from Asia to North America, 
Europe and Australia, the interregional movement of people is also vigorous within 
Asia. 
While the migratory movement of people varies between countries with 
specific individual features, there are three prominent general trends of international 
migration in Asia. First, temporary migration now forms a large component of 
international migration in Asia. For example, ten times as many Filipino migrants 
migrate to other Asian countries as move to North America: 582,584 Filipinos 
migrated to Asian countries as temporary migrants in 2001, whereas only 51,308 
migrated to the United States and Canada as permanent immigrants (Oishi, 2005). 
Many Asian countries adopt temporary migration schemes, which involve the rigid 
control of low-skilled and manual workers, the prohibition of the settlement of 
migrant workers and their families. The strict regulatory systems of many Asian 
states are designed to prevent cultural and social changes that might be brought by 
the settlement of migrant workers. 
Second, international migration in Asia has been increasingly 
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institutionalised. The role played by migration industries is significant in Asia, and 
migrant workers tend to rely heavily on recruitment agencies organised by individual 
agents and public and private brokers. To a large extent, the restrictive immigration 
control of many labour-receiving countries has accelerated the growth of such 
intermediaries, which accumulate profits from the migration business by providing 
legal and clandestine channels for migrant workers. 
Third, the feminisation of migration is particularly salient in Asia. The 
feminisation of migration is not a new trend, but the number of migrant women has 
already increased significantly since the late 1970s. Asia has become both a major 
destination for female labour migration and a source of labour to other parts of the 
world (Oishi, 2005). `Feminisation' refers not only to the increase in the number of 
women migrant workers, but also to the social construction of the workers and the 
types of their jobs. Most women migrant workers are concentrated in `typical female 
jobs', such as domestic workers, assembly-line workers in manufacturing factories, 
restaurant and hotel staff, cleaners and `entertainers' (a euphemism for sex workers). 
Also, there has been a significant increase of cross-border marriage migrants who are 
mostly women from developing countries in Asia. Although cross-border marriage 
migration of women constitutes a significant part of the feminisation of migration in 
Asia, it has received less attention apart from the partial studies of `war brides' 
(Glenn, 1986; C. B-L. Kim, 1977) or `mail-order brides' (Cahill, 1990; Chuah, et al, 
1987; Cooke, 1986; del Rosario, 1994). Despite the smaller scale of movement of 
marriage migrants in comparison with that of temporary labour migrants, it is, 
however, important to consider the case of cross-border marriage migration in 
migration studies. The cross-border marriage migration of Asian women, which has 
led to permanent settlement mostly in the country of the migrant's husband, has 
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social, economic, political and cultural implications, all of which illustrate the 
intertwined relationships of marriage, migration, labour and citizenship (Piper and 
Roces, 2003; Constable, 2005). 
A burgeoning literature has explored the recent phenomenon of international 
migration in Asia. In particular, more scholars have begun to focus their research on 
the international migration of Asian women. For example, Gamburd (2000) examines 
the impact of female migration on communities and families left behind in Sri Lanka. 
Oishi (2005) did comparative research on cross-national migration patterns and 
examined the causal mechanisms of female migration in Asia. Others focus on 
migrant domestic workers, including Constable's (1997) ethnographic accounts of 
Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong, Parrenas' (2001) comparative research on 
Filipina domestic workers in Los Angeles and Rome, Huang, Yeoh and Rahmän's 
(2005) edited collection of research on the phenomenon of female domestic workers 
in Asia and Lan's (2006) study of the relationship between Filipina and Indonesian 
migrant domestic workers and their Taiwanese employers. All of these studies have 
provided rich findings and advanced our understanding of the experiences of migrant 
women and the dynamic process of the feminisation of international migration. 
Nonetheless, there is a lack of comprehensive analysis of migrant women and a lack 
of research providing dynamic insight into the multiple stages of the migratory 
process, including the motives or causes, migratory channels, the nature of 
employment in the labour market and settlement in the country of destination. 
Moreover, despite its significant location as one of prime destinations of migration in 
Asia, the study of migrant workers - needless to say, women migrant workers - in 
Korea is largely absent in scholarly work. To address these shortages, this research is 
designed to provide a comprehensive analysis of the interactive process of 
4 
international migration through a gendered lens focusing on the case study of 
migrant women in Korea. 
I. The Case Study: Migrant Women in Korea 
A case study of Korea would provide an interesting, new empirical account of the 
process of international migration. Since the mid-1980s, Korea - once a major labour 
sending country - has become one of the major labour receiving countries in East 
Asia. From the 1960s to the 1980s nearly two million Korean workers were sent to 
Europe and the Middle East, mostly as miners and nurses to West Germany and as 
construction workers to the Middle East. However, the situation has been reversed 
since the 1990s. Having grown into one of the newly industrialising countries (NICs) 
in Asia with relatively high wages and a shortage of unskilled manual workers in 
small- and medium-sized firms, Korea has become a prime destination for migrant 
workers from developing countries in the region. 
Korea insists on defining itself as a non-immigrant (sojourn) country. Legal 
permission for the permanent settlement of migrant workers does not exist in Korea. 
The only way to attain formal citizenship is through naturalisation. However, like 
other developed countries, Korea has been facing the `3-D syndrome' since the late 
1980s. As 3-D jobs - the aversion to difficult, dangerous and dirty jobs - in Korea 
are avoided by native workers, these jobs are predominantly taken by migrant 
workers. These migrant workers are filling up the gap in the Korean labour market, 
maintaining the country's economic development. The influx of migrant workers 
presents a new challenge for the Korean nation considered as `monocultural and 
homogenous' which has a fear of the cultural and social changes that might be 
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brought by migrants. The contradiction between the demands of economic rationality 
and an exclusive nationalistic ideology determines the characteristic feature of 
current policies of the Korean state toward migrant workers from poorer countries. 
The Korean government has adopted a temporary migration scheme, which rigidly 
controls the flow of low-skilled migrant workers. One of the distinctive examples of 
these regulatory measures is the `industrial trainee scheme' for foreign unskilled 
workers who, being legally recognised as `trainees' and not `workers', end up 
working for low wages with no labour protection. Under these circumstances, Korea 
has been able to reduce possible economic and social costs and, at the same time, 
enjoy the benefits of the migrant labour force. 
With the increasing number of migrant workers, a series of human rights 
violations emerges as one of the major social and political problems in Korea. In 
particular, gender related issues become evident as women migrant workers suffer 
various forms of sexual and racial discrimination due to their vulnerable positions as 
being migrant - often undocumented - workers from poorer countries. Although this 
is a general problem which can also be found in other labour receiving countries, 
migrant women in Korea are far more disadvantaged because of the strong 
Confucian, patriarchal culture, which is prevalent in Korean society and embedded in 
every aspect of state policies. Women migrant workers in Korea are concentrated in 
the archetypical female occupations, such as labour-intensive factory workers, 
restaurant staff, hotel cleaners, domestic/care workers and `entertainers'. These 
occupations were traditionally reserved for Korean women, but are now increasingly 
filled by migrant women from developing countries in Asia, such as China, the 
Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia. 
This study primarily focuses on the case of migrant women in Korea, which 
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is a topic that has been largely overlooked by migration studies. One of the 
distinctive characteristics of the Korean case is that, unlike many other Asian 
countries, the feminisation of migration is less obvious in terms of the sheer number 
of women migrant workers. Women migrant worker constitute only one third of the 
total migrant workers in the Korean labour market. This could be one of the reasons 
why despite a growing interest in the issue of the human rights of migrant workers in 
Korea and inconsistent government policies toward them, the subject of women 
migrant workers has been largely neglected by Korean researchers and no 
comprehensive study of migrant workers in Korea with a gender sensitive approach 
is available. However, regardless of numbers, women migrant workers play crucial 
economic and social roles within Korean society. This study is therefore intended to 
challenge the absence of the gender perspective in the study of migrant workers in 
Korea. It does this by arguing that a case study of migrant women in Korea can show 
the complex dynamics of the process of international migration in Asia. The research 
is original in this respect, and challenges the existing theoretical and sociological 
discussion concerning the process of international migration in migration studies. 
II. Aims of the Study and Research Questions 
This study proposes that gender is one of the principal analytical factors for 
theoretical conceptualisation in the study of international migration and, to a large 
extent, an important variable for the study of social and economic development in the 
era of globalisation. The aim of the study is to examine the process of international 
migration in the historical, social and political contexts of Korea, by way of the 
integration of theoretical analyses with a critical gendered lens. It aims to analyse the 
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social formation of the `gendered' process of migration by looking closely at the 
three different migratory stages of female migrants: the migratory journey, 
employment and settlement. Taking empirical account of migrant women in Korea, 
the study attempts to show that gendered and racialised social relationships of power 
are pervasive in state policies and institutions. It also aims to show that, through the 
process of international migration, the sexual division of labour has been extended at 
a transnational level and this, in turn, has reinforced a gendered global labour market. 
The research will explore answers to the following questions: 
i. Can existing theories explain the process and complexity of international 
migration and its multi-dimensional impacts on political, social, economic 
and cultural aspects? 
ii. How can we adopt a more comprehensive and balanced approach toward 
the study of the international movement of people and the socio-economic 
development process? How is gender implicated in this? 
iii. How can we produce a gender sensitive approach to the explanation of 
international migration? How do we produce the knowledge that 
legitimates women as `knowers'? 
iv. What are the main factors that transformed Korea from a labour-sending 
into a labour-receiving country? 
v. What pushes women to move to Korea? How do the migratory journeys 
of women differ from those of men? 
vi. In what forms of labour are women migrant workers engaged in the 
Korean labour market? In what ways is the sexual division of labour 
extended from the national to the transnational level through international 
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migration? 
vii. Why are migrant women marginalised and rendered invisible in the 
dominant society? How are gender, race and class socially constructed 
and embedded in the institutional structure in Korea? 
viii. In what way is the gendered process of international labour migration 
moulded from the interactions between the economic, social and political 
aspects? 
III. Structure of the Study 
Chapter 1 begins with the question of whether there could be an overarching theory 
that encompasses the complexities of multifaceted migration. This chapter offers a 
concise account and critical evaluation of the dominant theories of migration. I 
attempt to reassess the conceptual framework through a gendered lens and to 
postulate that a gender sensitive approach is important for a comprehensive approach 
to theoretical conceptualisation in the field of international migration. This chapter 
includes a critical review of recent literature on women and migration, and explores 
how to advance the analysis of international migration from a gender sensitive 
approach. The chapter also introduces the theoretical approach used in the study and 
provides a brief overview of how the process of international migration will be 
analysed throughout the study. 
Chapter 2 provides the historical background to the context of this study. It 
explores multiple interlocking factors that transformed Korea from a labour sending 
country into one of the main labour receiving countries in Asia. This chapter starts by 
examining the historical background to the emigration of Korean workers during the 
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period between the 1910s and the 1980s. It then turns to an examination of three 
interlocking factors that have led to the influx of migrant workers to Korea: (1) the 
process of Korea's economic development, including the state-led economic 
development during the period between the 1960s and the 1980s and the policy of 
economic liberalisation in the 1990s that intensified the globalisation of capital; (2) 
changes in Korea's international relations in the post-Cold War era; and (3) cultural 
and social factors that have affected the increased movement of people from certain 
Asian countries to Korea. 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology used in this study explaining the 
process by which the fieldwork data was collected and interpreted. Looking at both 
epistemological issues and research methods, this chapter introduces not only the 
ways in which the empirical study was designed and carried out, but also the process 
and the principle by which research questions were approached. Adopting feminist 
epistemology as an alternative theory of knowledge for this research, this chapter 
attempts to systematise as well as expand existing approaches to the migration of 
women which tend to merely `add women, mix and stir' within orthodox theoretical 
frameworks of international migration. 
Based on the epistemological and methodological position established in 
Chapter 3, the subsequent chapters focus on the empirical study of migrant women in 
Korea, beginning with an exploration of women's decisions on migration and their 
migratory journeys to Korea in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 examines in what ways the 
structural changes in the international migration system and the current system of the 
control of labour migrants in Korea have influenced individual decisions and 
strategies to pursue international migration. Analysing the empirical data of the 
migratory journeys of migrant women, this chapter suggests that while there are 
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evident structural determinations, a potential migrant acts strategically to further her 
interests by exploiting available resources within the increasingly institutionalised 
migration system in Asia. 
Chapters 5 and 6 explore in what ways women migrant workers are 
engaged in the labour market with certain types of occupations available for them 
once they entered Korea. These two chapters attempt to show that the feminisation of 
labour migration has a significant implication for the sexual division of labour in 
both the private and public spheres, which is further extended to the transnational 
level. Chapter 5 focuses on changes in production and employment patterns in 
Korea, which have increased the demand for a female migrant workforce in certain 
sectors of the economy and generated continuing flows of migrant workers. Based on 
an analysis of empirical data from the manufacturing and service industries in which 
women migrant workers are heavily concentrated, this chapter discusses the 
gendered and racialised division of labour in the Korean labour market. Focusing on 
reproductive labour, Chapter 6 examines the ways in which the traditional sexual 
division of labour in the private sphere has been extended to the transnational level 
through the commodification of reproductive work increasingly done by migrant care 
and domestic workers. This chapter is based on the argument that the sexual division 
of labour cannot be fully understood without considering the sexual division of 
reproductive labour in the private sphere, since the sexual division of social 
reproductive labour interacts with and reinforces the sexual division in the labour 
market. These two chapters highlight gender relations and racial discrimination in the 
labour market and anomalous state policies, which draw attention to the unlawful 
treatment of women migrant workers due to their `multiple vulnerability' as women, 
migrants and undocumented workers. 
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Chapter 7 examines how gender, race and class are socially constructed and 
embedded in the institutional structure, which results in different experiences for 
different groups of migrant women. This chapter begins with the question why 
despite the vital economic and social roles of migrant women in the country of 
destination, migrant women are marginalised and rendered invisible in the narratives 
of their multifaceted experiences as women, migrants and workers. It proposes that 
the different experiences of migrant women can be sufficiently explained not simply 
by arguing the gendered structure of society, but also by considering interconnections 
of racialisation, nationalism, class and gender. This chapter attempts to apply an 
integrated framework on the discussion of gender, race and class to the analysis of 
the racialisation of migrant workers and the issues of citizenship of (im)migrant 
women in the specific context of Korea. 
The conclusion returns to the initial aim of this study and draws together the 
issues and findings, which were developed in previous chapters. It also suggests the 
broader implication of the study for further research. 
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Chapter 1 
Literature Review: Critique of Migration Theories 
Introduction 
As the process of migration affects every dimension of social existence and develops 
its own complex dynamics, research on migration is `intrinsically interdisciplinary' 
(Castles and Miller, 2003: 21). Each social scientific discipline explains different 
aspects of the movement of people with a range of approaches based on different 
theories and methods. Nevertheless, Arango (2000: 283) critically argues that `a 
number of these explanations were not originally conceived to explain migration, but 
rather born to explain other facets of human behaviour and then imported and 
adapted for the explanation of migration' and `the overall balance sheet of theoretical 
contributions still mixes lights and shadows'. It is, however, highly doubtful whether 
there could be an overarching theory that encompasses the complexities of migration. 
After all, as Arango (2000: 295) observes, `migration is hard to define, difficult to 
measure, multifaceted and multiform, and resistant to theory-building'. 
This chapter presents a succinct account and critical evaluation of the main 
theories of migration and introduces the theoretical approach of this study. One of the 
prominent features of international migration has been the large number of women 
on the move. In particular, `the feminisation of migration' is most pronounced in Asia. 
`Feminisation' refers not only to the increase of the number of women migrant 
workers, but also to the social construction of the workers and their jobs in the local 
and global economy. Witnessing the continuing rise of the migration of women, there 
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has been a gendered intervention of feminist scholars in migration studies. Despite 
significant contributions from feminist scholars in migration studies, much of the 
gendered discussion still remains within the framework of gender-blind theories of 
international migration. A gender-sensitive approach needs to do more than just add 
`women' migrants to the explanation of causes and trends of international migration. 
Nevertheless, it does not mean simply rejecting the theoretical legacy of existing 
theories of international migration. In this study, I attempt to reassess the conceptual 
framework through a gendered lens and to combine existing migration theories with 
a gender-sensitive account to explain how gender is implicated in the process and 
structures of international migration. 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section examines 
one of the oldest theories of migration, the neo-classical economic approach. It looks 
at how the push-pull, equilibrium and cost-benefit analyses offered by this theory 
explain the movement of people, and evaluates its contributions and limitations. 
Following this, the second section looks at the structural approach, which is rooted in 
Marxist political economy and has developed a macro account of international 
migration since the early 1970s. The third section examines integrative theories of 
migration, which emerged in the late 1980s. Challenging the orthodox frameworks of 
agency and structure, researchers have increasingly called for an integrated approach, 
which allows for the explanation of migration at both the micro and macro levels. 
The fourth section postulates that a gender sensitive approach is important for a 
comprehensive approach to theoretical conceptualisation in the field of international 
migration. It critically reviews recent literature on women and migration and 
explores how to advance the analysis of international migration from a gender 
sensitive approach. In the concluding section, the theoretical approach used in this 
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study is discussed. This section includes a brief overview of how the process of 
international migration is analysed in historical, social and political contexts, and 
how this process should be scrutinised by means of a better integration of theoretical 
analyses with a critical gendered lens. 
I. The Neo-classical Economic Approach 
The neo-classical economic approach is probably the oldest and most well-known 
approach, although it is also the most criticised theory of international migration. 
This approach is based on the assumption of `methodological individualism' (Goss 
and Lindquist, 1995: 320) and understands the international movement of labour as a 
result of rational individual decisions to maximise returns on their labour. The 
following three analyses - push-pull, equilibrium and cost-benefit accounts - share 
this basic standpoint in theorising labour migration. 
Push-Pull Analysis 
Understanding the pattern of movements of labour as a result of aggregate individual 
decisions of behaviour, the push-pull analysis attempts to develop a `general 
framework' for explaining the labour migration process. Ravenstein's laws of 
migration (Ravenstein, 1885; 1889), which were developed from the 1881 British 
census data on the birthplaces of informants, provide starting-points for the push-pull 
analysis. In Ravenstein's laws of migration the size of population and distance are 
essential factors in shaping the pattern of movements of labour. For Ravenstein, most 
migrants travel short distances and those who travel long distances tend to go to big 
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cities, which are centres of commerce and industry. Migration takes place by stages 
through an absorption process. There are `currents of migration' in which people in 
the rural area tend to move to nearby towns and eventually towards rapidly growing 
cities. In this case, the decline of the rural population is soon compensated by 
migrants streaming from further rural areas. Although Ravenstein's laws of migration 
take into account a number of non-economic factors motivating currents of migration, 
such as oppressive laws, a burden of taxation, bad climate, or movements under 
compulsion (e. g. slave trade), it clearly emphases that the economic motive to 
`better' themselves in material respects is predominant in factors influencing 
individual decisions to migrate (Todaro, 1976). 
Based on Ravenstein's laws of migration, Lee (1966) attempts to develop a 
general framework for analysing migration, which includes the development of 
`streams' and `counter-streams'. Taking into account destinations and the volume of 
migration, Lee examines the efficiency of migration and introduces a number of 
factors which influence a degree of the efficiency and the individual decision to 
migrate: origin and destination plus and minus factors'; intervening obstacles; and 
personal factors. For Lee, streams and counter-streams coexist in the migration 
process - i. e. there will be migrants who return to their origin areas when they find 
that their initial perceptions do not accord with reality in the destination area or fail 
to achieve their objectives of movement. Accordingly, the volume of the `net' stream 
(streams minus counter-streams) is more directly related to minus factors at origin 
(origin `push' factors) than to destination `pull' factors. 
1 As people do not possess sufficient knowledge of the precise outcome of potential destination pluses 
and minuses, `perceptions' of destination pluses and minuses, uncertainty, expectations and risks are 
important elements in the migration process. In this case, the existence and nature of personal, family 
or ethnic `contracts' in destination areas can significantly influence migrant perceptions (Todaro, 
1976). 
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Lee also emphases that migration is selective and migrants are either 
`positively' or `negatively' selected. Lee's `positive-negative' selectivity of migration 
is explained with individual decisions based on `pull factors' at destination and `push 
factors' at origin. Migrants responding to plus factors at destination tend to be 
`positively' selected, i. e. they are more educated, skilled and ambitious than the 
general origin population and the potential destination is socially, economically, or 
politically more lucrative. On the other hand, migrants responding to push factors at 
origin tend to be `negatively' selected. For example, unskilled-rural peasants are 
driven off their lands by economic hardship/unemployment or people flea from 
political/religious persecution. 
Equilibrium Analysis 
Like the push-pull analysis, the equilibrium analysis of the neo-classical approach 
also understands that rational individual decisions result in international labour 
migrations and highlights that international migration, just like internal migration, is 
caused by differences in wage rates between countries (Borjas, 1989; Lewis, 1954; 
Ranis and Fei, 1961; Todaro, 1976)2. 
Geographical differences in the supply of and demand for labour and the 
resulting differential in wages induce workers from the low-wage country to migrate 
2 Massey et al. (1993: 434) discuss a number of implicit propositions and assumptions of the macro- 
level analysis: i) The international migration of workers is caused by differences in wage rates 
between countries; ii) The elimination of wage differentials will end the movement of labour, and 
migration will not occur in the absence of such differentials; iii) International flows of human capital - 
that is, highly skilled workers - respond to differences in the rate of return to human capital, which 
may be different from the overall wage rate, yielding a distinct pattern of migration that may be 
opposite to that of unskilled workers; iv) Labour markets are the primary mechanisms by which 
international flows of labour are induced; other kinds of markets do not have important effects on 
international migration; and v) The way for governments to control migration flows is to regulate or 
influence labour markets in sending and/or receiving countries. 
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to the high-wage country. Asserting that there is an abundant supply of labour in the 
poor country, which could fulfil a scarce supply of labour in the affluent country, this 
macro-level or equilibrium analysis understands that workers are naturally and 
voluntarily moving towards other countries having higher wages and more job 
opportunities. As a result of this movement of labour, the supply of labour decreases 
and wages rise in the poor country, whereas the supply of labour increases and wages 
fall in the affluent country (Massey et al, 1993). This, in turn, leads an international 
wage to an equilibrium point. The elimination of wage differentials will eventually 
end the movement of labour, and migration will not take place in the absence of such 
differentials. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The neo-classical cost-benefit analysis asserts that individual rational actors decide to 
migrate as a cost-benefit calculation leads them to expect a positive monetary net 
return from migration (Massey et al., 1993). In this analysis, potential migrant 
workers estimate the costs and benefits of moving to other countries where the 
expected discounted net returns are greatest over a certain period of time (Borjas, 
1989). 
The following equation is an analytical summary of the individual decision- 
making process (Massey et al, 1993: 434-435; Todaro, 1976: 32-33): 
ER(0) _ý [P (t)P(t) 2 Yd (t) - P3(t)YO (t)ý-' dt - C(O) 
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ER(0) is the expected net return to migration calculated before departure at time 0; t 
is time; P (t) is the probability of avoiding deportation from the destination country 
(1.0 for legal migrants and <1.0 for undocumented migrants); P2 (t) is the probability 
of employment at the destination; Yd (t) is earnings if employed at the place of 
destination; P3 (t) is the probability of employment in the country of origin; Y, (t) is 
earnings if employed in the country of origin; r is the discount factor; and C(O) is the 
sum total of the costs of movement (Massey et al., 1993: 435). If the quantity ER(0) 
is positive for the potential destination, the rational individual migrates; if it is 
negative he/she stays and if it is zero, he/she is indifferent between moving and 
staying. In this scheme, a potential migrant goes to the country in which the expected 
net return to migration is greatest. 
The microeconomic formulation concludes that international movement is 
caused by international differentials in wage and employment rates3 and aggregate 
migration flows between countries are sums of individual moves decided on the basis 
of individual cost-benefit calculations (Massey et al., 1993: 435). `Human capital 
characteristics' such as education, experience, training and language skills - which 
increase the probability of employment and earnings in the destination - will also 
increase the probability of international movement. The cost of movement (C(O)) 
includes not only the costs of travelling, the costs of maintenance during moving and 
job-hunting, the material costs and efforts of learning a new language and culture, 
but also the psychological costs of leaving families and relatives at the origin and 
making new ties at the destination. As proposed by the equilibrium analysis, 
international movement does not occur in the absence of differences in wage and 
3 Unlike the equilibrium analysis, this analysis does not assume full employment. 
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employment rates between countries4. Migration continues until expected earnings 
have been equalised internationally. 
Evaluation 
In the neo-classical approach, international labour migration is viewed as a 
functional distribution of labour between countries, particularly from labour- 
abundant to labour-scarce areas. According to this approach, labour migration is, in 
general, considered as an economically efficient and positive movement that could 
fulfil the deficiency of labour in the destination and bring positive returns to migrant 
workers. As S. M. Lee (1996: 8) observes, `in the long-term, the functionalist 
paradigm predicts that migration will decline as economic equalisation occurs, 
assuming the inevitable modernisation and development of economies'. 
The simple and `optimistic cast' of the neo-classical approach to migration 
has influenced national policies on labour migrations in a number of developing 
countries, e. g. the Philippines. For governments in developing countries, migration 
has become a solution to problems such as unemployment and poverty, which could 
provoke political discontent. Migrant workers are expected to send remittances to 
their home and this can possibly alleviate internal poverty and help to service foreign 
debts (Phizacklea, 1998; 1999). 
The emphasis here on individual decisions on migration could be a useful 
tool for explaining female labour migration. In a situation of poverty and 
unemployment women could decide to move to cities and abroad for work. Labour 
4 However, the cost-benefit analysis suggests that the important factor in migration decision making 
process is the expected difference of earnings, not the absolute real-wage differential. 
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migration provides them with possibilities of employment and earnings to help their 
families. Women are no longer seen as passive actors - following their husbands as 
marriage partners - and become positive actors making their own choices. 
Nevertheless, the neo-classical approach has been heavily criticised for its 
tendency towards ahistoricism. Historically, for example, there have been push 
factors for labour migration in Asia, but it has not always been pull factors that have 
provoked the movement of labour between countries. During the 1960s and the 
1970s when Japan faced a deficiency of labour, there was no inflow of foreign 
migrant labour, not withstanding the fact that there were certainly many workers who 
would have been willing to migrate to Japan for jobs and economic returns for their 
labours (Seol, 1999). This approach also provides a limited explanation of other 
types of migration, such as forced migration (notably slavery) or movements of 
indentured labour, which used to comprise a larger volume of international 
movements than free labour migration did until the early 20th century. 
The neo-classical approach is also criticised for its unrealistic 
assumptions/propositions, which overlook the specific political-economic contexts of 
each country. Looking at international labour migration in the same light as internal 
labour migration, this approach takes no account of structural and administrative 
constraints and obstacles, such as immigration policies and laws imposed by states. 
These institutional constraints affect not only individual migration decisions but also 
the legal status of migrant - especially women - workers in the destination. As it will 
be discussed throughout this study, the patriarchal nature of the state, which is 
s Rapidly growing Japan experienced serious labour shortages between 1965 and 1975. However, 
the Japanese government prevented small and medium size firms from hiring foreign migrant workers. 
Instead, the government encouraged them to mobilise retired people and married women into the 
workplace and at the same time introduced labour-saving technology. Until the 1970s, except Korean- 
Japanese migrants who moved to Japan during the Japanese colonial period, there had been no foreign 
migrant workers in Japan. 
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described as `state masculinism' (Phizacklea, 2000: 108), is reflected in the system of 
immigration legislation and the application of immigration policies, which give rise 
to discriminatory measures against women. Furthermore, whereas the analysis of the 
neo-classical approach is based on the role of individual actors, it takes no account of 
other intermediaries such as employment agencies, brokers and traffickers. Most 
migrant workers, especially women, are exposed to the manipulative activities of 
intermediaries with whom state authorities often connive. Migrant workers 
increasingly tend to fall into a huge debts trap to these intermediaries in the process 
of migration. More importantly, with an overemphasis on human agency `the 
complexity of hierarchically structured social relations' (Phizacklea, 1998: 26) and 
gender differentiating factors, such as the gender segregated labour market, are not 
seriously considered. It views individual actors as a homogenous group making 
rational decisions on migration without considering gender, ethnicity and class 
relations. 
II. The Structural Approach 
Providing a very different macro account of international migration, the structural 
approach has been one of the dominant theories of migration since the early 1970s. 
The structural approach is rooted in Marxist political economy and views 
international migration as a product of the international capitalist development 
process (Bonacichi and Cheng, 1984; Castles and Kosack, 1973; Castells, 1975; 
Nikolinakos, 1975; Petras, 1981; Portes and Walton, 1981; Sassen, 1988). Most 
accounts of this approach are drawn from dependency or world system theories. 
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The Marxist Notion of a `Relative Surplus Population' 
As a starting point, it is worth looking at the Marxist notion of a `relative surplus 
population', which is fundamental to the main argument of the world system account. 
Marx (1970) argues that as capital accumulation cannot be rapid enough to absorb 
the whole working population, accumulation itself produces a `relatively surplus 
population' - i. e. creates unemployment. A surplus population is `a condition for the 
existence of the capitalist mode of production' as the `industrial reserve army' 
provides a mass of available labour power and regulates the general increase of 
wages. A relative surplus population includes not only the unemployed who lost jobs 
as a result of technological and structural changes in the mode of production, but also 
the `potential' group of women or young people who are not yet wage labourers. 
As the capitalist mode of production extends, the `potential' surplus 
population has to sell its labour power to survive. However, the surplus population 
reaches its limit when the whole of the reserve army of labour participates in 
economic activities. In the 19`h century, the industrialised capitalist economy had 
already approached the limit while there were massive reserve armies of labour in 
other parts of the world. As a consequence, capitals in the core penetrate into the 
periphery by disintegrating traditional/pre-capitalist economies using the power of 
market to proletarianise populations in the periphery. Marx suggests the example of 
the 19th century England, which supplemented its deficient labour supply with 
peasants from Ireland and dispatched them to its colonies in the New World. 
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World System Theory 
Drawing on the Marxist notion of a relative surplus population and based on the 
work of Wallerstein (1974), world system theory asserts that the international 
movement of labour is based on the structure of the world capitalist market, which 
has developed and extended since the 16th century. The penetration of capitalist 
economic relations into peripheral, non-capitalist countries causes the international 
movement of labour. It is argued that the present labour migration is closely related 
with earlier colonisation or colonising movements (Portes and Walton, 1981). This 
capitalist market penetration was assisted by the colonial regime that exploited 
natural resources and labour to serve the economic interests of colonising countries. 
Today, neo-colonial governments and multinational firms enter the Third World on 
the periphery of the world economy in search of land, raw material, cheap labour and 
new markets for their products. As capitalism has expanded outward from the core, a 
growing share of the human population has been incorporated into the world market 
economy. As this world capitalist market influences and controls natural resources 
and labour in the periphery, it creates a disposable relative surplus population and 
migration flows are inevitably generated, some of which move abroad (Massey et al., 
1993). 
According to world system theory, the international mobility of labour 
follows the international flow of goods and capital in opposite direction (Massey et 
al., 1993). Foreign investment from the industrialised country changes market 
relations and develops modern forms of production, thereby disrupting the traditional 
employment structure in the periphery. At the same time, it forges strong material 
and cultural links with the core and this whole process mobilises the regional and 
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transnational movement of labour (Sassen, 1988). This process has been intensified 
by multinational corporations and the globalisation of financial markets. It is argued 
that there is a continuing polarisation of the employment structure in global cities6 
(Castells, 1989; Sassen, 1988; 1991). The world economy is managed from a small 
number of global cities in which banking, finance, administration and the high- 
tech/IT industry are concentrated. A highly skilled workforce is concentrated in such 
global cities (e. g., London, Paris, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Tokyo, Sydney, 
etc. ) and these cities also have a strong demand for services from unskilled workers. 
These low-paid service jobs are largely filled by unskilled migrant workers from the 
periphery since native workers refuse to take these jobs. 
For industrialised countries, migration can be a labour supply system 
particularly suited to the needs of firms, where the organisation of the labour process 
entails low wages and powerless labour (Sassen, 1988). The use of migrant labour 
reduces the cost of production for employers through low wages and lower costs for 
the organisation of production. Due to their vulnerable status as foreigners, they are 
less likely to be politicised and more likely to rely on their employers. Therefore, by 
hiring migrant workers, apart from cheap labour, firms can gain additional benefits 
from labour supply flexibility - e. g. night shifts, ease of hiring or firing - and 
organisational flexibility - e. g. the use of hazardous equipment in substandard work 
spaces (Sassen, 1988: 40). Portes and Walton (1981: 50) argue that `the cheapness of 
migrant labour is not a built-in feature of the migration process and does not inhere 
in the personality of migrants, but is dependent on deliberate political manipulation'. 
Such manipulation is conditioned by the political vulnerability of immigrants. 
Crossing a political border itself weakens the status of workers in the host country as 
6 This will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5. 
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the weaker the legal standing of migrant workers, the more employers can obtain 
compliance and make more profits from them through use of political threats such as 
deportation (Castells, 1975; Portes and Walton, 1981). 
Evaluation 
The structural approach understands migration movements within the context of the 
international capitalist development process. In the context of an unequal and 
exploitative relationship between the core and periphery, migration has become a 
chronic mechanism to be activated in order to suit the demands of employers in core 
countries (Bonacichi and Cheng, 1984). For this approach, international labour 
migration is viewed as an `intrinsic component' of major processes of structural 
change throughout history, rather than as a result of individual motivations and push- 
pull factors of origin and destination (Portes and Walton, 1981; Zolberg, 1978; 1989). 
Therefore, unlike the neo-classical approach, international migration is explained as 
a response to the dynamics of market creation/relocation and the structure of the 
world political economy, which has led to a gap of wage rates or of employment 
opportunities between the poor and rich countries. 
Highlighting political economy of the migratory process with international 
and historical perspectives, the structural approach makes up for the limitations in the 
ahistorical and unrealistic neo-classical approach. It reflects historical processes and 
the emergence of different types of migration, colonialism, multinational firms, 
interpenetrating structures of capital investment practices in post-colonial countries 
and external constrains (e. g. immigration policies and laws) on the movement of 
people. This approach provides a convincing account of tendencies in the current era 
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of globalisation, such as global inequalities, the international division of labour and 
the disadvantageous status of migrant workers in the host country. 
The structural approach can be a useful tool to analyse changing divisions of 
labour at the local and global levels and the relationship between changes in the 
location of production and the emergence of selective gendered migration. Sassen 
(1988) provides a significant example of the relationship between the 
industrialisation process in the Third World and female migration. Through 
investment practices of multinational firms in export processing zones (EPZs) in 
Southeast Asia and Mexico, she argues, young female labour is incorporated into 
world-market factories. The integration of women into employment in the 
multinational firms induces more women to migrate toward cities and other countries 
and results in the feminisation of migration. It also emphasises the gender-specific 
nature of low-wage labour - especially in developing countries - which is closely 
related with the decisions of multinational firms to relocate production lines (Chant 
and Radcliffe, 1992). On the whole, this approach highlights the fact that women as 
well as men migrate to sell their labour in the host country. As Phizacklea (1999) 
points out, the structuralist model can provide an account that recognises migrant 
women as individual and collective agents who are also subject to external 
constraints. 
The structural approach is nevertheless criticised for `its mechanistic, 
capital-logic approach to global migratory process' (Phizacklea, 1998: 26). Whereas 
the neo-classical approach is blamed for its voluntaristic account, the structural 
approach is overly economically determinist neglecting the role of human agency. 
Without an analytical mechanism for individual migrants, the structural approach 
does not explain why some people migrate while others do not. Also, while some 
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have seen its potential for explaining the migration of women in the constantly 
evolving transformation of production relations, relations of reproduction in which 
women are largely involved are marginal within this approach (Chant and Radcliffe, 
1992). More and more women are integrated into labour migration, which is closely 
related with paid reproductive work, such as domestic service and sex/entertainment 
work. The engagement of migrant women in paid reproductive work is one of the 
significant features in the process of international migration. For example, the 
increasing tendency towards the commercialisation of care work carried out by 
women migrant workers has formed `global care chains' that have reinforced the 
inequality of social reproduction between rich and poor countries as well as the 
international sexual division of labour. In order to provide a complete picture of the 
process of international migration, which is dynamic and constantly evolving, it is 
crucial to embrace a further dimension of reproductive work alongside the 
organisation of production. 
III. The Integrated Approach 
New conceptualisations of migration emerged in the late 1980s, which considered 
migration as a system evolving from linkages between sending and receiving 
countries. Challenging the orthodox frameworks of agency and structure, researchers 
have increasingly called for an integrated approach, which is capable of explaining 
migration at both the micro and macro levels. This integrative conceptualisation 
attempts to articulate between different levels of migration analysis by stressing 
social networks (Boyd, 1989; Fawcett, 1989) and a migration systems paradigm 
(Fawcett and Arnold; 1987). 
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The Social Networks and Migration Systems Perspectives 
Boyd (1989) argues that studying networks allows for an understanding of migration 
as a social product. In other words, international migration is not either a mere result 
of rational decisions made by individual actors or a mere result of economic or 
political parameters, but rather an outcome of all these factors in interaction. As a 
starting point for the social networks perspective, Boyd (1989: 645) notes that 
`structural factors provide the context within which migration decisions are made by 
individuals or groups. However, at this micro-level analysis, the decision to migrate 
is influenced by the existence and participation in social networks, which connect 
people across space. ' Social networks based on interpersonal ties of family, kinship 
and community connect former migrants, migrants and non-migrants in sending and 
receiving countries across time. 
Taking the household as a means of `bridging the gap between social and 
individual levels of analysis', Boyd (1989) highlights that families and households 
are the basic units of analysis in the social networks perspective. Migration provides 
an important strategy for the survival of families, by generating income in the form 
of remittances to ensure its maintenance and reproduction. Functioning as the 
connection between the macro- and micro-levels, the household is one of the 
intermediate objects of analysis in a social networks perspective. 
Migrant networks, which develop from social networks, increase the 
likelihood of international movement as they provide information and resources, 
thereby reducing the costs and risks of movement. As migrant networks expand and 
the costs and risks of migration fall, the flow becomes less selective in socio- 
economic terms and more representative of the sending community or society 
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(Massey et al., 1993). Massey (1990: 8) argues that `once the number of network 
connections in an origin area reaches a critical level, migration becomes self- 
perpetuating because migration itself creates the social structure to sustain it. ' 
Apart from households, kinship and local community ties, there is another 
significant object of analysis in a social networks perspective: intermediary networks 
which are comprised of private and state employment agencies, brokers and 
voluntary humanitarian organisations. Once international migration to certain core 
countries has increased, receiving countries tend to raise the entry barriers to control 
the flow. Strict immigration control then creates a lucrative economic niche for 
entrepreneurs and organisations who provide a range of legal or illicit services to 
migrants for their own profits (Massey et al., 1993). This yields an underground 
market in international migration: smuggling across borders; counterfeit documents, 
passports and entry visas; recruitment of workers with unreasonable fees; brokering 
fake marriage between migrants and citizens of the destination country; and other 
clandestine services needed for migrants in the country of destination. At the same 
time, voluntary humanitarian organisations are formed in order to help migrants, who 
are easily manipulated and victimised by these clandestine practices in the 
underground market. 
As a step toward a broad-based theoretical development of migration study, 
Fawcett and Arnold (1987) introduce a migration systems paradigm which views 
international migration as a unified social process and understands that individual 
decisions and actions are conditioned by structural forces at each stage of migration. 
Based on three conceptual categories - state-to-state relations and comparisons, mass 
culture connections, and social networks -a migration systems paradigm attempts to 
understand the dynamic process of international migration through the use of both 
30 
micro- and macro-data. It highlights the diverse linkages between places - which are 
not only flows and counter-flows of people, but also transactions involving 
information, goods, services and ideas obtained via mass media and 
telecommunications - and the interplay between the macro-level structural factors 
and personal/intermediary networks at the micro-level. 
Evaluation 
The social networks and migration systems perspectives emphasise the importance of 
taking account of social as well as political and economic linkages at the micro- and 
macro levels. Understanding international migration through an integrated approach 
provides for more comprehensive analytical frameworks. Its emphasis on 
intermediary institutions - such as recruiters, brokers and humanitarian organisations 
- as well as social networks provides for a more detailed and satisfactory explanation 
of the process of migration. According to a study of social networks among Filipino 
migrant workers in one of industrial complexes in the suburbs of Seoul in Korea 
(Park et al., 1999), 48.7% of workers were strongly influenced and helped by 
friends to come to Korea for employment and 51.3 % of workers came to Korea 
through public and private recruitment agencies. On the whole, over 80% of workers 
have already had either friends or family or acquaintances working in Korea. This 
study shows that by means of social networks workers cover costs and gain access to 
information in a migration setting in Korea. It also highlights the gradual expansion 
7 This study focuses on Filipino migrant workers in the Masuk industrial complex located in a suburb 
of Seoul in which a large number of furniture making sweatshops are concentrated. Along with 
workers from Bangladesh, Filipino workers are a majority of workers living and working in the area 
and most of them are undocumented. Workers in the Masuk industrial complex build up a large Filipino community revolving around the local Christian church. 
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of social networks among Filipino workers and active roles of recruitment agencies 
or brokers in contributing to the continual flow of new and return workers from the 
Philippines into Korea. 
Despite the useful account provided by the integrated approach, it should be 
cautiously combined with a gender sensitive perspective. In particular, the household 
as a basic unit of the social networks analysis does not always make collective 
decisions. In her in-depth study of Mexican migration, Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994: 95) 
argues that household members have competing interests and agendas, and the 
`household cannot think, decide, or plan, but certain people in households do engage 
in these activities'. Her study shows that men who migrated to the U. S. - leaving 
their wives and children - decided autonomously, often without considering the 
opinions of other family members. Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994: 96) also points out that 
traditional gender relations in the migration networks, which have facilitated men's 
and constrained women's migration, are changing. Through migration, social and 
cultural expectations of gender relations have been reformulated and women have 
paved the way for their own migration system and networks of support. Accordingly, 
understanding patterns of migration requires attention to the power relations of 
gender in social networks and in households. 
Also, the social networks perspective is rather one dimensional. It tends to be 
limited in providing an adequate analytical framework for reconciling micro and 
macro perspectives. The analytical concept of `linkages' developed by the social 
network perspective does not fully explain the complex and dynamic nature of 
agency and structural factors within the migration system. While there are evident 
structural determinations, a potential migrant could act strategically to further her/his 
interests by taking advantage of available resources within the increasingly 
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institutionalised migration system. Importantly, an understanding of the articulation 
between structure and agency is needed in the analysis of the process of international 
migration. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, Goss and Lindquist (1995) 
suggest an integrated concept called, the `migrant institution', which articulates 
between various levels of analysis, and therefore goes beyond the analysis of the 
social networks perspective. As we will see later, the notion of migrant institutions is 
highly relevant in the case of international migration in Asia where the process of 
migration has been largely institutionalised. 
IV. Migration Theory with a Gender Sensitive Approach 
Gender as a Central Concept ofAnalysis 
Noting the absence of women in the study of international migration, some of the 
recent literature has acknowledged the different migration experiences between 
women and men. During the 1980s and the 1990s, some researchers in Europe and 
North America began to focus on migrant women. This shift was informed by the 
emphasis on gender equality in the women's movement and by changes of the 
international mobility of labour with growing female labour force participation 
(Boyd, 1989; Lim, 1995; Morokvasic, 1984, Pedraza, 1991; Phizacklea, 1983; Seller, 
1994; Simon and Brettell, 1986; Tienda and Booth, 1991). These studies emphasise 
that woman is a valid analytical category in international migration and reject the 
conventional stereotypical treatment of women as `passive dependents', notably the 
emphasis placed on their roles as wives and mothers. They make women visible in 
the context of international migration and provide rich empirical studies of women as 
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individual migrants and their diverse experiences in the migration process. 
It is nevertheless argued that migration studies still remain predominantly 
gender insensitive as migration research adds sex as a variable in analyses without 
reassessing the conceptual framework in a gendered way. The tendency within the 
study of migration has been merely to `add women, mix and stir' within orthodox 
theoretical frameworks (Grieco and Boyd, 2003; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994). It is 
essential that the term `gender' rather than `sex' should be used (Grieco and Boyd, 
2003; Pessar and Mahler, 2003). While `sex' is a simple biological dichotomous 
variable, which is invariant over time and space, `gender' is `the social and cultural 
ideals, practices and displays of masculinity and femininity' (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 
1994: 2) which construct roles, relations and hierarchy. In her study of Mexican 
migrant women in the U. S., Hondagneu-Sotelo locates gender at the centre of her 
analytical framework, rather than simply adding a gender variable to the 
conventional approach. She argues that: 
[t]his study begins with the premise that an appropriate research 
strategy required more than either examining men's gender in 
isolation or simply "adding" women to the picture. Gender is not 
simply a variable to be measured, but a set of social relations that 
organize immigration patterns. The task, then, is not simply to 
document or highlight the presence of undocumented women who 
have settled in the U. S., or to ask the same questions of immigrant 
women that are asked of immigrant men, but to begin with an 
examination of how gender relations facilitate or constrain both 
women's and men's immigration and settlement (Hongagneu- 
Sotelo, 1994: 3, emphasis in the original). 
Hondagneu-Sotelo shows that gender is exercised in relational and dynamic ways. 
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She illustrates how the social relations of gender influence the migration decisions, 
behaviours and experiences of both women and men. The emphasis on the social 
relations of gender leads us to ask how gender is implicated in the process and 
structures of migration. Gender-sensitive research goes further than simply 
explaining causes and trends of international migration. It should aim to show how 
ostensibly gender-neutral processes of movement are in fact gender specific, 
resulting in fundamental differences in the migration experiences of women and men. 
Gender-Specific Structure of International Migration 
Pessar and Mahler (2003) note that gender is a fluid - not fixed process - as one of 
ways humans create and perpetuate social differences. They assert that gender should 
also be understood as a structure that organises and signifies power at levels above 
the individual. Accordingly, gender is embedded in institutions and there are 
structural factors that condition gender relations. Pessar and Mahler (2003: 813) cite 
Glenn's argument: `major areas of life - including sexuality, family, education, 
economy and the state - are organised according to gender principles and shot 
through with conflicting interests and hierarchies of power and privilege' (Glenn, 
1999: 5, cited in Pessar and Mahler, 2003: 813). Arguing that gender relations are 
present in all types of institutions, including the market, the state, education, the 
family and even the street, Connell (1987) develops a concept of a `gender regime', 
referring to `the historically produced state of play in gender relations in a given 
institution'. A gender regime is an aggregate of practices, ideological and material 
that acts to construct images of masculinity and femininity in a given social context 
and to sustain forms of gender inequality. According to Connell, gender inequalities 
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persist through a complex of institutions, and it is important to show how gender is 
actually reproduced through the strategies and interactions of such institutions. 
Taking account of those arguments on gendered institutions and structures, 
many researchers show that there are fundamental differences in the migration of 
men and women (Lim, 1995; Simon and Brettell, 1986; Tienda and Booth, 1992) and 
the migration process is gendered and sex-selective (Morokvasic, 1983; Pedraza, 
1991). Gender differences arise from the subordinate status of women in familial, 
societal and cultural structures of both the sending and receiving countries. Grieco 
and Boyd (2003: 11) argue that `women's status acts as a "filter", gendering structural 
forces and influencing the migratory and settlement experiences of men and women 
differently'. The process of migration is certainly constrained by social structures 
both in the country of origin and destination. Gender as well as race, ethnicity, 
nationality and class determine people's ability and decision to move, their act of 
migration. Through their policies concerning emigration and immigration in 
particular, states are major actors in the international migration process. Even though 
immigration laws and regulations seem gender-neutral on the surface, value 
judgements based on stereotypical images of men and women and the traditional sex 
roles in societies are embedded in administration practices concerning the control of 
migration flows. Many scholars argue that the migration policies of many receiving 
countries implicitly assume a `dependent' status for women (Boyd, 1976,1986; Lim, 
1995). Migrant women are often classified by their relation to men, such as wives or 
daughters, regardless of their own independent status. Such policies and practices are 
based on the stereotypical idea that places women into the private sphere rather than 
the public sphere, thereby increasing the social vulnerability of migrant women. 
Some migrant women become economically dependent on their husbands or fathers 
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until a work permit is granted. If women decide to work without documents, they 
become dependent on their employers and their undocumented status in the labour 
market can make them more vulnerable to exploitation, low wages and poor working 
conditions. 
Patriarchal Gender Relations 
For a gender-sensitive study of international migration the question should be not 
`why women are excluded', but `to what extent the general institutional structure and 
the character of particular institutional areas have been formed by and through 
gender' (Acker, 1992, quoted in Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994: 3). It is therefore essential 
to examine in what way gender relations are constructed and exercised in different 
areas in society, such as the family, the labour market and the state. In particular, the 
pattern of the incorporation of migrant women into the labour market shows us how 
the economic structure consolidates gender relations in the labour market. Grieco and 
Boyd (2003: 23) argue that racial, nationality and gender stereotypes are prevalent in 
the labour receiving country and act as powerful allocative mechanisms in the labour 
market. Migrant women tend to be segregated into traditional `female' occupations, 
such as domestic/care work, service work or garment manufacturing (Morokvasic, 
1984; Pedraza, 1991). As Morokvasic (1984) asserts, migrant women become 
incorporated into `sexually segregated markets' at the lowest stratum in high 
technology industries in the receiving country, or in the `cheapest' sectors in those 
industries which are labour intensive and employ the cheapest labour to remain 
competitive. Accordingly, in the process of international migration the sexual 
division of labour becomes evident in the labour market. Nevertheless, the 
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concentration of migrant women in certain `female' occupations, which are mostly 
`unskilled' and low paid, cannot be explained by mere economic reasons, such as 
human capital deficiencies, cheap labour costs or increasing demands of labour. 
There are certainly sex roles and occupational stereotypes that segregate migrant 
women into certain occupations and industries in the labour market. Moser and 
Young (1981) note that women tend to be segregated into particular occupations, 
which are carefully delimited by an ideology linking their activity to gender and the 
vast majority of women work in occupations which have a structural resemblance to 
their family role in the household. 
Here, it is worth considering the concept of patriarchy, which has been a 
controversial subject of discussion within feminist literature. Literally, patriarchy 
means rule of the father and the term was originally used to describe social systems 
based on the authority of male heads of household. Since the early 20th century, 
feminist theorists have used the concept to refer to the social system of masculine 
domination over women in general. Attempts have been made to understand 
patriarchy from many different standpoints and here we will look at some of the 
more influential interventions since the 1970s. Rich (1980), for instance, understands 
patriarchy as male domination over women's sexuality and bodies. For her, sexual 
practice is socially constructed around male notions of desire - not women's - and 
heterosexuality is socially and politically institutionalised in contemporary society. In 
The Dialectic of Sex Firestone (1971) develops the idea that patriarchy and sex class 
are based on the reproductive capacities of women. She argues that women's 
oppression lies in their reproductive roles, such as pregnancy, childbirth and 
childcare, and these roles have been controlled by men. Focusing on the exploitation 
and the oppression of women derived from men's control over the productive and 
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reproductive activities, which take place within the domestic mode of production, 
Delphy (1984) argues that patriarchy and capitalism are independent forms having 
their own system of exploitation and social classes. Mitchell (1975) defines 
patriarchy in terms of ideology and a concept derived from psychoanalytic theory. 
She discusses gender in terms of the separation between the two systems in which 
the economic level is ordered by capitalist relations ('the economic mode of 
production') and the level of the unconscious, which is ordered by the law of 
patriarchy ('the ideological mode of reproduction'). On the other hand, Hartmann 
(1979) understands patriarchal relations operating at the level of the expropriation of 
women's labour by men, not at the level of ideology or the unconscious. Hartmann 
argues that women are exploited by men in the form of both housework and wage 
labour and these two forms of exploitation reinforce each other, locating women in a 
position of disadvantage within the family and the labour market. She supports her 
argument by providing historical examples of how women have been excluded from 
the better jobs by organised male workers with the support of the state. 
Among the various discussions of patriarchy, Eisenstein's analysis of 
capitalist and patriarchal relations is important work to note. Criticising biologically 
determinist, ahistorical and universal analyses of patriarchy by Firestone and 
Mitchell, Eisenstein (1979b) argues that forms of patriarchy vary between historical 
periods or societies. She argues that patriarchy precedes capitalism through the 
existence of the sexual ordering of society, which derives from ideological and 
political interpretations of biological difference, and that these social relations of 
reproduction are carried over from time to time. Eisenstein (1979a) explains that 
there is the dynamic of power involved in society that drives from both the class 
relations of production, in which exploitation occurs, and the patriarchal sexual 
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hierarchy, in which the oppression of women occurs. Emphasising the mutually 
dependent relations between patriarchy and capitalism, she states that: 
patriarchy (as male supremacy) provides the sexual hierarchical 
ordering of society for political control and as a political system 
cannot be reduced to its economic structure; while capitalism as an 
economic class system driven by the pursuit of profit feeds off the 
patriarchal ordering. Together they form the political economy of 
the society, not merely one or another, but a particular blend of the 
two (Eisenstein, 1979a: 28). 
Eisenstein argues that patriarchy and capitalism operate within the sexual division of 
labour and society, which has both a material form (sex roles) and ideological reality 
(the stereotypes, myths and ideas defining theses roles). For her, `the patriarchal 
system of control is necessary to the smooth functioning of the society and the 
economic system' (ibid. ). In other words, patriarchy and capitalism become `an 
integral process' for both economic profit and societal control, and capitalist and 
patriarchal relations form a mutually interdependent system of `capitalist patriarchy'. 
Eisenstein also examines the role of the state. Introducing the concept of `the 
capitalist patriarchal state', she argues that patriarchy operates at the state and society 
level as well as the family level. She explains that: 
the state represents and defines the real separation of public and 
private life in terms of the differentiation of women from man. 
Patriarchy thus transforms biological sex into politicised gender, 
giving men priority while making women "different" (i. e. unequal), 
or "less", or the "other". And it simultaneously establishes the 
sexual division of labour, the distinctness of family and market, 
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patriarchal controls within the market, and so forth. Although the 
specific historical source of patriarchal control has shifted from the 
"father" to the "husband" to the "state" (while remaining 
simultaneously rooted in each), the dynamic of sexual class - the 
process of hierarchically differentiating woman from man - ensures 
the continuity of patriarchy. We cannot understand patriarchy, 
therefore, by simply analysing domestic power structures (the 
dominance of a particular father or husband) or a static notion of 
biological power (strength, aggression) (Eisenstein, 1984: 330-331). 
Eisenstein's concept of `the capitalist patriarchal state' is closely related to current 
state policies towards women migrant workers. In particular, as we will see in 
Chapter 6, maintaining the patriarchal idea of reproductive work as women's 
personal responsibilities, the state responds to the function of reproduction and to the 
need for the maintenance of the household by importing migrant women rather than 
by providing proper state welfare provisions. In this regard, the state manipulates 
both local and migrant women to fulfil its own need for sustaining economic and 
social development. As women migrant workers now carry out the jobs traditionally 
occupied by local women, migration may simply transfer them from one form of 
patriarchy to another, leaving gender relations in the private and public spheres 
essentially unaltered. Through the feminisation of labour migration, the sexual 
division of labour has therefore been extended to the transnational level. 
On the other hand, Walby (1990) reformulates patriarchy in an attempt to 
overcome the earlier problems of reductionism, ahistoricism and universalism. 
Walby defines patriarchy as `a system of social structures and practices in which men 
dominate, oppress and exploit women'. She identified six structures of patriarchy: 
the mode of production in the household; paid work; the state; male violence; 
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sexuality; and culture. She argues that while these structures are relatively 
autonomous, they have causal effects upon each other and capture the depth and 
pervasiveness of gender inequalities. For Walby, patriarchy changes over time. She 
argues that in Britain during the 20th century patriarchy changed from the `private' 
form to the `public' form. Private patriarchy is based in the family and household 
involving individual men exploiting the labour of individual women. On the other 
hand, in public patriarchy women are not confined to the domestic sphere anymore, 
but engaged in the public sphere through paid work and political participation. 
According to Walby, patriarchy is not obsolete but still prevalent in society. It has 
only changed its form, rather than being restricted to the household. 
Regarding the issue of international migration, Walby's argument on `private 
to public patriarchy' highlights both historical and spatial factors. It integrates the 
influence of political, economic and cultural forces and, furthermore, understandings 
of patriarchal structures in local and global contexts (Youngs, 2000). As mentioned 
above, the system of patriarchy has been extended to the global level through 
gendered labour migration and increasing cross-border marriages in the Asian region. 
However, it is interesting to note that through the process of international migration, 
the public and private spheres operate across state boundaries and deviate from the 
conventionally constructed dichotomy of public and private spaces, which 
institutionalises social practices8. Women migrant workers play a crucial role in the 
public sphere in both the countries of destination and origin, by means of paid 
8 Youngs (2000) points out that there is little analysis of the changing power relationships between 
the public realm of the state and market and the private realm of the household/family. Besides, there 
is little attention paid to how conceptions of public and private spaces and the ways in which people 
occupy and act in them are being altered. In order to answer this question Youngs observes Filipina 
maids in Hong Kong. Through her study, she shows how the women migrant workers are 
renegotiating the boundaries of public/private and local/global in ways that reveal these supposed 
oppositions as complexly and contradictorily interconnected. 
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employment and sending remittances. At the same time, given the characteristics of 
their jobs such as domestic and caring work, the majority of these workers are often 
confined to the `private' sphere and become a largely invisible, hidden force in 
economy and society. 
It is therefore crucial to take account of a dynamic view of patriarchy that 
goes beyond the public and private dichotomy. Youngs (2000) argues that political 
economic space has been predominantly viewed through `the patriarchal prism'. 
According to Youngs (2000), `the patriarchal prism' through which political 
economy has traditionally been interpreted is based on the prioritisation of public 
sphere activities over the private realm on the basis of a power relationship between 
the two. She explains that gender critiques of public/private dynamics break apart 
this prism and provide access to an understanding of the world economy in both local 
and global terms. She emphasises the relevance of public/private questions for 
consideration of structure/agency interactions in an era of globalisation. 
Above all, it is crucial to avoid a universalising view of patriarchy and gender 
inequality. Patriarchal structures operate across public and private spheres with 
different histories and societies. Also, it is important to incorporate racialised social 
relations into the account of gender relations. From this point of view patriarchal 
gender relations are constructed simultaneously with hierarchies of class and 
racialised social relations. As Gardiner (1997: 126) argues, `patriarchy offers a 
historically grounded rather than universal explanation of male dominance' and 
feminists should avoid using patriarchy as a universal explanation for gender 
inequality. This is because `gender relations are constituted by a shifting matrix of 
elements including race, class, sexuality, fertility and care of dependants, all of which 
operate with degrees of autonomy and linkage' (Gardiner, 1997: 126). 
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Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994: 3) describes patriarchy as `a fluid and shifting set 
of social relations' and women not only collaborate but also resist the patriarchal 
gender relations in diverse ways. Here, Kandiyoti's notion of the `patriarchal 
bargaining' is a useful intervention (Kandiyoti, 1988). The patriarchal bargain 
indicates the existence of set rules regulating gender relations, to which genders 
accommodate and comply, but which are at the same time contested, redefined and 
renegotiated. Kandiyoti (1988: 274) argues that `different forms of patriarchy present 
women with distinct "rules of the game" and call for different strategies to maximise 
security and optimise life options with varying potential for active or passive 
resistance in the face of oppression'. In this sense, patriarchal gender relations are 
fluid and negotiable and can be seen as the production of both imposition and 
struggle (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). The notion of patriarchal bargaining can 
be applied to understanding the different strategies of individual women and coping 
mechanisms used by women in different historical, social and cultural contexts to 
defend their subordinate positions. As we will see in Chapter 4, women's decisions 
on migration can be understood as patriarchal bargaining to cope with economic, 
social or cultural problems at home, such as poverty, unemployment or social 
pressures of marriage. 
Bringing the `Woman as an Agency' Perspective into the Analysis 
Clearly, women have often appeared as vulnerable and invisible subjects in the 
process of international migration. Female migrants are subject to problems caused 
by factors related to their sex and gender in the patriarchal social relations. Moreover, 
women from the Third World migrating to developed countries for work are often 
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represented by a stereotypical image of sacrifice, suffering and isolated victims. It is 
however crucial to avoid `abstract structuralism' - i. e. the tendency to lose agency in 
social and historical processes - in the analysis of migrant women. Apart from the 
mere `victim' approach, it is important to direct our attention to women's agency and 
empowerment, by questioning how migrant women make strategic choices when 
taking a decision on migration and when organising collective power that enable 
them to redress exploitation and inequality (Piper, 2000; Tacoli, 1999). In the 
conference on `Gender, Migration and Governance in Asia', Molina (2002) points 
out that there has been a shift of paradigm in the political economy of migrant 
women. 
A paradigm shift of migrants invokes the recognition of the 
paramount characteristics of migrant as resilient and struggling 
women and workers with huge political and economic potentials. 
Moreover, it is also equally important to recognise that in addition 
to the economic benefits, migration has also provided a process for 
women migrants towards self-determination and self-worth along 
the lines of class and gender (cited in the report on `Gender, 
Migration and Governance in Asia' conference, 2002). 
It is important to balance two contrasting views in the victim/agency divide in 
this discussion - one emphasising the `victimisation' of women workers and the 
other the `agency' of individual migrant women. Piper (2003: 28) states that the 
association of the migration of women with exploitation and the presentation of 
migrant women as victims often lead to a strong policy orientation towards various 
forms of protection of female migrant workers. She argues that although women 
should be promoted as individual and collective agents, those policymakers' ideas of 
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`protection' might not address migrant women's need for empowerment. Piper and 
Roces (2003) also emphasise that it is necessary to contextualise the experiences of 
migrant women to show to what extent they are victims and agents. Piper and Roces 
(2003: 9-10) subscribe to the following description of various levels and extents of 
agency. 
The notion of agency attributes to the individual actor the capacity 
to process social experience and to devise ways of coping with life, 
even under the most extreme forms of coercion. Within the limits 
of information, uncertainty and other constraints that exist, social 
actors are `knowledgeable' and `capable' (Long, 1992, cited in 
Moser and Clark, 2001: 4). 
According to Piper and Roces (2003), differences in determining agency and 
identity are related to the importance of place and location in the constitution of 
multiple realities. Taking the example of increasing numbers of migrant women 
working as entertainers and sex workers, especially in Asia, those women are often 
undocumented migrants and the nature of their occupation is socially stigmatised by 
the highly patriarchal and Confucian value systems that are prevalent in Asia. They 
work in isolation with little or no protection from government authorities and very 
often become victims of violence and poverty. Nevertheless, it is necessary to pay 
attention to the cases in which some women entertainers and sex workers `choose' 
their jobs for their own economic survival strategy. With a low level of education or 
skill and given their own country's economic stagnation, some women choose this 
type of job from the very few `options' available for them. Therefore, rather than 
perceiving those workers as mere passive `victims', governments and civil society 
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groups need to consider the specific social and personal contexts in which some 
women decide to migrate for those jobs9. It is after all necessary to avoid 
generalising migrant women as victims on the basis of the universal and simplistic 
assumptions that ignore the social and personal context in which women act in their 
own interests. 
Questioning a simplistic picture of migrant women confined to 
`institutionalised forms of dependency', Phizacklea (1998: 34-35) discusses the 
possibilities for transformative politics and for organisation and coalition-building 
across hierarchies of class, ethnicity and gender. She cites an example of an 
organisation called KALAYAAN, which represents a coalition of migrant and 
immigration groups, trade unions, lawyers and individuals, which led to a successful 
campaign to reform the immigration law governing for migrant domestic workers in 
Britain10. This example shows that the social networks of migrant workers could 
provide workers with more than a simple support group, which was set up with a 
social function. Phizacklea shows how KALAYAAN served as an organisation that 
was able to transform the roles of migrants, through networking and coalition- 
building intended to take on political campaigns. Despite unequally distributed 
knowledge and power, and structural constraints, migrant workers acted as collective 
agents showing that `the powerless have the capacity to mobilise resources and 
secure `spaces' of control"' (Phizacklea, 1998: 27) in a migration setting. 
9 For further discussions on policies and training implications regarding the issue, see the report on 
the `Gender, Migration and Governance in Asia' conference (ANU, 5-6 December 2002). 
(http: //apmrn. anu. edu. au/publications/fulldocwp 13. htm) 
10 For detailed information and discussions, see Anderson (1993). 11 In her discussion, Phizacklea embraces Giddens' structuration thesis which attempts to move away 
from a rigid agency and structure division, by viewing structure as a set of rules and resources integral 
to the conduct of individual and collective actors (1998: 26-27). Giddens' theory of structuration will 
be examined in detail in Chapter 4. 
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Conclusion: Unpacking the Gendered Process of International Migration 
The theoretical approach of this study is based on the following observation: `there is 
no such thing as a general theory of migration' (Arango, 2000: 283). International 
migration is too complex and multifaceted to be explained by a single overarching 
theory. As Arango observes, theorising international migration takes `the form of a 
string of separate, generally unconnected theories, models or frameworks, rather than 
a cumulative sequence of contributions that build upon previous blocks' (ibid. ). The 
focus of existing theories has primarily been on understanding the causes of 
international migration by explaining why people move or what determines the 
volume of migration from one country to another. However, the migratory process 
does not end when people take a decision to move based on `push' factors and when 
they successfully arrive at the destination country. Rather, the process continues with 
the employment of migrants in the labour market, the settlement of migrants and 
consequential societal transformations in the country of destination and, furthermore, 
with the emerging process of transnationalisation and its economic, political and 
social implications for the country of origin. Theorising the multiform process of 
international migration, which takes place with various interrelated variables, 
therefore, requires multidisciplinary and multidimensional approaches. As Fielding 
aptly asserts, `perhaps migration is another "chaotic concept", one that needs to be 
"unpacked" so that each part can be seen in its proper historical and social context so 
that its significance in each context can be separately understood' (Fielding, 1983: 3, 
cited in Arango, 2000: 295). Focusing on the empirical research of the migration of 
women to Korea, this study therefore attempts to `unpack' the process of 
international migration within historical, social and political contexts of Korea and to 
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scrutinise each process with a better integration of theoretical analyses through a 
critical gendered lens 12. 
In this study, the process of international migration is unpacked into the three 
different migratory stages: the migration decision and entry to the destination; modes 
of employment; and residence/settlement in Korean society. While multiple - 
economic, social, political and cultural - dimensions of the process of migration are 
taken into account throughout the study, a different analytic framework needs to be 
adopted for an adequate explanation of each migratory stage. 
First, the importance of the link between structure and agency is considered 
in the analysis of the migration decision and admission to the country of destination 
(Chapter 4). As an explanatory framework for this migratory stage, the concept of the 
migrant institution, which was developed by Goss and Lindquist (1995) in the 
context of the structuration theory, is examined. Understanding the concept of the 
migrant institution within the structuration perspective provides an analytical 
framework for articulating between structure and agency in the process of 
international migration. The crucial role played by states in the process of 
international migration should not be underestimated. As Arango (2000: 293) 
observes, `any theory built primarily with economic materials is bound to be in 
trouble in an international migration scene in which political considerations and the 
state intervenes so prominently'. The state strategically imposes strict rules and 
regulations, thereby increasing structural constraints in the process of international 
migration. Structural constraints then give rise to other actors in the migration 
institution, who provide alternative migrant channels to potential migrants. Despite 
evident structural determinations, a potential migrant acts strategically to further her 
12 Feminist epistemological issues relating to the empirical research will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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interests by exploiting available resources within the increasingly institutionalised 
migration system. 
Second, the conceptual point of entry into the analysis of modes of 
employment of migrant workers in Korea is the systematic link between international 
migration and changing divisions of labour (Chapters 5 and 6). A critical examination 
of the theory of New International Division of Labour (Ernst, 1980; Fröbel et al., 
1980) leads to the conceptualisation of the notion of the transnational division of 
labour (Cohen, 2006), which embraces changing aspects of divisions of labour in 
developed as well as developing countries and, more importantly, patterns of 
international migration. In particular, the notion of the transnational division of 
labour provides an important tool to understand the changing position of the Korean 
economy in the global market and how the country has become reliant on the supply 
of migrant workers from developing countries. The concept of the transnational 
division of labour also offers a valuable account of the `feminisation' of the labour 
force at local and global levels, which can be extended into the notion of the 
transnational sexual division of labour facilitated by the international migration of 
women workers. Moreover, the process of international migration has not only 
reconfigured the transnational division of labour, but also deepened the gendered and 
racialised division of labour within the labour market. Just as the state controls the 
inflow of migrants, the labour market for unskilled migrant workers is strictly 
regulated by the state. The analysis of changing divisions of labour in Korea gives a 
comprehensive account of how social, political, cultural and institutional processes 
are intertwined in the context of production and social reproduction. While the 
analytic framework for this migratory stage is primarily based on the structural 
account of international migration, the empirical data shows how women migrant 
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workers strategically opt for employment suitable to them within this structural 
context. 
Third, the migratory stage of the residence and settlement of migrants in the 
country of destination is completely omitted in the existing theories of migration. 
Regardless of the type of migration - whether it is labour, asylum or marriage 
migration - the social and political relations of migrants to the host society are one of 
the significant aspects of the migratory process. As mentioned above, the central aim 
of this study is to avoid the simple addition of `gender' in the analysis of the 
experiences of migrant women. The experience of the residence and settlement of 
migrant women in Korean society can be sufficiently explained not simply by 
arguing the gendered structure of society, but also by considering social and political 
relations in the aspects of race, ethnicity and class. Therefore, a feminist integrative 
framework (Acker, 2006; Brewer, 1993; Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1989; Glenn, 
1992; King, 1988) is adopted to analyse how gender, race and class are socially 
constructed factors in the interlocking system of multiple discriminations 
experienced by migrant women. Following Fielding's argument above in favour of 
unpacking each migratory process `in its proper historical and social context', the 
integrated framework for the discussion of gender, race and class is applied to the 
analysis of the racialisation of migrant workers in the specific context of Korea. As 
the empirical data will show in Chapter 7, interconnections of racialisation, 
nationalism, class and gender have significant implications for the social structural 
division in terms of citizenship rights of women (im)migrants in Korea. 
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Chapter 2 
Migration Transition: The Case of Korea 
Introduction 
This chapter serves to provide the background to the site of this research. It explores 
how Korea, once a labour sending country, transformed into one of the main labour 
receiving countries in Asia. Until the mid-1980s Korea was one of the major labour 
sending countries in Asia. During the Japanese Colonisation (1910-1945), over four 
million Koreans were voluntarily and involuntarily moved to China, Manchuria, 
Central Asia and Japan. During the period between the 1960s and the 1980s nearly 
two million Korean workers were sent to Europe and the Middle East. Since the 
1990s, however, Korea has become a prime destination for migrant workers from 
developing countries in the region. As the beginning of major inflows of migrant 
workers into Korea coincided with Korea's growth into one of the newly 
industrialising countries (NICs) in Asia, it is easily assumed that the dominant factor 
in the migration transition of Korea is the country's rapid economic development. 
Nevertheless, as this chapter will show, economic development is just one of the 
multiple interlocking factors that has brought on the influx of migrant workers to 
Korea. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. First, it starts by examining 
the historical background to the emigration of Korean workers during the period 
between the 1910s and the 1980s. This historical overview of the earlier emigration 
of Korean workers is particularly important for an understanding of the current 
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demographic composition of migrant workers in Korea. More than one third of 
migrant workers in Korea are ethnic Koreans who are descended from those who left 
the Korean peninsular and established settlements in the north-eastern provinces of 
China, Manchuria, Siberia, Sakhalin and Central Asia from the 1860s to the 1940s. 
Of the ethnic Korean migrants flowing back into Korea, most are from China, but 
there are also ethnic Koreans coming from Russia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 
The second section examines three interlocking factors that have led to the 
influx of migrant workers to Korea. Firstly, it presents a historical overview of the 
process of Korea's economic development, which was managed by the state. This 
section examines the state-led economic development during the period between the 
1960s and the 1980s and the more recent policy of economic liberalisation in the 
1990s, which intensified the globalisation of capital movement and the relocation of 
large Korean firms to developing countries in Asia. It also looks at the changes of the 
Korean labour market that subsequently increased demand for migrant labour. 
Secondly, it examines how Korea's international relations in the post-Cold War era 
have affected its liberalisation of economic and diplomatic policies, which have led a 
significant impact on the flow of migrant workers to the country. Considering the 
political aspect is particularly crucial in the case of Korea. Due to its specific geo- 
political position during the Cold War, Korea's economic behaviour had been 
predominantly determined by the national-security related concern to maintain 
relations with North Korea and the global powers: China, Japan, Russia and the 
United States. As the conflict-ridden Cold War ended at the beginning of the 1990s, 
the geopolitical situation changed and brought significant economic and social 
changes in the Asian region. Finally, this section looks at cultural and social factors 
that have affected the increased movement of people from certain Asian countries to 
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Korea. It identifies the material, cultural and social linkages that brought large 
numbers of migrant workers into Korea. 
1. Historical Background of Emigration of Korean Workers 
Emigration to Manchuria and Japan (the 1910s -1940s) 
Since the year of 1910 when Korea was annexed to Japan, Korea had been under 
Japanese colonial rule for 35 years. The movement of Korean workers to Manchuria 
and Japan during this period was a principal component of the economic and military 
expansion of the Japanese empire. In 1911 the emigration of Korean workers to 
Manchuria and Japan started to take place on a large scale. In the 1910s and the 
1920s Manchuria was the favoured destination of Korean migrants. Farmers and 
labourers crossed the Yalu and Turnen rivers and left for Manchuria (some moved 
even further up and settled in Siberia) to escape from famine and poverty. Migrants 
to Manchuria came mainly from northern rural areas - Hamkyeong and Pyeongan 
provinces - and moved with their family members. However, by the late 1920s 
migration slowed down as the Chinese government and the Manchurian Chinese 
regarded Korean migrants as the `civilian front' carrying out the colonial economic 
policy of the Japanese Army (S-W. Park, 1999). Under these political circumstances, 
Korean migrants in China and Manchuria became disadvantaged in education, 
residence, tenant farming and community activities. During this period, Korean 
workers also started to move to Japan. Rather than push factors in Korea, pull factors 
in Japan had a great influence on the movement of Korean workers to Japan. The 
Japanese munitions industry that was stimulated by the First World War boom faced 
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a shortage of manual labour and Korean migrant workers started to fill this gap. In 
1922 Japan introduced the `Free Passage' system for Koreans in order to obtain 
cheap labour to overcome the post-war economic recession. Unlike family migration 
to Manchuria, which mostly came from the northern provinces of Korea, migrants to 
Japan were predominantly individual male workers and over 85% of these workers 
were from southern rural areas - Cheolla and Kyeongsang provinces. Those migrants 
were temporary manual labourers who spent only one or two years in Japan before 
returning to Korea. 
In the 1930s and the early 1940s when Japanese military expansion in the 
Pacific Asia region accelerated, the movement of Koreans extended to all of the 
Japanese wartime empire. A year after the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the Japanese 
Kwangtung Army established the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo. In 1937 
Japan declared war on China, before overstretching its power by declaring war on the 
United States. During this period, nearly 2.6 million workers voluntarily migrated to 
Manchuria and Japan in search of higher wages (S-W. Park, 1999). Higher wages and 
better employment opportunities in the booming Japanese wartime industrial 
economy attracted a great number of Korean migrant workers. Japan also needed 
these cheap colonial workers to make up for a shortage of labour in the domestic 
labour market, after a large number of Japanese workers were mobilised for warfare. 
These migrant workers were given lower-end manual jobs in day labour, construction, 
mining and the metalworking industry. They were strictly regimented by Chinese and 
Japanese colonial authorities. On the other hand, another 1.5 million Koreans were 
conscripted and mobilised to serve as industrial labour and civilian personnel in the 
Japanese military during the late 1930s and the early 1940s (S-W. Park, 1999; Shin, 
1998). A great number of women in Korea and other colonies were mobilised for so- 
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called `military comfort women' who were forced into sex slavery by the Japanese 
Imperial Army. These were young women aged between 17 and 20 and were sent to 
the frontlines in Manchuria, Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia. 
S-W. Park (1999) argues that this massive migration of Korean workers 
during the 1910s and the 1940s was a result of the yen-bloc labour market formed in 
the Japanese wartime empire. 
The economic autarchy of the yen bloc created a new demand for 
labour by integrating all the peripheral colonial labour markets. 
Japan's military security policy resulted in endless military and 
colonisation campaigns in East Asia, beginning with Taiwan 
(1895), and continuing with Korea (1910), Manchuria (1931), and 
finally deep into China (1937) until it overstretched itself in the 
self-destructive Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (1941). 
Japan was not unmindful of the economic potential of these regions, 
but its primary reason for acquiring them was assumed strategic 
necessity (S-W. Park, 1999: 20). 
By 1945 there were roughly four million Koreans - accounting for 16% of the total 
Korean population - residing in Japan, Manchuria, China and the Soviet Union. After 
Korea restored its independence from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, only half of 
those migrants returned to Korea. Those who remained in Japan and China account 
for the majority of today's overseas Koreans. The Korean diaspora in this period was 
an involuntary consequence of the history of modem Korea. 
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Emigration to West Germany (the 1960s - early 1970s) 
The 1960s was the important turning point of international migration of Koreans as 
voluntary migration for overseas employment began. In 1962 West Germany agreed 
on providing industrial technology for Korea. For the Korean government advancing 
the coal mining industry was one of the crucial components of its industrialisation 
strategy. Accordingly, in 1963 247 Korean miners arrived at West Germany for three- 
year contract labour and during the next 15 years 8,395 Koreans migrated to West 
Germany to work as miners (see Table 2.1). After a formal agreement between the 
West German and Korean governments, in 1965 Korean nurses began to migrate to 
West Germany. As Table 2.1 illustrates, by 1977 10,371 Korean nurses had migrated 
to West Germany by which point they outnumbered miners. 
Table 2.1: The number of Korean Miners and Nurses Migrated to West 
Germany, 1963-1977 
Year Miners Nurses Total 
1963 247 - 247 
1964 806 - 806 
1965 1,180 18 1,198 
1966 286 1,227 1,513 
1967 7 421 428 
1968 3 91 94 
1969 10 837 847 
1970 1,305 1,717 3,022 
1971 982 1,363 2,821 
1972 71 1,449 1,728 
1973 842 1,182 2,176 
1974 1,088 1,206 2,386 
1975 459 3 924 
1976 314 62 752 
1977 795 795 1,590 
Total 8,395 10,371 20,532 
Source: K. U Lee, 2000: 91 
While miners tended to concentrate in the south and the west, such as 
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Duisburg, Frankfurt and München, most of the nurses were working in the north, 
such as Hamburg and Berlin. When the three-year contract terminated, only 40% of 
the miners returned to Korea, while 40% of them remained and settled in West 
Germany. The remaining 20% of miners migrated to other countries, mainly to the 
United States. On the other hand, as friendly and hard working Korean nurses had 
established a positive reputation in West Germany, they tended to extend their 
contracts at the request of their employers. At the end of the contract, a large number 
of nurses tended to remain in West Germany, as there was a large wage gap between 
the Korean and German labour market. Moreover, when they returned to Korea their 
nursing careers in West Germany were not acknowledged by Korean hospitals (K. CG 
Lee, 2000). Many of the Korean nurses married Korean miners and settled in West 
Germany permanently and these nurses and miners have formed the largest overseas 
Korean community in Europe until the present. 
Emigration to the Middle East (the mid-1970s -1980s) 
The number of Korean workers migrating for overseas temporary employment 
increased dramatically during the oil boom of the mid-1970s. The oil price increases 
in 1973 led to a massive investment programme by Middle Eastern oil exporting 
countries. This required a large number of foreign workers, notably to meet the 
demand for workers in the expanding construction industry. In 1975 there were 
nearly 1.7 million foreign workers in the major oil producing countries (Hyun, 1989). 
Until 1975 the main source of overseas labour had been the neighbouring Arab 
countries. However, between 1975 and 1979 there was a rapid increase in the 
temporary migration of South Asian workers, mainly from Pakistan and India 
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(Amjad, 1989). During this period, the number of workers from the Philippines, 
Thailand and Korea also began to increase. Korean emigration for temporary 
employment was concentrated in the Middle Eastern construction industry. A large 
proportion of Korean workers migrated to Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwait 
13. Korea 
was one of significant suppliers of labour for the Middle East. Unlike migrant 
workers from South Asia, Korean workers were regular employees of Korean firms 
that had contracts in the Middle East (Amjad, 1989). 
The most distinctive feature of Korean emigration to the Middle East was that 
it took place within an organisational setting (Hyun, 1989). The majority of Korean 
workers migrated without accompanying their families and were employed directly 
by Korean construction firms with branches in the Middle East. All workers were 
housed in a work camp, which was a self-sufficient housing unit and an enclave 
community in which everything was supplied by their Korean companies. While 
workers worked within a familiar environment, they were almost entirely isolated 
from the host society. The work camp was an attractive scheme, not only to the host 
countries - who did not want their cultural identity to be affected by contact with 
non-Arab/non-Muslim workers - but also to the Korean firms who benefited from 
the highly efficient control of labour. 
Korean emigration to the Middle East grew primarily in response to 
prospects for better economic opportunities. Average monthly earnings from 
employment in the Middle East were about twice as high as the earnings of 
construction workers in Korea at that time. The economic benefits of migration on 
the migrant family's household were substantial. Remittances from abroad also had a 
positive effect on the Korean economy, which had suffered from a chronic balance of 
13 In 1982,71% of the total migrant workers in the region worked in Saudi Arabia (Hyun, 1989). 
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payments deficits. The voluntary, temporary and organised migration to the Middle 
East resulted in a substantial flow of remittances from Korean migrant workers and 
Korea experienced the first ever current account surplus in 197714. Hyun (1989: 151) 
points out four main features that affected the high rates of remittance flows from 
Korean migrant workers in the Middle East: (1) remittances from the individual 
workers without accompanying families; (2) the temporary nature of Korean labour 
migration, where the main motive was the accumulation of savings for the future; (3) 
the lower living costs in work camps15; and (4) the Korean government's stipulation 
that at least 80% of the earnings of migrant workers should be remitted through the 
Korean banking system. Korean contract labour migration to the Middle East 
reached a peak during the first half of the 1980s and then dropped in the second half 
of the decade. The number of Korean migrant workers began to decrease 
significantly from the mid-1980s. 
II. Globalisation and an Influx of Labour Migrants to Korea 
When the construction business in the Middle East slowed down in the mid-1980s, 
Korean labour migration to the region declined sharply and most Korean workers 
returned home. Conversely, from the late 1980s foreign workers began to enter 
Korea. A significant inflow of migrant workers, mostly from Asian countries, took 
place from the beginning of the 1990s. The number of migrant workers in Korea 
increased rapidly to over 100,000 in 1995,200,000 in 1996,400,000 in 2004 and 
over 500,000 in 2007. Korea was transformed from a major labour sending country 
14 Remittances from abroad increased from US$18.4 million in 1965 to US$1,077 million in 1986 and 
the average annual rate increase during this period was 21.4%. In 1982, foreign exchange earnings 
from remittances reached their highest level at US$1,939 million (Hyun, 1989). IS Return trip expenses and living costs in the destination country were paid by the employers. 
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into one of the main labour receiving countries in Asia. This section examines a 
number of factors - economic globalisation, Korea's international political and 
economic relations, and cultural/social linkages within the Asian region - that have 
led to the influx of migrant workers to Korea. 
Korea in the Midst of Economic Globalisation 
Rapid Economic Growth through the Export-oriented Industrialisation Strate g 
Since the 1960s, Korea's industrialisation has been carried out under an export- 
oriented industrialisation (EOI) policy based on strong government economic 
management. The export-promotion policy was an important shift in the country's 
development strategy from the import-substitution policy of the 1950s. Korea's EOI 
policy promoted labour-intensive industries, which in turn made use of a relatively 
cheap and abundant labour force. Successive shifts in the composition of exports 
have occurred since the beginning of the first five-year plan in 1962. Exports in the 
early 1960s were dominated by primary commodities - such as silk, tungsten and 
fish - as well as labour-intensive products - such as plywood, wigs and garments. 
The Korean economy successfully took off during the 1960s: its economic growth 
reached an annual rate of 7.8%, while annual exports grew to 41.7%. In the 1970s, as 
industrialisation proceeded, manufactured goods emerged as the dominant type of 
export commodity and the major exports shifted to textiles, ships and steel plates, 
which relied on capital as well as labour. The proportion of primary commodities fell 
from 80.1% in 1960 to less than 15% by 1975 (Song, 1997). 
The 1970s was the decade in which the Korean industrialisation accelerated, 
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with the development of heavy and chemical industries (HCIs), such as steel, 
petrochemical, shipbuilding, machinery and nonferrous metals. The HCI strategy was 
introduced in 1973 to address concerns regarding the transformation of industry from 
a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive structure. It also sought to reduce the 
mounting current account deficits caused by an ever-increasing import demand for 
industrial products. The development was initiated by the government and, in 
particular, by President Park Jung-Hee's ambitious commitment to heavy and 
chemical industries at the Blue House (the Presidential Office), without much 
consultation with other economic ministries. In the early 1970s, HCI was generally 
seen as premature for an economy with only a decade of growth based on light 
manufacturing and with few natural resources. Furthermore, the private sector was 
not capable of investing in heavy and chemical industries. The IMF and the 
Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) also strongly opposed HCI when the policy 
was first announced. However, despite the objections of domestic and international 
capitalists, it was pushed vigorously by Park's authoritarian government (E. M. Kim, 
1997). 
There were several international and domestic political and economic 
conditions that explain why, despite objections, the Park regime made this abrupt 
move into HCI. The international financial system became very unstable owing to 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971. As a consequence, the growth of 
economic nationalism was accompanied by increasing protectionism, and continuous 
dependence on labour-intensive export industries seemed less promising as domestic 
wages rose rapidly. The political conditions of the period were, nevertheless, more 
important than these economic factors. In the early 1970s, there were significant 
changes in East Asian geopolitics, as Nixon's visit to China and the thawing of the 
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Cold War brought uncertainty to the Korean peninsular. The Nixon Doctrine 
emphasised greater self-defence among US allies in Asia, and the Nixon 
administration began a partial withdrawal of US military forces from Korea in 1971. 
As a result, Park felt a great threat and was determined to strengthen Korea's military 
power. His decision to promote HCI was therefore influenced considerably by 
Korea's defence considerations, notably with respect to the North Korean rivalry. 
By the 1980s, export commodities had become even more capital-intensive. 
Korea's export structure reached a turning point when manufactured exports shifted 
decisively to skill-intensive products such as computers, semi-conductors, colour 
televisions and motorcars. During the period between 1986 and 1988, Korea 
experienced an unprecedented economic boom, achieving the first trade surplus. This 
was the result of favourable external conditions, the so-called `three lows': the low 
exchange value of the Korean currency (won) via-ä-vis the US dollar and Japanese 
yen; low international interest rates; and low oil prices. 
Korea's rapid economic growth through the EOI strategy was clearly 
associated with the rapid urbanisation and labour migration from rural areas to the 
major cities, which led to a massive growth of the manufacturing workforce. As a 
proportion of the total workforce, the manufacturing workforce peaked in the late 
1980s, while the agricultural workforce declined rapidly during the 1960s (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 shows that the unemployment rate declined remarkably to very low levels 
in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The high growth rate resulted in the creation of 
over ten million jobs and this was reflected not only in the overall increase in the 
workforce, but also the expanding economic participation of female workers (Kim, 
Bae and Lee, 2000). It is interesting to note that the decline of unemployment in the 
1980s coincided with the conspicuous decline of the number of Koreans working 
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overseas, mostly in the Middle East. The number of Korean migrant workers in the 
Middle East decreased by 80% between 1983 and 1990 - from 225,000 to 45,000 -, 
as a result of improved job opportunities and wages at home (Wilkinson, 1994). 
Table 2.2 Changes in Employment Structure and Unemployment in Korea, 
1963-1990 
1963 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988 1990 
Economically 
Active ('000 8,230 10,062 12,193 14,431 15,592 17,305 18,487 
persons) 
Unemployed 
(%) 8.2 4.5 4.1 5.2 4.0 2.5 2.4 
Agriculture, 
Forestry and 
Fishing (% of 63.1 50.5 45.9 34.0 24.9 20.7 18.3 
employed 
population) 
Mining and 
Manufacturing 
(%of 8.7 14.3 19.1 22.6 24.5 28.5 27.3 
employed 
population) 
Services and 
others (% of 28.2 35.2 35.0 43.4 50.6 50.8 54.4 
employed 
population) 
Sources: Economic Planning Board, Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey, 
various issues; Ministry of Labour, Republic of Korea, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1991 (Wilkinson, 
1994: 81). 
At the beginning of its industrialisation Korea was endowed with an almost 
unlimited labour supply and an absence of strong trade unions. The Korean trajectory 
for economic growth - which was shaped by a strong, comprehensive developmental 
state, a tight alliance between the state and large private enterprises called `chaebol', 
and the exclusion and repression of labour - worked well for several decades. The 
state formed a tight working partnership with the chaebol in pursuit of the common 
goal of economic development. In fact, the state and the chaebol were the two 
principal institutions of the industrialisation and economic development of Korea 
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during the 1960s and the 1970s. The chaebol played an increasingly greater role over 
time not only as the implementers of the government's industrial policies but also as 
entrepreneurs who took advantage of both political and market incentives (E. M. 
Kim, 1997). The chaebol in Korea have three main organisational features: (i) family 
ownership and management with a centralised and hierarchical system of control 
based on loyalty; (ii) flexibility in mobilising and in exchanging capital, technology 
and personnel among member companies; and (iii) horizontal diversification - the 
so-called `octopus style' of territorial expansion - in an unusually wide range of 
often unrelated business activities (E. M. Kim, 1997). Although a large number of 
independent small- and medium-sized enterprises flourished during the 1960s and 
contributed to EOI, the chaebol and their member firms began to dominate the 
domestic economy. Furthermore, the chaebol received a disproportionate amount of 
government support, such as low-interest-rate loans. As Amsden (1989) points out, 
unlike Japan or Taiwan, Korea's export was dominated by the chaebol and large 
businesses rather than by non-chaebol affiliated small- and medium-sized firms. 
During the 1960s, the Park regime sought to consolidate the relationship 
between the government and the chaebol. While the state and the chaebol formed a 
close working relationship, the state was the dominant member of this partnerships, 
remaining autonomous from the interests of the private sector and often exerting its 
influence in an authoritarian manner. The Park regime achieved a delicate balance in 
this relationship, in which each of the two partners was an autonomous member of a 
formalised and close alliance - i. e. `embedded autonomy' (Evans, 1995) - that was 
essential for effective implementation of the state's economic development plans. 
Unlike the reciprocal relationship between the state and the chaebol, the 
state-labour relationship was one in which labour was extensively repressed. The 
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Korean government supported the rapid growth of the chaebol and exports through 
an increasingly violent interventionist labour policy. The state, in collaboration with 
the chaebol, suppressed wages in order to make Korean export products price- 
competitive in the world market. The 1963 amendments to the labour law also made 
difficult for workers to form independent labour unions for collective bargaining. 16 
According to Choi (1989), by the end of the 1960s, dissident labour unions gradually 
disappeared, while government-sponsored and company-approved labour unions 
took on labour union activities. Accordingly, labour unions lost their militancy and 
did not represent the interests of the workers in their negotiation with the 
management (E. M. Kim, 1997). Repression of labour represents a darker side of 
Korea's economic growth. Korean workers, who worked long hours under poor 
working conditions, did not enjoy the outcomes of economic development and their 
right to form and mobilise labour unions was severely restricted. 
However, as Korea's economy was rapidly growing, average real wages in 
the manufacturing sector rose spectacularly and there was growing antagonism 
between the chaebol and labour in the 1980s. The state's HCI drive of the 1970s 
produced a small group of the super-wealthy chaebol demanding the reduced role of 
state in the economy, not withstanding the fact that they grew due to the state's 
generous subsidies and protection. In spite of reduced state support, the chaebol 
flourished and dominated the nation's political, social and economic arenas making 
Korea the `Chaebol Republic' (Wolgan Choson, 1989). As the chaebol and the 
country as a whole became more prosperous, workers began to feel that they were 
not equally sharing the country's `economic miracle'. In fact, real wages in Korea 
had fallen substantially behind the nation's gross domestic product and also lagged 
16 For details of the 1963 amendments, see E. M. Kim (1997: 121). 
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far behind industry-wide productivity gains (Ungson, Steers, and Park, 1997). Many 
workers felt that the miracle itself had occurred only as a result of the sacrifice of 
their labour, and that the time had come to demand a return on this investment. 
Accordingly, workers and trade unions began a concerted drive to improve wages 
and working conditions. In addition, the HCI brought relatively well-trained workers 
into large factories providing fertile ground for labour union mobilisation. Despite 
having one of the most repressive labour regimes in relation to labour, Korea had, by 
the end of the 1980s, also developed one of the most militant labour movements in 
Asian history (Deyo, 1987). The number of strikes rose from 300 in 1986 to almost 
4,000 in 1987 and these strikes resulted in significant wage increases across broad 
segments of the workforce. Wage rates increased by 37% within a year between 1987 
and 1988 (Ungson, Steers, and Park, 1997). During the period between 1970 and 
1984, wage increases were faster in Korea than in Brazil, Argentina or Taiwan. 
Taking 100 as the base in 1970, the wage index in 1984 reached 276 in Korea, 
compared to 84 in Brazil, 112 in Argentina and 191 in Taiwan (Amsden, 1989: 195- 
196). In particular, wages in the manufacturing sector have risen since 1987, thereby 
pushing up labour costs in the manufacturing industry. With rapid increases in wages, 
differences in wage levels were widening between Korea and other developing 
countries in Asia. By the late 1980s, Korea was no longer a cheap labour country. 
Korea's Economic Relations with the United States 
Korea's industrialisation had depended heavily on imports of capital, goods and 
technology from Japan and on exports of its products to the mass consumer markets 
of the United States and Europe. When Korea was still at the state of the `less 
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developed economy' in the 1950s and the 1960s, its economic relations with the 
United States were mainly that of recipient and donor. During the period between 
1953 and 1962, foreign aid to Korea (95% of which came from the United States) 
amounted to about 8% of Korean GNP and 77% of fixed capital formation, and 
financed about 70% of imports (Mason, et al., 1980). Korea was, at this stage, the 
third largest recipient of foreign aid in the world, following Vietnam and Israel (Song, 
1997). However, economic relations between Korea and the United States entered 
into a new phase from 1986, as Korea's trade balance with the United States turned 
positive for the first time. By the late 1980s Korea became one of the top five trade 
surplus countries in the world - following Japan, West Germany, Taiwan and Canada 
- and the United States was Korea's largest trade partner accounting for most of 
Korea's trade surplus. 
On the other hand, the United States found that its own traditionally positive 
trade balance with Korea turned negative. The American deficit with Korea increased 
from US$4.3 billion in 1985 to US$ 9.6 billion in 1987 (Wilkinson, 1994). Believing 
Korea's overall trade surplus was due to the maintenance of unfair trade barriers and 
an undervalued Korean currency, the United States placed great pressure on Korea to 
reduce tariff barriers. Korea, on the other hand, insisted that the United States failed 
to recognise that Korea was still a developing country with a large foreign debt, and 
that the country was still undergoing rapid and difficult socioeconomic and political 
transformation. Although Korea initially reduced tariff barriers, as the United States 
demanded, many tariffs remained and the government remained committed to raising 
or imposing tariffs whenever strategically necessary for the economy. Accordingly, 
economic relations between Korea and the United States became increasingly 
strained. The United States announced the end of the General System of Preference 
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(GSP) status for Korea in 1989 and the application of the so-called `Super 301' 
provisions of the omnibus trade act to pressure Korea to liberalise its markets and 
revalue its currency (Song, 1997). A Korean state undergoing rapid economic 
development would not receive an American favouritism any more17. Under these 
circumstances, Korea could not go against the current of the times and was forced to 
adapt to external pressures in an increasingly protectionist and globalised world. 
Korea's Globalisation Drive in the 1990s: `the Se, gyehwa Policy' 
In November 1994 President Kim Young Sam articulated a new national goal for 
creating a New Korea, namely, globalisation. Segyehwa is the Korean term for 
globalisation, as envisioned by the President Kim Young Sam18. Segyehwa entailed 
political, cultural and social reforms and was far more comprehensive than mere 
`economic liberalisation'. As illustrated in the following speech by President Kim, 
segyehwa was meant to describe Korea's unique concept of political, economic, 
social and cultural globalisation to reach the level of the advanced nations of the 
world. 
Fellow citizens: Globalisation is the shortcut which will lead us to 
building a first-class country in the 21st century. This is why I 
revealed my plan for globalisation and the government has 
17 It is also worth noting that the geo-political and historical structure in East Asia had also 
significantly influenced on the long-term aid and assistance from the United States. During the Cold 
War, economic prosperity of the region was thought to be a wise strategy against communism. Thus, 
due to the strategic considerations, the United States had provided huge military and economic aid to 
Korea and tolerated the mercantilist policies of Korea and Japan. However, the end of the Cold War 
weakened American geo-political interests in the East Asian region (for more details on this 
discussion, see Haggard, S. and Moon, C-I (eds), 1989). 
18 The Kim Young Sam government announced on 6 March 1995 that it had decided to keep, not 
translate into English, the Korean word 'segyehwa' in its romanised form, as the official name for its 
globalisation drive (S. Kim, 2000). 
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concentrated all of its energy in forging ahead with it. It is aimed at 
realising globalisation in all sectors - political, foreign affairs, 
economy, society, education, culture and sports. To this end, it is 
necessary to enhance our viewpoints, way of thinking, system and 
practices to the world class level. ... We 
have no choice other than 
this (President Kim Young Sam, 6 January 1995, cited in S. Kim 
(2000: 1)19). 
Subsequently, in order to formulate strategic policies for globalisation the Kim 
government formed the Presidential Segyehwa Promotion Committee (PSPC) in 
January 1995. In order to pursue the segyehwa policy, the Kim administration set 
four policy aims: a clean government; a sound economy; a healthy society; and 
peaceful unification with North Korea. In particular, economic reforms were focused 
on the liberalisation of the Korean market through an open market policy, under the 
name of `globalisation', which was described by President Kim as a global trend in 
an era of a `borderless' global economy in which room for asserting national 
sovereignty in economic affairs was sharply diminishing (Gills and Gills, 2004). The 
vision and basic principles of the initiative for economic globalisation focused on 
achieving world-class competitiveness by enhancing economic efficiencies through 
the promotion of economic liberalisation and deregulation. 
The initiatives of the Kim government in economic liberalisation and 
deregulation were clearly reflected in the `New Economy Policy' (NEP). Identifying 
economic liberalisation with democratisation, the Kim government claimed that the 
policies of a democratic government should be predicated on liberal market 
competition20. The NEP attempted to relax regulations to encourage the participation 
19 Seoul KBS-I Television in FBIS-EAS-95-004,6 January 1995 (Internet version). 20The Kim government is widely criticised for beginning the liberalisation process without a carefully 
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and creative power of the private sector, as well as to reform monetary, financial and 
administrative institutions in the pursuit of market autonomy and justice (Republic of 
Korea Government, 1993, cited in Y. H. Lee, 2000: 121). E. M. Kim (2000) points 
out that the Kim government's segyehwa policy towards business was more passive 
than active. In the 1990s Korea moved away from the EOI policy towards the goal of 
economic liberalisation under the globalisation drive. The policy was aimed at 
deregulation so that individual enterprises could be autonomous in their management 
and investment. The policy was intended to encourage the private sector to take 
initiatives in the globalisation drive. The policy was certainly different from the 
previous government-led industrial development policy, which directed the private 
sector to invest in certain industrial sectors by providing low-interest-rate loans, 
industrial licenses and other subsidies. Thus, Korean enterprises are no longer 
protected by a strong central government or by high trade barriers, but must compete 
in a global market against multinational firms with considerably more resources, 
experience and technology. 
The Globalisation of Production: Korea's Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
The late 1980s witnessed a general increase in foreign direct investment in the world 
economy and the rapid rises of multinational corporations (MNCs) from the newly 
industrialising countries (NICs) in Asia. Dunning (1997) argues that while previously 
prepared economic and institutional foundation. This is attributed to Kim's political ambition to join 
the OECD. Accession to the OECD was not based on a purely economic rationale because President 
Kim regarded it as a significant political achievement. He viewed that Korea would be internationally 
acknowledged as a developed country by being a member state of the OECD and wanted to achieve 
this during his term of office. In an attempt to gaining access to OECD membership (which occurred 
in 1996), the Kim government sought the rapid liberalisation of the financial market without carefully 
considering the economic conditions prevailing at the time. Some scholars argue that Kim's abrupt 
liberalisation drive was the main cause of the Korean financial crisis in the late 1990s. 
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foreign direct investment (FDI) came mainly from the advanced industrialised 
countries seeking markets, resources or greater efficiency, the new forms of FDI 
from developing countries - such as Korea - sought to acquire new competitive or 
ownership-specific advantages. He observes that this new type of FDI occurs often in 
firms producing technology-intensive and branded goods in oligopolistic industries. 
As mentioned above, by the mid-1990s Korea's exports and industrial structure were 
fundamentally transformed. The major export industries in Korea have changed from 
traditional, labour-intensive to capital-intensive - and recently to technological- 
intensive - industries. With changes in the industrial structure and constant increases 
in labour costs, many large Korean firms moved their labour-intensive assembling 
factories to countries with lower labour costs. 
Although overseas foreign direct investment (OFDI) of Korean firms was 
first permitted in 1968, OFDI was constrained by a small foreign currency reserve 
and the government concerns over capital flight. Following the country's first trade 
surplus in 1986, the Korean government relaxed its policy on OFDI. In 1994 a 
number of OFDI policies were introduced to ease regulations and decrease the 
number of restricted sectors. In 1996 investment restrictions in all sectors and regions 
for OFDI were completely abolished and regulations on foreign real-estate 
acquisitions were relaxed (E. M. Kim, 2000). Although the Korean government did 
not provide subsidies to promote OFDI, it removed barriers to overseas investments 
and allowed private firms to freely invest in overseas markets (ibid. ). OFDI therefore 
became one important dimension of the corporate globalisation of Korea in the 1990s. 
Korea's OFDI outpaced its inward FDI in 1990, making the country a net exporter of 
direct investment. The OFDI of Korean firms is concentrated in Asia and North 
America. It is argued that OFDI in North America constitutes an attempt by Korean 
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firms to penetrate the North American market created by the North America Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). On the other hand, the high OFDI in Asia is attributed to 
lower wages in the region and the intension of Korean firms to increase market 
shares in the fast growing Southeast Asian and Chinese markets. 
With the government's support, in the form of the segyehwa policy, the 
chaebol have taken the lead in Korea's OFDI. E. M. Kim (2000) argues that the 
involvement of the chaebol in OFDI has been `impressive', as in 1994 the total OFDI 
of the five largest chaebols - Daewoo, Hyundai, LCD Samsung and SK - was nearly 
US$1.4 billion, accounting for almost 70% of all OFDI. Assembly manufacturing 
accounted for the largest share of OFDI (E. M. Kim, 2000). The investment patterns 
of the chaebol are diverse in terms of investment regions and businesses. For 
example, Daewoo has extensive investments in automobile and component 
production plants in the former Soviet-bloc and Eastern Europe - including 
Uzbekistan, the Ukraine, Poland, Romania and the Czech Republic - as well as in 
India, China, Vietnam and the Philippines. It has also established manufacturing 
electronics and home appliances in the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Poland and 
Mexico. In addition, Daewoo has expanded its OFDI into telecommunications 
equipment and services in Central Asia - including Uzbekistan, the Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan - and China. Hyundai was the first company to take its construction 
business abroad, notably to the Middle East. In 1992 Hyundai Engineering and 
Construction has entered the Thai market through a joint-venture housing project 
worth US$3.3 billion. It also entered China with investments worth US$100 million 
(Ungson, Steers and Park, 1997). Hyundai has also operated OFDI projects in 
automobile plants and semiconductor factories in the company's gigantic North 
American market. Samsung, which is the largest Korean Chaebol, has pursued a 
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dynamic OFDI strategy since 1993. Samsung has established a comprehensive 
manufacturing complex, putting all the components of production in one location in 
each of OFDI sites, in order to minimise transaction costs and increase synergy 
between processes (E. M. Kim, 2000). Among Samsung's companies, Samsung 
Electronics has been the most active company in OFDI. In 1993, Samsung 
Electronics established a joint-venture manufacturing plant for a telecommunication 
switching system in Shandong Province in China. It later expanded its products to 
fibre-optic cables, transmission equipment and handsets (Parsley and Clernan, 1994). 
MNCs are the main agents facilitating the globalisation of production. They 
operate 80% of FDI and are the main employers of 850 export processing zones 
(EPZs) in developing countries, with a workforce that has been estimated at around 
27 million (Gills, 2002). The globalisation of production is based on integrated 
global value chains, in which there are direct linkages between production, 
composition and retailing (Barrientos, Kabeer and Hossain, 2004). The globalisation 
of production involves a high degree of mobility and supply flexibility across 
countries. The organisation of the production process is facilitated by the mobility of 
capital and finance, and characterised by just-in-time global delivery systems. It has 
also altered labour relations, producing new trends in the form of the flexiblisation 
and feminisation of labour. The globalisation of markets for manufacturing goods has 
intensified competitive pressures to produce increasingly differentiated product lines 
at lower costs and with shorter lead times, in an effort to meet varying and specific 
market demands. Under these pressures, flexibility in the manufacturing industry has 
been a growing imperative for prompt production runs, rapid shifts between different 
products, and optimally priced product specification for different markets. Although 
technological improvement and just-in-time strategies have enabled companies to 
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ease some of the pressures, global manufacturing production takes advantage of the 
lower cost through forms of employment that are part-time, temporary, casual and 
sub-contract based. 
Under these circumstances, the participation of women in the labour force has 
been rising in global production. MNCs' foreign plants, especially global factories in 
EPZs, have drawn a large number of young women into waged labour. According to 
a study of local workers in overseas Korean firms in China, Vietnam, the Philippines 
and Indonesia, an average of 65% of workers are women (Chung and Seok, 2000). 
Similarly, according to data from the Bangladesh EPZs authority, 70% of the 
employees in the Chittagong EPZ were women in 1996 (Gills, 2002). Semi- 
conductor assembly plants - such as electronics plants or labour-intensive 
manufacturing plants producing garments, textile and shoes - require highly 
disciplined and less unionised workers for maximum efficiency. Women - 
particularly young women who are mostly first-time entrants into waged labour - are 
therefore most suitable for the operation of those global factories. Being a direct 
source of cheap labour, women workers are central to the off-shore manufacturing 
factories that produce or assemble commodities for the global market. Women in 
global production are often subject to particular social relations within global 
factories and the political economy of FDI in Asia (Gills, 2002; Lim, 2001). 
Developing countries become excessively competitive in order to attract and 
maintain FDI, as they believe that the growth of the export manufacturing industry 
through FDI will create further employment opportunities for the local labour market 
and increase exports. Foreign capital flows are encouraged by the policies of 
developing countries that offer profit-tax holidays, duty-free imports and exports, 
unrestricted remittance of profits, repatriation of capital and so forth. Moreover, 
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MNCs tend to easily evade labour regulations as many EPZs are excluded from the 
scope of national labour laws. This results in an increase in the level of labour 
exploitation, in the form of low wages, excessive working hours and very little job 
security. Lim (2001) argues that since female employment creation in multinational 
factories is based on patriarchal exploitation - low absolute and relative wages for 
women workers - the elimination of these conditions may well bring about an 
elimination of their jobs, given the `footloose' nature of globally mobile capital and 
the availability of flexible female labour in other developing countries. 
The Globalisation of Production and International Migration 
The `new industrialisation' through OFDI in the developing countries of Asia has 
generated both internal and international migration. Many of the Asian workers in 
global production are drawn from rural subsistence farming. Often large-scale 
employment in commercial agriculture displaces small farmers and results in rural to 
urban migration. Furthermore, the expansion of export manufacturing industries in 
EPZs and the resultant new jobs bring rural young women into wage-labour. Sassen- 
Koob (1984a: 1144) argues that immigration and global production `have evolved 
into mechanisms for the massive incorporation of Third World women into wage- 
labour'. She argues that there are systemic links between the employment of women 
in global production in less developed countries and the employment of immigrant 
women in developed countries. Sassen-Koob (1984a) points out that a foreign FDI 
firms dominate the new industrial zones objectively and culturally, thereby creating 
linkages to the countries where the capital originates. Thus, rural migrants to EPZs 
become potential international migrants as the presence of foreign firms in EPZs 
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facilitates access to information and a sense of cultural familiarity with potential 
destination countries. 
In regard to Sassen-Koob's observation, there is a possible relation between 
expansion of OFDI of Korean MNCs and an influx of Asian migrants to Korea since 
many migrant workers in Korea come from countries that have been the central sites 
for OFDI of Korean firms. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the Korean 
case shows a more systematic link than the U. S. one suggested by Sassen-Koob. For 
example, in 1991 the Korean government introduced a temporary migration scheme, 
namely the Industrial Technical Trainee Programme. Those who had been employed 
in the Korean overseas companies were sent to Korea as trainees for apprenticeships 
of between six months and two years. Initially, only those companies that established 
overseas branches through FDI were eligible to apply for trainees. Under this scheme, 
a thousand workers from Southeast Asia and China migrated to Korea as `industrial 
trainees'. 
Labour Shortages in the Manufacturing Sector 
As discussed above, in an effort to deal with rising labour costs, many large Korean 
firms have moved their labour-intensive assembly factories to countries with cheaper 
labour costs, such as China, Vietnam, Indonesia and Eastern European countries. 
Nevertheless, there are many firms that are compelled to remain in Korea for various 
reasons (W W. Park, 2002). First of all, small firms tend to remain in Korea, as their 
initial capital bases are too small to move overseas and they lack adequate 
information on the off-shore operation. Second, some industries - such as 
construction, mining, agriculture and fisheries - cannot move overseas because by 
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nature these industries are geographically dependent and immobile. Third, time- 
constrained industries, such as cleaning, printing and dairy products, cannot relocate 
overseas. These firms, therefore, have had to increase international competitiveness, 
either by reducing labour costs through automation or by producing high-quality 
products through substantial investment in R&D. However, for most small and 
medium-sized firms, technological renovation and product innovation are not easy 
options, because they involve large-scale and constant investments and their 
production processes do not often lend themselves to change (Y B. Park, 1996). All 
things considered, many small and medium-sized manufacturing firms in Korea have 
little choice but to rely on the workforce within the limits of the possible. 
Table 2.3 The Number of Vacancies and Shortage Rate in Small and Medium- 
sized Korean Firms, 1990-2000 
(in 000s and %) 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
Employees 
4,428 
4,563 
4,615 
4,534 
4,904 
4,929 
5,218 
5,294 
4,892 
4,870 
5,723 
All 
occupation 
Vacancies 
192 
250 
197 
164 
175 
183 
156 
129 
32 
47 
72 
Shortage 
rate 
4.34 
5.48 
4.26 
3.62 
3.57 
3.71 
2.98 
2.44 
0.65 
0.97 
1.26 
Employees 
2,420 
2,446 
2,320 
1,964 
2,251 
2,161 
2,212 
2,172 
1,874 
1,716 
1,866 
Production 
and related 
Vacancies 
166 
222 
157 
119 
124 
125 
106 
84 
20 
28 
40 
Shortages 
rate 
6.85 
9.07 
6.76 
6.04 
5.64 
5.80 
4.80 
3.88 
1.04 
1.63 
2.15 
Source: Ministry of Labour, Report on Employment Prospects, each year 
Notes: 1990-1998 (firms with over 10 workers); 1999-2000 (firms with over 5 workers) 
Labour shortage rate = the number of vacancies as per cent of total full capacity employment 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, however, labour shortages in small and 
medium-sized firms have intensified. Small and medium-sized firms have suffered 
serious labour shortage problems as the labour shortage rate for these firms grew 
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steadily from 1.5% in 1985 to 4.34% in 1990. For the firms engaging in the 
manufacturing industry, the shortage rate was even more remarkable, increasing from 
2.35% to 6.85% during the same period. Furthermore, in certain industrial sectors - 
including plastics, electrical machinery and commercial fishing - the shortage rate 
was even higher, reaching 30% and even 40% (Los Angeles Times, 10 November 
1996). As seen in Table 2.3, by 1991 there were 222,000 production jobs that were 
not filled with workers. However, after Korea introduced the Industrial and Technical 
Training Programme21 in 1991 - which allowed foreigners to enter Korea as 
`trainees' in small and medium Korean firms - the shortage rates in small and 
medium-sized firms started to decline from 9.07% to 1.04% between 1991 and 1998 
(see Table 2.3). The steady decline of labour shortages after 1992 illustrates that 
continuous inflows of migrant workers into the manufacturing sector have reversed 
the labour shortage problem in small and medium-sized Korean firms. Moreover, 
with the onset of the Asian crisis in 1998 the severity of the labour shortage further 
diminished. 
It is nevertheless worth noting that the decline in the labour shortage rate 
during the period of the financial crisis (1997-1999) was only a temporary 
phenomenon. During the early stage of the crisis, the Korean government initiated a 
repatriation policy leading to large-scale deportation of undocumented migrant 
workers. The intention of the Korean government with such a policy can be found in 
the following statement made by a spokesperson for the Korea Federation of Small 
Businesses (KFSB). 
We expect a temporary vacuum in jobs occupied by foreign 
21 The Industrial and Technical Training Programme will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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workers because Koreans are still reluctant to work in the 
sweatshop sector, known here as the three-D sector - dirty, 
dangerous, and difficult. But after a time the three-D market will be 
swamped with South Korean applicants (Agence France Presse, 16 
February 1998, cited in Lim, 2003: 143). 
Contrary to this prediction, whereas the unemployment rate in Korea jumped from 
2.6% in 1997 to 7% in 1998, many small and medium-sized firms still faced a labour 
shortage problem and, in fact, the shortage rate has increased constantly ever since. 
As seen in Table 2.4, the total shortage rate in small and medium-sized firms was 
9.36% in 2002. In particular, the shortage of unskilled labour in production and 
related jobs was most severe (11.55%) among the categories of occupation. On the 
other hand, the shortage rates in administrative and managerial jobs (4.14%) and 
services (3.01 %) are comparatively lower than those in production jobs. According to 
the report of Ministry of Planning and Budget (2003), the smaller firms tend to face a 
higher shortage rate, and - notably in production and related jobs - the shortage rate 
in small firms employing 5 to 19 workers is as high as 18%. 
Table 2.4 The Number of Vacancies and Shortage Rate by Occupation in Korea, 
2002 
Employees (people) Vacancies Shortage rate 
Administrative and managerial 398,387 17,224 4.14 
Production and related 
Professional 71,432 7,333 9.31 
Technical and semi-professional 171,431 17,252 9.14 
Skilled 603,913 72,987 10.78 
Unskilled 641,416 83,768 11.55 
Sub total 1,488,192 181,338 10.86 
Services 16,978 527 3.01 
Sales 80,081 5,862 6.82 
Total 1983 638 204,951 9.36 
source: Ministry of Planning and Budget, Report on the Labour Shortage in the Small and Medium Firm (2003) 
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There are a number of structural changes that have caused the shortage of 
labour in small and medium firms in Korea. First, there has been a change in the 
Korean demographic structure. While Korean demography took the form of a 
pyramid until 1960, since the 1980s the demographic structure has transformed into a 
bell shape, as a result of a decrease in the level of fertility and an increase in the 
average life expectancy. Based on the national statistical data for the period between 
1990 and 2005, the average population growth was 0.7% and the average growth of 
the population over 65 was 4%. As a result of a change in the age structure, Korea 
now faces an ageing population and a shortage of young workers. A cheap and 
abundant supply of young workers migrating from rural areas to cities fed rapid 
economic growth in the 1960s and the early 1970s, but this rural to urban migration 
of young workers ceased in the mid-1970s (Y B. Park, 1996). Second, there has been 
a `job mismatch' between the supply and demand for labour. High educational 
attainment by young people and substantial differentials in wages and in the social 
status of production and non-production workers have led to a `job mismatch' in the 
Korean labour market and this has resulted in labour shortages in the manufacturing 
sector. As seen in Table 2.5, the number of high school students entering higher 
education has constantly increased. Accordingly, the number of university and 
technical college graduates has constantly increased (see Table 2.6). As the number 
of college graduates increases, those who are likely to enter production work after 
high school declines significantly. Under these circumstances, a large number of new 
entrants into the labour market prefer non-production jobs with substantially higher 
wages, higher social status, better working environments and welfare provisions. The 
labour force has started to move away from the manufacturing sector - which is 
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characterised as dirty, dangerous and demanding - to the service sector in parallel 
with the changes in the Korean industrial structure (Y B. Park, 1996). Finally, there 
has been a `skill mismatch' between the supply and demand for labour. Y -B. Park 
(1996) argues that, since the 1980s Korea has neglected the vocational training of 
industrial skilled manpower and over-emphasised general and commercial subjects in 
high school. As a result, although 90% of labour market entrants had at least a high 
school diploma, most of them had an academic or commercial education. He points 
out that the supply of industrial skilled manpower based on vocational training 
decreased from 89,000 to 54,000 during the 1980s. 
Table 2.5 The Ratio of High School Students Entering Higher Education, 1985- 
2002 
(VO)- 
1985 1995 1997 2001 2002 
Academic 
High School 53.8 72.8 81.4 85.2 87.0 
Vocational 
High school 
13.3 19.2 29.2 44.9 49.8 
Source: Ministry of Education, A Statistical yearbook of Education, each year 
Table 2.6 Changes in the Number of University/Technical College Graduates 
(neonle 
1995 1997 2001 2002 Increase Rate* 
University 
Technical 
College 
180,664 
143,075 
192,465 
175,965 
239,702 
232,972 
244,852 
239,114 
35.3 
67.1 
Total 323,739 368,430 472,674 483 966 49.5 
Source: Ministry of Education, A Statistical yearbook of Education, each year 
Note: *Increase rates of the number of graduates between 1995 and 2002 
Changes in Korea's International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the rapid economic development and 
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changes in the industrial structure are not the only factor that has brought on the large 
flow of migrant workers into Korea. Owing to the country's specific geo-political 
position, the political aspect is also one of the crucial factors in the `migration 
transition' (Castles and Miller, 2003) of Korea. In the aftermath of the Korean War 
(1950-1953), economic decisions in Korea have been made on the basis of security 
rather than overall economic deliberation. A concern for national security - 
particularly geopolitical insecurity - during the Cold War, has affected Korea's 
economic behaviour profoundly. Korea has lad to face an unpredictable and 
antagonistic relations with North Korea and the world powers: China, Japan, Russia 
and the United States. In the conflict-ridden and turbulent Cold War geopolitical 
situation, Korea had close economic relations with the United States and Japan, 
while treading a cautious path with China and Russia. Under these circumstances, the 
phrases stressing security - such as `security first (anbo jaeil)' and `the security 
dimension (anbojeok chawon)' - have often been used by policy makers and national 
leaders in order to justify unpopular decisions and to compel the Korean public and 
Korean firms to comply with government policies (Song, 1997). However, between 
1989 and 1991, when the Cold War reached its terminal stage with the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the de-Sovietisation of Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union heralded an acceleration of globalisation, which has altered the very nature of 
international relations and the nature of Korea's foreign policy. In order to adapt to 
the pressures and advantages associated with globalisation, Korea has shifted the 
focus of a national policy from a security agenda to an economic one. Changes in 
Korea's foreign policy and the normalisation of diplomatic relations with countries 
from the former socialist bloc - including Russia, China, Vietnam and Eastern 
European countries - have enhanced economic and cultural relations between Korea 
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and these countries and subsequently led to vigorous movements of people. 
It is generally argued by Korean scholars (e. g., C-J. Lee, 2000; Song, 1997) 
that the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games marked a turning point in the unfolding of 
Korea's active diplomatic and economic relations with the Soviet Union, China and 
other former socialist countries in Eastern Europe. With the two previous games - in 
Moscow (1980) and in Los Angeles (1984) - having been adversely affected by 
boycotts from the two opposing blocs, the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games were attended 
by 161 of the 167 members of the International Olympic Committee, including the 
Soviet Union and China. C-J, Lee (2000) comment on this event as follows. 
The success of the Olympiad inculcated the populace with a sense 
of national pride and a heightened awareness of internationalism. In 
particular, South Korea set forth a new national image - that of a 
vibrant, competent, and efficient modern state - and its leaders 
developed confidence in their ability to manage domestic and 
foreign affairs (C-J, Lee, 2000: 172). 
This `sports diplomacy' provided the main impetus for Korea's `northern 
diplomacy (bukbang oegyo)', which attempted to overcome the ideological and 
security constraints in the Cold War system. The objectives of Korea's northern 
diplomatic policy are well presented in the following statement by President Roh The 
Woo. 
The northern policy of the Republic of Korea will serve to 
convince socialist countries of the effectiveness and efficiency of 
freedom and democracy and help them carry out reforms. The 
ultimate objective of our northern policy, however, is to induce 
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North Korea to open up and thus to secure stability and peace in the 
Korean Peninsular. The road between Seoul and Pyongyang is now 
totally blocked. Accordingly, we have to choose an alternative 
route to the North Korean capital by way of Moscow and Beijing. 
This may not be the most direct route, but we certainly hope it will 
be an effective one (Korea: A Nation Transformed, 1990, cited in 
C-J. Lee, 2000: 173). 
In September 1990 Korea and the Soviet Union agreed to normalise diplomatic 
relations. Mikhail Gorbachev was favourably inclined to Korea's northern diplomatic 
initiatives and economic cooperation. Korea agreed to provide US$3 billion in 
economic assistance to the Soviet Union and the two countries agreed that they 
would respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence, and settle international conflicts and controversies by peaceful means 
(C-J. Lee, 2000). Both Korea and the Soviet Union believed that rapprochement 
between two countries would be a significant step toward eliminating the Cold War 
conflicts and the longstanding confrontational mentality in the Asia Pacific Region. 
The success of Korean northern diplomacy with the Soviet Union resulted in Korea's 
entry into the United Nations and the conclusion of the Basic Agreement 
('Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation') 
with North Korea (ibid. ). 
The normalisation of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union boosted 
Korea's efforts to normalise diplomatic relations with China. In the first place, Korea 
made peaceful approaches toward China, which had experienced diplomatic isolation 
and economic difficulties following the Tiananmen Square incident. In an effort to 
advance economic relations between two countries, Korea fully supported China's 
open-door policy, which was initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s. In 1985 the 
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two countries agreed to set up a temporary channel of communication in Hong Kong, 
through the Korean Consulate and the China News Agency. Relations improved in 
1986 when China sent a huge delegation to the Asian Games in Seoul, despite 
objections from North Korea (Sung, 1994). In 1988 China's Shandong province was 
designated as an `open area', in an effort to attract Korean investments. A year after, 
Korea permitted selected Korean banks to enter into correspondent bank agreements 
with the Bank of China, thereby facilitating foreign exchange transactions (ibid. ). In 
1990 Korea sent large numbers of tourists to China, imported Chinese goods and 
provided financial support for the Beijing Asian Games (C-J. Lee, 2000). In the same 
year a direct passenger ferry service between China and Korea was launched and the 
two countries established the Overseas Trade Promotion Offices in Seoul and Beijing. 
C-J. Lee (2000) argues that, on the whole, the economic imperative was a crucial 
factor in China's decision to shift to a policy of diplomatic flexibility toward Korea. 
As a result, in August 1992, Korea and China agreed to normalise diplomatic 
relations. The two countries agreed to develop `enduring relations of good 
neighbourhood, friendship and cooperation on the basis of the principles set forth in 
the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, non-interference in each other's initial 
affairs, equality and mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence' (Korea Herald, 25 
August 1992, cited in C-J. Lee, 2000: 174). Since then, China has become one of 
Korea's major trading partners and Korean firms' OFDI sites. Furthermore, Korean 
government's relaxation of the immigration control toward Chinese nationals after 
the normalisation led to increasing movements of people between the two countries. 
Following the normalisation of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union 
and China, Korea established diplomatic relations with Vietnam in December 1992. 
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Previously, the relationship between Korea and Vietnam had been hostile. During the 
Vietnam War (1969-1974), Korean troops were dispatched to assist the United States 
war against North Vietnam and from that point on the two countries had been 
enemies rather than allies in the Cold War system. However, although some political 
issues22 regarding the war remain unsettled, as far as the economic sector is 
concerned, bilateral relations between two countries have been increasingly 
constructive (The Korean Times, 10 July 2004). Since adopting the open-door policy 
of the `Doi Moi' reforms in 1986, Vietnam has attracted FDI on a large-scale and 
experienced huge increases in exports - especially textiles and natural resources, 
such as rice, oil and gas. Since establishing diplomatic relations with Vietnam in 
1992, Korea has emerged as one of the largest foreign direct investors in Vietnam. At 
the end of July 1992, investments by Korean companies in Vietnam stood at US$4.5 
billion, ranking fourth among foreign investors in Vietnam in terms of size (ibid. ). 
According to a report of The Korean Times (10 July 2004), there are currently 668 
Korean firms officially registered in Vietnam. Including Korean firms having made 
unofficial advances into Vietnam under the names of local firms, the total number of 
Korean firms operating businesses in Vietnam is estimated as more than 1000. 
Vietnam has a number of positive factors for Korean FDI. The country is endowed 
with abundant cheap labour and is located in a geographically strategic place for 
expanding Korea's business relations with other Southeast Asian countries. 
Furthermore, since significant levels of FDI from the United States, Japan and 
Europe have not yet made inroads into Vietnam, Korean investors still have had an 
advantage in the Vietnamese market. As there are large numbers of Korean firms in 
22 The Korean government has not yet made an official apology for the act of war and been neglected large numbers of Korean-Vietnamese descendants (Lai Dai Han) who were deserted by their Korean fathers, who were mostly military personnel, after the Vietnam War. 
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Vietnam, many Vietnamese workers have been sent to Korea as `trainees' and - 
following China, the Philippines and Bangladesh - Vietnamese migrant workers have 
constituted one of largest groups of migrant workers in Korea. 
The Formation of Cultural and Social Networks in the Asian Region 
It is apparent that contemporary migratory flows in Asia are unprecedented in their 
scale and impact. Nevertheless, the composition of the nationalities of migrant 
workers varies between receiving countries in Asia. For example, Korea has received 
large numbers of migrant workers from China, the Philippines, Pakistan, Indonesia, 
Vietnam and Bangladesh, whereas Japan has received the majority of workers from 
the Philippines, Thailand, Iran, Brazil, China, Peru and Korea. It is interesting to note 
that in Korea, where there are relatively high wages and severe shortages of labour, 
people still move to Japan in search of work. Moreover, workers from South America 
- such as Brazil and Peru - would rather cross over the Pacific Ocean and come to 
Japan, than go to the United States. Push and pull factors of international migration - 
such as wage differences, better employment opportunities or geographical proximity 
- cannot fully explain this varying range of the nationalities of migrant workers 
between receiving countries. Seol (1999) points out that push and pull factors 
between countries cannot give a clearer explanation of why Guatemalan workers 
would rather migrate to Korea, given the close proximity of the United States to 
Guatemala. According to him, it is because there has been a social bridge (in this 
case, Korean firms operating businesses in Guatemala) between Korea and 
Guatemala, and workers who came to Korea could not find this bridge between 
themselves and the United States. He correctly argues that, apart from structural 
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controls, such as immigration laws and regulations, this social bridge between 
sending and receiving countries has significantly influenced on the composition of 
the nationalities of migrant workers. In fact, it has been widely discussed that diverse 
linkages between countries have stimulated and maintained international flows of 
people (Boyd, 1989; Fawcett, 1989; Lim, 1987; Salt, 1987; Sassen-Koob, 1984a). As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the diverse linkages between sending and receiving countries 
are highlighted in migration systems theory, which suggests that `migratory 
movements generally arise from the existence of prior links between sending and 
receiving countries based on colonisation, political influence, trade, investment or 
cultural ties' (Castles and Miller, 2003: 26). 
The movement of capital and goods plays the most significant part in 
building up these linkages between countries. As mentioned above, as Japan and 
other Asian NICs - including Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan - have 
rapidly industrialised through the export-oriented strategy and penetrated into other 
developing countries with their capital and investments, Asian economies have 
vigorously integrated over the last decades and resulted in increased movements of 
people in the region. The nationalities of migrant workers in Japan and NICs tend to 
coincide with these countries' export markets and OFDI sites (Lloyd and Williams, 
1996; Martin, 1994; Sekiguchi, 1992; Seol, 1999). As discussed in the previous 
section, since the late 1980s Korea has become one of the leading export countries, 
and this process has actively involved OFDI in China, the Philippines, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Vietnam and Bangladesh and resulted in large numbers of migrant 
workers from these countries. In other words, material linkages have been brought by 
Korean capital investment in these developing countries. As Sassen (1988) argues, 
the international movement of migrant workers, therefore, takes place in the opposite 
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direction to the flow of capital and goods. 
Material linkages significantly influence the cultural and social linkages 
between sending and receiving countries. Trade commodities and the presence of 
foreign firms in developing countries tend to facilitate access to information and a 
sense of cultural familiarity with potential destination countries. Besides, as regional 
economic integration and the development of information technology have 
intensified, people in Asia have become more culturally interactive, easily adapting 
to diverse or sometimes similar cultures of neighbouring countries. One example is 
the recent `Korean Wave (Hallyu)' across East and Southeast Asia. The ever-growing 
demand for Korean pop culture is generating a Korean boom in many Asian 
countries. In China, one out of four foreign productions on TV is from Korea and the 
Korea National Tourism Organisation reports that 359 Korean films and soap operas 
were televised in China over the last two years (Arirang News, 1 March 2005). 
During the first eight months of 2004 nearly three million tourists from Japan, China, 
Taiwan and other Southeast Asian countries visited Korea (Korea. net, 2005). Fans of 
Korean pop music, TV soap operas and films spend money on trips to Korea as well 
as Korean goods, fashions, hairstyles and food. Dan Kim, the head of the advertising 
and special promotion department of the tourism organisation, states that `the boom 
has gone from dramas [TV soap operas] themselves to food, fashion, computer 
games.. . all things that appear in Korean dramas' (Yonhap News, 15 December 2004). 
The Korean Wave has clearly influenced people's consumption preferences for 
Korean goods and become a significant cultural and social bridge connecting Korea 
and people in Asia. 
Admittedly, those media linkages can portray attractive conditions that serve 
as an incentive to move. People in developing countries who become acquainted with 
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the appearance of Korean life styles, family/social relations, fashion, food and 
commodity goods on TV and in films may cherish the virtual image of comparatively 
affluent and developed Korea, thereby being stimulated to come to Korea in search 
of better economic opportunities. Fawcett (1989) identifies `Tangible/Mass Culture 
Connections' as one of linkages23 in a migration system, which `consist primarily of 
mass communication products', such as newspapers, films, books, magazines and TV 
programmes. He argues that: 
[t]hese are the media that can effectively convey images and ideas 
about places across space to large audiences. A certain amount of 
international movement is attributable to the media themselves, as 
in the example of reporters on foreign assignment. The more 
important aspect of mass culture connections, however, is the 
information they convey about distant countries. Television and 
films, in particular, serve to make other places less foreign or 
strange, thus in modern times effectively reducing a psychological 
barrier to moving that has been important historically. ... 
Information is the essential ingredient of this Tangible/Mass 
Culture linkage (Fawcett, 1989: 675). 
Cultural and social linkages are also shaped by historical and political factors. 
British colonial history in India and the subcontinent brought large numbers of 
workers from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh into Britain in the 1960s (Castle and 
Kosack, 1985). Colonial experiences have built up historical social linkages between 
Europe and former colonies, thereby bringing Jamaican workers to Britain, Algerian 
23 Fawcett classifies linkages into four categories (State-to-State Relations; Mass Culture 
Connections; Family and Personal Networks; and Migratory Agency Activities) and three types 
(Tangible Linkages; Regulatory Linkages; and Relational Linkages). For more details on this 
discussion, see Fawcett (1989). 
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workers to France and Surinamese workers to the Netherlands. As a result of 
Japanese colonialism, there are currently large numbers of ethnic Koreans living in 
Japan (660,000), China (1,960,000) and Russia and Central Asia (450,000) (Seol, 
1999). Undoubtedly, these overseas Koreans have formed social linkages between 
Korea and those countries. There are great numbers of Korean-Chinese migrant 
workers in Korea and Korean employers prefer these Korean-Chinese workers, who 
can communicate with them in Korean and understand Korean culture. Similarly, 
there are large numbers of migrant workers from Brazil, Peru and Argentina in Japan. 
Most of these workers are the descendants of Japanese (nikkeijin) who migrated to 
those countries in the past and who re-migrate to affluent Japan in search of work. 
These cases represent social linkages built up by ethnic ties between sending and 
receiving countries. On the other hand, there are political factors that affect the 
formation of social linkages. The long-term stationing of U. S. troops in Korea and 
the Philippines has brought many Korean and Filipino immigrants to the United 
States. As mentioned in the previous section, the normalisation of diplomatic 
relations between Korea and Vietnam has ended the long-term antagonism caused by 
the Vietnam War and resulted in cooperative economic relations between the two 
countries. Bilateral relations have been increasingly constructive and there are many 
Korean firms investing in Vietnam. Accordingly, this has led to increases in 
Vietnamese `industrial trainees' and migrant workers in Korea. 
After all, there have been bridges that connect Korea with other Asian 
countries. Material, cultural and social linkages have produced large flows of migrant 
workers into Korea. The following description of Nguyen how Vietnamese migrant 
workers became acquainted with Korea sums up the preceding discussion. 
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They have been acquainted with Korea through Korean 
commodities, such as Samsung TVs, Daewoo motorcars and LG 
cosmetics. They recognise Korean spicy dishes like Kim Chi, 
famous Korean sport like Taekwondo and the Korean national 
football team which is the strongest in Asia. They also know former 
President Park Jung Hee who entered the Vietnam War and the 
White Horse and the Fierce Tiger military units that fought in the 
war. People in the Ho Chi Min city call the motorway built by the 
Korean army in the 1970s the `Dai Han [Korean]' motorway.... 
Korean soap operas are remarkable eye-openers to Vietnamese 
people, especially the youth. Due to tremendous demand from 
viewers, most of the programmes have been replayed twice and 
three times on TV. ... Korean soap operas and 
films have made 
Korea familiar with Vietnamese People (Nguyen, 1999, cited in 
Seol (2000a: 158-159) - translated by author). 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided the overview of the processes in which Korea has transformed 
into a major labour receiving country in Asia. The main finding in this chapter is that 
Korea's `migration transition' has been influenced by economic, political and 
cultural/social changes that were interlocked on the local and global levels. In the 
first part of the chapter the history of the emigration of Korean workers during the 
colonial and the post-colonial periods was examined. As mentioned in the beginning, 
the historical overview of the earlier emigration of Korean workers is particularly 
significant because it helps to explain the current demographic composition of 
migrant workers in Korea. As we will see in Chapter 4, the `reverse migration' of 
ethnic Koreans from China and Central Asia to Korea implicates that there are strong 
historical and cultural linkages in this particular movement of people. The second 
93 
part of the chapter showed that Korea has passed through a `migration transition' as a 
result of industrial, demographic and international political transitions and increasing 
cultural/social linkages between Korea and other Asian countries. Korea has been 
transformed from a labour-intensive to a capital- and technological-intensive 
industrial economy based on high-tech industries, services and foreign investment 
under the globalisation drive ('segyehwa') pursued by the state. The Korean case 
shows a systematic link between the globalisation of production and international 
migration - i. e. there is a close relation between expansion of the OFDI of Korean 
MNCs and an influx of Asian migrants to Korea, since many foreign workers in 
Korea come from countries that have been the central sites for the OFDI of Korean 
firms. It has shown that as industrialisation has proceeded in Korea, the country has 
faced the rise of domestic wage levels and serious labour shortages in the 
manufacturing industry, owing to a demographic transition - which has been 
manifested in a decrease in the level of fertility and an ageing population - and job 
and skill mismatches in the labour market. Korea's migration transition has also been 
affected by the changes in Korea's international relations in the post-Cold War era. 
The period of between 1989 and 1991 - when the Cold War reached the terminal 
stage - became a turning point for the acceleration of globalisation that has altered 
the very nature of geopolitical relations and Korea's foreign policy. Changes in 
Korea's foreign policy and the normalisation of diplomatic relations with China and 
Vietnam have enhanced economic and cultural relations between Korea and these 
countries and led to increasing movements of people. Last but not least, the 
intensified movement of capital and goods has significantly influenced the cultural 
and social linkages that connect Korea with other Asian countries, further stimulating 
flows of migrant workers into Korea. 
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Korea is now undeniably dependant on migrant labour - particularly for `3D 
jobs' which local workers reject. The limited success of the repatriation policy and 
the continuous shortages of labour in the manufacturing industry during the Asian 
Financial Crisis in the late 1990s suggest that the inflow of migrant workers to Korea 
will continue. Under these circumstances, the influx of migrant workers presents 
various new challenges for the Korean state. The following chapters are based on the 
empirical research and will extensively examine how the Korea state has attempted 
to reduce the possible negative economic and social impact of migrant workers while, 
at the same time, sought to enjoy the benefits of migrant labour. The principal 
objective of this study is to find out how gender and race/ethnicity are significantly 
implicated in the state structures and policies that control the movement of people, 
and to what extent the ostensibly gender-neutral process of migration is, therefore, 
gender specific, resulting in different migration experiences between women and 
men. As a first step towards this examination, the next chapter will discuss the 
methodology of the empirical research. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology used in this study and explains the process 
by which the fieldwork data was collected and interpreted. It looks not only at the 
ways in which the empirical study was designed and carried out, but also the process 
and the principle by which research questions were approached. It aims to 
systematise as well as expand on the existing approaches to the migration of women 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
Since existing studies are based on problematic social inquiries that merely 
`add women, mix and stir' within orthodox theoretical frameworks of international 
migration, it is important to account for the process of knowledge production by 
discussing not only research methods but also epistemological and methodological 
issues in this study. According to Harding (1987: 3), epistemological issues have 
significant implications for `how general theoretical structures can and should be 
applied in particular disciplines and for the choice of methods of research'. She notes 
that there are close connections between epistemology, methodology and research 
methods. In order to understand such connections, she distinguishes three concepts as 
follows: a research method as a technique for gathering evidence; methodology as a 
theory and analysis of how research should proceed; and epistemology as a theory of 
knowledge. Harding highlights that in order to advance feminist inquiry one should 
consider important connections between these three aspects. 
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Epistemological issues and research methods are discussed in separate 
sections of this chapter. In order to produce a gender sensitive approach to the 
explanation of international migration, it is crucial to discuss epistemological issues. 
The first section therefore discusses why this study adopts feminist epistemology as 
an alternative theory of knowledge that legitimates women as `knowers'. I go on to 
ask the following questions: to what extent is a feminist standpoint important for this 
study?; what are the limitations of feminist standpoint theory? and can feminist 
standpoint theory provide an epistemic vantage point in this study? The second 
section discusses research methods, including the process and the techniques of data 
collection from the field research. In particular, it accounts for important issues 
concerning the primary method of data collection of this study: semi-structured 
interviews. 
I. Feminist Epistemology: A Feminist Standpoint 
Epistemology is a theory of knowledge and answers questions about who can be a 
"knower", what tests beliefs must pass in order to be legitimated as knowledge and 
what kinds of things can be known (Harding, 1987). Accordingly, epistemology 
provides a philosophical grounding for assessing what constitutes valid and adequate 
knowledge. Feminists argue that a traditional theory of knowledge within 
mainstream or, more appropriately, 'malestream' social science is androcentric and 
apolitical by excluding women as knowers. Regarding feminist critique of traditional 
epistemologies, Harding (1987: 3) explains that: 
they [feminists] claim that the voice of men (of the dominant class 
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and race); that the subject of a traditional sociological sentence is 
always assumed to be a man. They have proposed alternative 
theories of knowledge that legitimate women as knowers. 
Feminists argue that theorising knowledge is a political process. Feminist 
epistemology explicates the ways in which power relations shape which knowledge 
is believed and why. Traditional sociological theories, methods and concepts 
originating in the lives of men from dominant groups (i. e. white, Western, middle- 
class) have created an incomplete or distorted knowledge. Thus, claiming women as 
knowers or `agents of knowledge' (Harding, 1987), feminist epistemology redefines 
`knowing' and `knowledge'. 
Different epistemologies offer different accounts of what constitutes 
legitimate knowledge and what criteria develop valid knowledge of social life. 
Harding's typology classifies three feminist epistemologies, namely feminist 
empiricism, feminist standpoint theory and feminist postmodernism (Harding, 1986; 
1987; 1991). Among the three different theories of knowledge, feminist standpoint 
epistemology most strongly challenges the dominant androcentric epistemology 
(Harding, 1993). Harding (1996: 146) notes that standpoint theorists `enable us to 
gain a more accurate understanding of the epistemic authority of knowledge-claims 
that originate "from below" and suggest guidelines, a "method", for everyone to 
follow in seeking better to understand nature and social relations'. The core idea of 
feminist standpoint theory is that women's subordination to patriarchy provides a 
more complete understanding of gendered social relations than men have, and this 
gives them `epistemic privilege'. 
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Researching from Women's Experience 
Feminist standpoint epistemology draws from Marxist standpoint theory which 
provides an important epistemological means for understanding forms of domination. 
According to Marxist standpoint theory, which was developed from Hegel's 
reflections on the master/slave relationship from the standpoint of the slave's life, a 
proletariat's subordinate position enables her/him to attain dual vision and, therefore, 
to have an epistemologically privileged perspective on society. The standpoint of the 
bourgeoisie only captures a surface knowledge of society owing to the vested 
interests and values of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the proletariat, being 
oppressed and central to the capitalist mode of production, has insights both into 
being the means of capitalist production and the privilege of the bourgeoisie in the 
capitalist system. The distinct perspective of the proletariat, which emerges from 
practical - i. e. socially marginal and economically central - activities in a capitalist 
system provides a more accurate understanding of the social reality and, therefore, 
has epistemic privilege. 
In particular, Hartsock (1983) and Rose (1983) have explicitly based their 
theories on the Marxist account. Hartsock (1983) argues that just as a Marxist 
understanding of class and society from the standpoint of the proletariat enables us to 
understand bourgeois ideology, a feminist standpoint can allow us to get beneath the 
surface of social relations and understand patriarchal institutions and ideologies. 
`Patriarchy', which contributes to the continuation of women's oppression, and 
`reproductive labour', which are central to women's lives, are crucial concepts in the 
formulation of an account of feminist standpoint epistemology. Hartsock (1983) and 
Rose (1983) argue that women's lives differ structurally from those of men since 
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women's reproductive work in `the sexual division of labour' involves a unity of 
mind, body and heart, contesting the abstract and depersonalised traditional 
knowledge production. Hartsock (1983) uses the term `the sexual division of labour', 
rather than `the gender division of labour' as she claims that the division of labour 
between women and men cannot be determined by purely social dimensions. She 
argues that, whereas the fact that women and not men bear children is not a social 
choice, women's childrearing is clearly a societal choice implicitly decided by 
compulsory heterosexuality and male dominance in a society. Following Hartsock's 
argument on the distinctive experience of women, which differs structurally from the 
experience of men, Rose (1983) states that women's reproductive work - especially 
caring work - is distinctive because it is a `labour of love'. Thus, for Rose, an 
important aspect of feminist standpoint epistemology is `an acknowledgement of the 
central role of emotional involvement' in the process of knowledge production 
(Tanesini, 1999: 141). Given that their experiences differ structurally from those of 
men, women have a particular and privileged understanding of male supremacy and 
gendered social relations. For Hartsock and Rose, women do not merely have 
epistemic privilege over gendered social relations, but also over all knowledge 
production because of women's different ways of experiencing and because of the 
feminine cognitive style, which is reinforced through the sexual division of labour. 
Smith (1988; 1990) also focuses on women's experience as the basis of her 
theory of a feminist standpoint. Unlike Hartsock and Rose, for Smith, women's 
experience is granted an epistemic advantage only over the matters concerning 
gendered social relations. Smith's account (1988) is derived from her own experience 
of being a sociologist and a single mother of two children. For Smith, while the 
intellectual world has always appeared `genderless', it is certainly `gendered' and is 
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in fact `structured by its gender subtext' (1988: 7). She continues that: 
[i]nterests, perspectives, relevances [leak] from communities of 
male experience into the externalised and objectified forms of 
discourse. Within the discourses embedded in the relations of 
ruling, women were the Other (Smith, 1988: 7). 
Emphasising the division of labour that accounts for the different experiences of men 
and women, Smith (1988: 83) argues that women's main responsibility for managing 
household chores, bearing and caring for children - i. e. what Smith calls `the 
concrete and particular' - liberates men from attending to those needs and makes it 
possible for men to fully participate in `the abstract mode of action'. For Smith, 
moving between the two worlds, women sociologists could recognise, explore and 
find alternative ways of thinking and inquiring from the standpoint of women based 
on women's own experience - i. e. women's everyday lives. 
Nevertheless, feminist standpoint theories have been extensively criticised. 
Ramazanoglu and Holland (2002: 74) note that `attempts by feminist standpoint 
theorists to tackle productive ways of researching gendered social life at the limits of 
modern thinking have attracted numerous criticisms'. The foremost critique of the 
feminist standpoint theory is the risk of essentialism and universalisation. The 
epistemic privilege of a feminist standpoint posited by Hartsock, Rose and Smith is 
based on women's shared experience. However, women's experiences are not 
homogeneous, rather women encounter different problems and different forms of 
oppression based on social attributes, such as class, race, culture, religion, disability 
and sexual orientation. Feminist epistemology should avoid a simple question of 
producing `women's knowledge about women'. If feminist standpoint theories 
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generalise women's experiences without recognising differences, they may risk the 
pitfalls associated with traditional androcentric social science to which is objected by 
feminists themselves. 
The importance of diversity in women's experiences raises a serious 
question: whether there is `an experience', shared by all women, to constitute the 
basis of a standpoint. Ramazanoglu and Holland (2002) also remark that the 
grounding of a feminist standpoint in experience is problematic in practice since the 
notion of experience does not have consistent meanings across all versions of 
standpoint theories. In fact, the notion of `experience' itself has been strongly 
criticised by feminists (e. g. Scott, 1992). The notion of experience raises much wider 
and deeper discussions within feminism. In particular, it has been the focus of strong 
criticisms by those who follow post-structuralist perspectives. The main critique of 
the use of `experience' as a foundation of knowledge is that experience is contestable, 
because people's accounts of their lives are constructions of the events, based on 
interpretations of them. Nevertheless, Ramazanoglu and Holland (2002) - citing 
Skegg's (1997) negative, but sympathetic appraisal of standpoint theory - highlight 
standpoint theory's achievement in putting `women' at the centre of knowledge 
production. They state that `[t]his leaves making sense of `experience' as an 
unresolved issue, but one that cannot be abandoned' (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 
2002: 76), a view with which I concur. Indeed, experience, in particular shared 
experience, makes a problematic foundation for knowledge due to its constructed 
nature and ontological differences. However, this does not mean abandoning the 
notion of experience altogether, since taking account of women's experience is still 
indispensable for producing feminist knowledge. 
The standpoint debate is related to important issues which are continuously 
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debated within feminism and, more generally, in sociology. A large number of 
critiques of standpoint theories are made, particularly from postmodern and post- 
structuralist perspectives that are critical of universalistic grand theories. The 
problem of `difference' in standpoint theories, discussed above, is raised as one of 
those critiques. Indeed, standpoint theories underestimating the importance of 
differences among women are in danger of making some women's experiences 
invisible. Unjustified generalisations should be avoided. However, we should also be 
careful to avoid over-emphasising `differences', which could lead us to demean 
`gender' as a critical issue or an analytic category. Tanesini (1999) also cautions 
against putting too much emphasis on difference among women because this attitude 
tends to construe people with different identities as complete and mysterious `Others'. 
In this case, it becomes `easy to fall prey to all sorts of generalisations which merely 
reflect our prejudices: e. g. that all black people must be poor' (Tanesini, 1999: 148). 
Despite these criticisms, it is not simply a case of dismissing standpoint theory 
entirely. Feminist standpoint theory is still meaningful because it is the theory that 
strongly challenges the dominant androcentric knowledge by `centring' women's 
lives and experiences in the production of knowledge. Hence, it is worth examining 
recent standpoint theories that attempt to overcome the shortcomings of earlier 
feminist standpoint theories, and looking at their relevance to the research on migrant 
women in this study. 
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`Learning from the Outsider-Within'24 
Harding (1993; 1996; 1998) provides an alternative notion of feminist standpoint 
epistemology and attempts to clarify the critiques of standpoint theory (e. g. Harding, 
1998: 146-164). She argues that standpoint epistemology is based on the claim that 
all knowledge is socially situated and socially constructed. In other words, all 
knowledge is shaped by `what the socially advantaged groups in any society want to 
know and how it benefits them to understand and explain it' (Harding, 1996: 148). 
Harding argues that a feminist standpoint does not arise from the heterogeneous 
experiences of women, which are `shaped by social relations' (1991: 123), but rather 
from objective social locations. She posits that these objective social locations are 
better than others as starting points for knowledge production. Harding (1993: 56) 
explains that: 
[s]tandpoint theories argue for "starting off thought" from the lives 
of marginalized peoples; beginning in those determinate, objective 
locations in any social order will generate illuminating critical 
questions that do not arise in thought that begins from dominant 
group lives. 
She then argues that: 
[s]tarting off research from women's lives will generate less partial 
and distorted accounts not only of women's lives, but also of men's 
24 The title of this subsection is borrowed from the title of one of Collins' works: Collins, P. H. (1991) 'Learning from the Outsider Within: The Social Significance of Black Feminist Thought', in Fonow, M. and Cook, J. (eds), pp. 35-59. 
104 
lives and of the whole social order (Harding, 1993: 56-57). 
Harding (1993) notes that women's lives and experiences provide the `ground', 
rather than `foundation' in the conventional philosophical sense, for the production of 
knowledge. These grounds are `the site, the activities, from which scientific 
questions arise' and epistemic advantaged starting points for research (Harding, 
1993: 56). 
Harding (1991; 1996; 1998) argues that feminist standpoint theory therefore 
sets out guidelines for the `logic of discovery'. Starting research from marginal lives 
helps to foster an understanding of the mechanisms of oppression, which maximises 
the objectivity of the results of research by revealing and understanding previously 
hidden aspects of social relations. hooks (1984) also argues that by moving 
marginalised people's lives `from the margin to centre' of social analysis, we can 
start social inquiry from vantage points for critical insights into social relations. 
Adopting Black feminist Patricia Hill Collins' work, Harding argues that the position 
of marginal lives as outsiders within the social order can generate less partial and 
distorted accounts of nature and social life. Collins (1991; 2000) argues that Black 
feminist scholars in outsider-within locations have `new angles of vision' for critical 
insights of race, class and gender. Collins (2000: 11) illustrates the prominent notion 
of an `outsider-within perspective' by providing the example of Black domestic 
servants working in White households. On the one hand, their `Blackness' made 
them perpetual `outsiders' to the White families they are working for, but, on the 
other hand, doing caring work for White middle-class women allows them an 
insider's view and demystifies White power relations in the household. A similar 
thread of Collins' outsider-within perspective can be found in the work of Smith. 
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According to Smith's notion of the `bifurcated consciousness' of women, `women's 
situation in sociology discloses to us a typical bifurcated structure with the abstracted, 
conceptual practices on the one hand and the concrete realisations, the maintenance 
routines, and so forth, on the other' (Smith, 1990: 27). 
Starting research from the perspective of outsider-within offers `strong 
objectivity in the research, which is one of the prominent features of standpoint 
theory. Harding (1987; 1991; 1996; 1998) rejects `objectivism' adhered by a 
conventional scientific method that purports to be value-free and to maintain a 
neutral perspective. Instead, she argues that a `subjective' element in the analysis of 
fact increases the objectivity of feminist research. Therefore, the researcher is not `an 
invisible, anonymous voice of authority', but `a real, historical individual with 
concrete, specific desires and interests' (Harding, 1987: 9). Harding explains the role 
of the researcher in knowledge production as follows: 
We need to avoid the "objectivist" stance that attempts to make the 
researcher's cultural beliefs and practices invisible while 
simultaneously skewering the research objects beliefs and practices 
to the display board. Only in this way can we hope to produce 
understandings and explanations which are free ... of distortion from 
the unexamined beliefs and behaviours of social scientists 
themselves... the beliefs and behaviours of the researcher are part 
of the empirical evidence for (or against) the claims advanced in 
the results of research (Harding, 1987: 9). 
Moving the lives of migrant women from the margin to centre of the analysis, 
this study is based on the standpoint of the `outsider-within'. Migrant women are 
`outsiders' who exist `within' the very core of the international migration system, 
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from which they are, nevertheless, marginalised and silenced in the dominant study 
of migration. They play crucial economic and social functions, but are socially and 
politically marginalised in the country of destination. Adopting the standpoint of the 
outsider-within affords the lives of migrant women distinctively valuable positions in 
understanding social relations that are not visible from dominant accounts. In order 
to maximise objectivity, standpoint theory allows me as a researcher to examine my 
own social location within the research project, not just that of the migrant women 
who are `researched'. Because researchers and their subjects are located in specific 
social-historical settings and there is a social relationship between them, research 
cannot be construed as a process of removing the presence of the researcher 
(Anderson, 1993: 42). Thus, as an `outsider-within', I (being an immigrant woman 
researcher working within the discipline of sociology in the West and a married 
woman in Korean society) could use my own social position to reveal new 
sociological insights in the study of migrant women. 
On the other hand, in relation to race and ethnicity, my social position could 
be situated in the dominant group of society. The social relationship between me, as a 
researcher, and migrant women is bound by power relations shaped by race and 
ethnicity. Ramazanoglu (1989) argues that it is the researcher's role to interpret and 
conceptualise women's lives to see what could not be seen before. She illustrates, `a 
feminist researcher for whom racism is a salient concept could give a very different 
account of the same women's experiences from one who has no consciousness of 
racism' (1989: 54). As Anderson (1993: 42) aptly points out, politically engaged 
standpoints are not simply the result of biological identity: `they are not inherent in 
one's race, sex or class'. 
As mentioned above, the essentialist concept of women, which unifies 
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women's experience based on their roles in reproduction, should be avoided. 
Undoubtedly experiences of migrant women are bound up in the problems of 
`multiple jeopardy' of race, ethnicity and class, not the singular gender inequality 
(King, 1988). Harding's emphasis on standpoint theory as `socially located 
knowledge' makes up for this weakness in earlier standpoint theories. She argues that 
`socially located knowledge' is socially located in `a gender/class/race matrix' 
(Harding, 1996: 153). The subject of knowledge is not treated as being homogenous, 
but as being heterogeneous and contradictory. Multiple subjects mean that each 
group has its own standpoint. In this case, one could question which group's 
standpoint should be privileged. Is it the group that is most oppressed? How then do 
we measure oppression in order to distinguish the most oppressed? Collins' notion of 
the `matrix of domination' helps us to answer these questions (Collins, 2000). Collins 
rejects additive models of oppression. She points out that oppression cannot be 
reduced to one fundamental type, but particular forms of intersecting oppressions - 
e. g. intersections of race, gender and class - are interrelated. These intersecting 
oppressions are organised by the `matrix of domination'. Collins (2000: 18) argues 
that `regardless of the particular intersections involved, structural, disciplinary, 
hegemonic, and interpersonal domains of power reappear across quite different forms 
of oppression'. In this sense, women are all partly victims of oppression and partly 
oppressors to varying degrees depending on the situation (Tanesini, 1999: 153). This 
is a significant point for this study, which deals with diverse groups of women who 
may share their positions in Korean society as migrant workers, but whose 
experiences could be different from each other in terms of race, ethnicity or 
nationality25. 
25 This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
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II. Research Methods 
Qualitative Research 
As seen in the first section, feminist research methodology focuses on discovering 
the social relationship between the researcher and the researched. When research 
remains too tightly bound by the framework of scientific methodology, the vital 
texture and nuances in this relationship would be missed out (Anderson, 1993). In 
this case, qualitative methods are more appropriate for carrying out feminist research 
because `when we study qualitatively, we get to know them personally and 
experience what they experience in their daily struggles in society' (Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1984: 7). Taylor and Bogdan (1984) explain that while quantitative research 
emphasises objectivity and reliability, qualitative research emphasises validity. They 
note that: 
[q]ualitative methods allow us to stay close to the empirical world 
(Blumer, 1969). They are designed to ensure a close fit between the 
data and what people actually say and do. By observing people in 
their everyday lives, listening to them talk about what is on their 
minds, and looking at the documents they produce, the qualitative 
researcher obtains first-hand knowledge of social life unfiltered 
through concepts, operational definitions, and rating scales (Taylor 
and Bogdan, 1984: 7). 
This study adopts qualitative methods, in particular, semi-structured and group 
interviews. Semi- and unstructured interviews are widely used methods in feminist 
research since they `convey a deeper feeling for or more emotional closeness to the 
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persons studied' (Jayaratne, 1983: 145, cited in Westmarland, 2001). A qualitative 
approach to data collection does not represent the complete realisation of diverse 
lives of migrant women. However, this study is not intended to provide `rigorous 
evidence' on the subject of migrant women, but rather attempts to discover the lives 
of these women and their experiences in the social, political and cultural context of 
international migration, which could not be seen before. 
Some official statistical data are collected and analysed in this study. 
Numerical information illustrated by tables, graphs or pie charts helps us to clarify 
and draw a wider picture of the research subjects. However, statistical data should be 
critically assessed and cautiously used in any analysis. While secondary analyses of 
statistical data are presented in this study, they do not play a significant role, for the 
following reasons. 
First, women are largely invisible in official statistics collected during the 
fieldwork. Official statistics were of no use for major parts of this study because 
there is limited data on migrant women for the purposes of analysis. There is no sex 
breakdown of figures in almost all government statistical data on migrant workers in 
Korea. Neither the total population of legal and undocumented migrant workers, the 
population of migrant workers in different industries, the population of industrial 
trainees, nor the statistics on working hours and wages are subdivided by sex. 
Women do not appear as a category in the data on the total number of migrant 
workers in service industries, in which most migrant women are engaged. 
Throughout the fieldwork, I interviewed a number of government officials and 
attempted to collect any data with a sex breakdown, but the figures were largely 
unavailable. As Oakley and Oakley (1979: 188) point out, the function of official 
statistics may not be `that of providing material for social scientists, but that of 
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satisfying the `needs' of government departments and thus indirectly those of 
government itself'. The invisibility of women workers in official statistics therefore 
partly explains their invisibility in policymaking and implementation regarding 
migrant issues in Korea. 
Second, there are certain ambiguities in the official statistical data on 
migration. There are concerns over accuracy and potential for political manipulation 
in official statistics because they are produced by individuals within organisational 
settings and by governmental policies (Irvine et al., 1979; May, 1997). Questioning 
the `neutrality' of official statistics published by the state, Irvine and Miles 
(1979: 125-126) argue that its economic and political functions are embedded in the 
production of official statistics, such as its processing and presentation. An example 
of the ambiguous nature of official statistics is the data on the number of 
undocumented migrant workers. There is no clear indication of how data on 
undocumented workers was collected and produced. The Korean government tends 
to evaluate its policy measures based on the official data, which often under- 
represents the actual number of undocumented workers. For example, based chiefly 
on the decreased number of undocumented workers in the official statistics, the 
2005 report of the Korea Labour Institute (the government-funded research 
institute) evaluates the Employment Permit System (EPS) as a `generally satisfying' 
policy after one year of its enforcement. After all, as Irvine and Miles remark, 
formulating statistics is a social practice. Therefore, 
it is not necessarily the case that quantitative analysis makes social 
research any more `scientific', let alone more `objective'. The use 
of statistical techniques poses its own problems, in the same way as 
do other ways of presenting and assessing knowledge of society; it 
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is inherently no more theory-free or value-neutral than other 
approaches (Irvine and Miles, 1979: 3-4). 
Working in the Field 
The field research was conducted between April and September 2005 in Korea. The 
fieldwork involved the collection of published and unpublished materials, the 
participation in conferences and seminars on the relevant subjects of this study, and 
interviews with 31 migrant women, several male migrant workers, three government 
officials and four NGO workers26. During the fieldwork, I also worked as a volunteer 
for the nongovernmental organisation, the `Women Migrants Human Rights Centre 
(WMHRC)' in Seoul. This was prearranged through email correspondence with 
WMHRC during the fieldwork planning stage in March 2005. The organisation was 
selected through an internet-based search, based on its location and the range of 
activities and services provided for migrant women living in Korea. My voluntary 
work in WMHRC involved translation of materials published by the centre and 
assistance for organising a regional conference on women migrant workers in Asia 
jointly promoted by Migrant Forum Asia, WMHRC and the Joint Committee for 
Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK), which was held in September 2005. My initial 
expectation was that WMHRC would become a useful research site and a potential 
contact point for informants and interview participants. Working in the organisation 
gave me access to useful inside information and documents, and an opportunity to 
take part in seminars and workshops organised by NGOs in the field. Nevertheless, 
because the activities and services of WMHRC were concentrated on supporting 
26 See Appendix for the list of interview participants. 
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mainly cross-border marriage immigrants27, it had a limited role as an effective 
research site to locate the diverse groups of migrant women who I aimed to interview. 
Accordingly, in addition to WMHRC, I had to establish different contacts to find 
interview participants from diverse groups. 
Over a period of six months, I organised interviews through five different 
contacts. Interestingly, each contact gave me access to different groups of migrant 
women. First, I was introduced to Carol, who is a Filipina migrant married to a 
Korean man, by WMHRC. Carol acted as a crucial informant and introduced me to 
other Filipina migrants. I also met three Korean-Chinese workers, including a woman 
who came to WMHRC seeking legal advice for a divorce from her violent husband. 
Second, nine out of fourteen Korean-Chinese workers were interviewed through the 
Korean-Chinese Association, which is a group organised by Korean-Chinese 
migrants in Korea. I made regular telephone contacts with the deputy director of the 
Korean-Chinese Association, who later became a key informant for Korean-Chinese 
interviewees who were all working in the service sector. Third, I interviewed three 
Indonesian workers, including a husband of one of the interview participants, and 
two Sri Lankan women workers through the Migrant Workers' Centre in Inchoen 
City. This centre is not an NGO, but is operated by a local government. Due to the 
regional specificity28, all of the interviewees through this contact were working in the 
manufacturing sector. Fourth, I was introduced to a Vietnamese male worker, Tan, 
who was working in a glass factory where a friend of mine was working as an office 
manager. Tan became a key informant and introduced me to several groups of 
Vietnamese workers including three Vietnamese women who participated in the 
27 Since January 2005, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family has commissioned WMHRC to implement the project of support for marriage migrants. 28 Large industrial complexes are concentrated in this part of Inchoen City. 
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interviews. Tan's extensive social network with Vietnamese migrant workers in 
Korea helped me to get inside the close-knit Vietnamese community in Hwa-Sung 
City and to have an opportunity for group interviews. Finally, I met the Filipina 
worker, Jenny, in the Migrant workers' Centre in Osan City, in which subcontracted 
factories of major electronic companies are concentrated. Jenny introduced me to a 
group of Filipina workers who were resident in the same village. 
The Process of Semi-structured In-depth Interviews 
Since it was not possible to get hold of lists of migrant women in Korea for the 
purpose of sampling, I used the method of `snowball sampling'. The snowball 
sampling technique helped me to find a number of key informants, who introduced 
me to other interviewees. Firstly, I interviewed one migrant through each contact. 
Therefore, at the outset I started interviews with just five people from the five 
different contacts discussed above. After having completed the interview, they then 
became informants and were asked to nominate others for interviewing. It was 
evident that Filipina and Vietnamese migrants who belonged to close social circles 
were more willing than other groups of migrants to introduce me to their friends for 
the interview. 
All interviews were conducted by myself. Interviews were held in Korean 
with Korean-Chinese migrants and mainly in English with the other migrants. Some 
interviews, especially with the participants who had resided in Korea for a long time, 
were conducted bilingually in English and Korean. This was useful for interviewing 
migrants whose mother tongue was neither English nor Korean, since Korean words 
or expressions supplemented the communication in English. The interviews with 
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Vietnamese workers were assisted by a Vietnamese interpreter, Quyen, who was a 
Ph. D. student at Sung Gyun Gwan University in Korea. Quyen translated Vietnamese 
into English and vice versa for each individual interview with three Vietnamese 
women workers and for a group interview. With the full consent of the interviewees, 
the names appearing in this study are either real names or pseudonyms. 
Apart from a couple of group interviews, interviews were conducted on a 
one to one basis and each interview lasted between one and two hours. With the 
consent of the interviewees, interviews were recorded on a digital recorder. I adopted 
a semi-structured in-depth interview but allowed as much room as possible for the 
interviewees to talk about their experiences in terms of their own frames of reference. 
Interview questions were designed using a chronological and biographical approach, 
exploring the biography of the interviewees in terms of four phases: the pre- 
migration; the migratory journey; the present life and work; and the prospective plan. 
Interviews did however not always begin with the questions on the first phase of 
migration. Starting the interview with the question on the past, such as "how did you 
decide to come to Korea? " or "what did you do before coming to Korea? " seemed to 
give the interviewee a negative feeling that she was being interrogated by the 
researcher. Therefore, interviews often began with rather simple questions about the 
present, such as the period of residence in Korea, commuting journeys between home 
and place of work, or current jobs. 
Oakley (1981: 41) argues that `the goal of finding out about people through 
interviewing is best achieved when the relationship of interviewer and interviewee is 
non-hierarchical and when the interviewer is prepared to invest his or her own 
personal identity in the relationship'. The interview participants in this study had to 
answer questions on their private lives including various aspects of conjugal and 
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social relations. Furthermore, because the majority of the interviewees are 
undocumented workers, some were rather apprehensive about being interviewed by a 
Korean researcher. One of the possible problems for the research based upon inter- 
personal dialogue is the difficulty in ascertaining whether or not the truth is being 
told by the interviewee. At the core of the problem and its resolution, there lies the 
concept of the bond of mutual trust. Accordingly, it was important for me to build a 
genuine rapport with an interview participant. In this case, the one-way process of 
interviewing, in which the interviewer detaches him/herself and treats the 
interviewee as a passive individual or an object for data producing, does not help to 
obtain best information (Maynard and Purvis, 1994; Oakley, 1987). I, therefore, tried 
to avoid impersonal and hierarchical relations with interviewees. The personal 
involvement became an important element in establishing trust among interviewees 
who were particularly suspicious or feeling uncomfortable about being interviewed. I 
found that simply `being a woman researcher interviewing a woman' was not 
sufficient for an effective interview, and establishing a basis of trust between 
interviewer and interviewee was not easily established during the interview per se. In 
fact, maintaining contact with interview participants prior to and after interviews was 
essential for establishing a good rapport. For example, it took me nearly two months 
to establish trust and a close rapport with Korean-Chinese workers before the actual 
interviews were conducted. I regularly visited the deputy director of the Korean- 
Chinese Association who later became a key informant, and attended Sunday 
worship services in church where I could meet and informally talk to members or 
non-members of the Association. Accordingly, informal social meetings with the 
interview participants were a significant part of the interview process. 
Except for Korean-Chinese migrants, most interviews were conducted in the 
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participants' homes. As most of the interviewees were engaged in paid work during 
weekdays, interviews were conducted mainly at weekends or in the evening on 
weekdays. Interviewing at home facilitated a friendly and relaxed ambience. 
Although conversations during interviews were occasionally interrupted by phone 
calls or children, home interviews provided me with the opportunity to observe the 
interactions and lives of interviewees in a family setting. For Korean-Chinese 
migrants; interviews took place in the office of the Korean-Chinese Association. 
Because most of the Korean-Chinese interviewees were employed as live-in 
domestic workers, they were not available for interviewing during weekdays. I, 
therefore, visited the office of the Korean-Chinese Association on Sunday when 
those workers came to the office for a social gathering after attending church. 
In addition to individual interviews, three group interviews were conducted. 
Owing to the rigorous crackdown campaign against undocumented migrant workers, 
which was implemented by the Immigration Bureau between March and August 
2005, when I visited Filipina and Vietnamese workers during the summer many were 
out of work and staying at home to avoid being caught. Thus, on three occasions I 
had an opportunity to have group interviews with a number of female and male 
workers who were sharing the same house. Since a group interview was not the main 
method of fieldwork research, it was rather informal and unstructured. Group 
interviews provided me with valuable insights into group dynamics and social 
relations, such as gender relations within the group. Group interviews showed that 
interaction within the group influenced people's opinions and responses to certain 
issues. For example, whereas in individual interviews interviewees tended to avoid 
negative opinions and express unpleasant feelings about Korean bosses or Korean 
society in general, workers tended to express grievances more openly in group 
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interviews. 
The Field Journal 
During the fieldwork, I wrote a field journal. The journal was written after interviews 
or social meetings with migrant workers. Although it was rather brief and informal, 
the journal helped me to keep a record of conversations with interviewees outside of 
the interview setting. During breaks or mealtimes, when the digital recorder was off, 
some women talked at length about their personal histories, including failed 
marriages and children left back home. In addition to the interview data, such 
information certainly provided me great insights into their lives. This type of data 
was valuable and was therefore included in the data analysis. The journal also helped 
me to keep track of specific questions covered in the interviews and to record lists of 
questions missed in the interview. This was particularly useful when repeated 
interviewing was conducted because it reminded me to ask those questions in the 
subsequent interview. 
The Analysis of Interviews 
All the recorded interviews were fully transcribed by myself. The interviews with the 
Korean-Chinese migrants, which were held in Korean, were transcribed in Korean 
and the selected transcriptions used in this study were translated into English. Each 
set of interview data is indexed chronologically according to the migratory stages of 
an interviewee: the pre-migration; the migratory decision and passage; the present 
work and life in Korea; and the prospective plan. The chronological index of the data 
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helped me to analyse the experiences of interview participants in accordance with 
each stage of the migratory process and to observe the ways in which different 
migrants related their experiences to their migratory journey. While a qualitative data 
analysis software package, such as Nvivo, is being increasingly used for data 
analysis in the Social Sciences, I chose not to use computer assisted methods in the 
data analysis in this study. By coding text and breaking it down into categories, the 
use of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) can facilitate the 
process of data analysis and provide a quick and simple way of finding the frequency 
with which interviewees use certain words in what contexts. Proponents of 
CAQDAS also argue that it provides reliable and rigorous qualitative data (Morison 
and Moir, 1998; Richards and Richards, 1994). However, CAQDAS was less 
applicable to this study owing to the relatively small volume of data and the in-depth 
semi-structured interview data, which contained significant non-verbal gestures and 
particular nuances in each interview. Moreover, in this study, as the interview data 
represented the biography of the interview participant in relation to her migratory 
journey, it was important for me to become familiar with the data by understanding 
and analysing the biographical detail of each participant rather than coding text and 
breaking her story down into categorised files to find similarities with the stories of 
other participants. 
As mentioned above, this study is not intended to provide `rigorous 
evidence' on the subject of migrant women. It rather attempts to discover the lives of 
those women, which have been largely marginalised in the dominant study of 
international migration. Through this attempt to recover the experiences of small 
groups of migrant women, it is hoped that the evidence and arguments presented will 
provide a stimulus for further debate, not only on the lives of migrant women in 
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Korea - which has been neglected in scholarly work - but also on the wider and 
more fundamental issues of gender relations in the process of international migration. 
Conclusion 
In order to expand on existing approaches to the migration of women that merely 
`add women, mix and stir' within orthodox theoretical frameworks of international 
migration, this chapter has discussed the process of knowledge production by 
looking at epistemological and methodological issues as well as the research methods 
used in this research. The primary empirical data of this research were collected 
during a six-month period of fieldwork. This involved both individual in-depth 
interviews with 31 migrant women and group interviews. Moving the lives of 
migrant women from the margin to centre of the analysis, this research is based on a 
feminist standpoint of the outsider-within. Migrant women are `outsiders' who exist 
`within' the very core of international migration system from which they are, 
nevertheless, marginalised and silenced in the dominant study of migration. They 
play crucial economic and social functions, but are socially and politically 
marginalised in the country of destination. Therefore, a standpoint of the outsider- 
within attributes to the lives of migrant women distinctively valuable positions in the 
process of understanding social relations that are not visible from the dominant 
accounts. From the standpoint of the outsider-within, women's experiences are 
socially located in `a gender/class/race matrix' (Harding, 1996). Acknowledging the 
heterogeneous nature of women's experiences is a significant point for this study, 
which focuses on diverse groups of women who may share their positions in a host 
society as migrant workers, but whose experiences may be different from each other 
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in terms of race, ethnicity, or nationality. Based on the epistemological and 
methodological position established in this chapter, the following chapters will focus 
on the empirical study of the migration of women to Korea, beginning with an 
exploration of women's decisions on migration and their migratory journeys to Korea. 
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Chapter 4 
Migrant Women On the Move: The Road From Home 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the processes that lead individuals to pursue international 
migration in search of better employment opportunities. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
international migration cannot be fully understood either as the result of an 
individual's rationally-based decision or by structural determinants in the countries 
of origin and destination. It is recognised that the household and social networks also 
play a part in facilitating migration. However, as mentioned earlier, this meso-level 
approach is problematic as an analytical concept as it does not take the power 
relations of gender into account. It is also questionable whether the social networks 
perspective can provide an adequate analytical framework for reconciling micro and 
macro perspectives. The empirical data of this study suggests that while there are 
evident structural determinations, a potential migrant acts strategically to further her 
interests by exploiting available resources within the increasingly institutionalised 
migration system. Therefore, an account of the articulation between structure and 
agency is needed in the analysis of the process of international migration. 
This chapter attempts to integrate empirical data collected from fieldwork in 
South Korea into the concept of the `migrant institution', developed by Goss and 
Lindquist (1995) in the context of the structuration theory of Giddens. This chapter is 
divided into three main sections. In the first section, I examine Goss and Lindquist's 
application of Giddens' structuration theory to the process of international labour 
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migration. Understanding the concept of the migrant institution within the 
structuration perspective provides an analytical framework for articulating between 
structure and agency in the process of labour migration to Korea. The second section 
starts by examining structural changes in the state control of unskilled migrant 
workers in Korea in the period between 1991 and 2003. It goes on to discuss the 
current migrant labour control system in Korea. Finally, in the third section, focusing 
on the pre-migration stage - including individual decisions on migration and various 
migrant channels chosen by potential migrants -I discuss how migrants acquire their 
knowledge of structures and exploit available means to realise their ends. 
I. Articulating Between Structure and Agency in the Analysis of the Process of 
International Migration 
Migrant Institutions: A Structuration Perspective 
Massey et al. (1993: 451) note that `as organisations develop to support, sustain, and 
promote international movement, the international flow of migrants becomes more 
and more institutionalised and independent of the factors that originally caused it'. 
Taking account of the `institutionalisation of migration' through personal and 
intermediary networks, Goss and Lindquist (1995) further develop the concept of the 
`migrant institution' to articulate between various levels of analysis. They define the 
migrant institution as `a complex articulation of individuals, associations, and 
organisations which extends the social action of and interaction between these agents 
and agencies across time and space' (Goss and Lindquist, 1995: 319). They develop 
this concept in the context of the structuration theory of Giddens and apply this to the 
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case of the Philippines. 
Identifying weaknesses in extant theories of international migration with 
respect to the articulation between structure and agency, Goss and Lindquist 
(1995: 331) find `a useful set of sensitising devices' in the theory of structuration. 
Despite a number of limitations inherent in the theory of structuration, they argue 
that the theory provides `a means to transcend the macro-micro dichotomy and may 
help us to begin to develop a theoretical conception of social networks necessary to a 
fuller understanding of the process of labour migration' (Goss and Lindquist, 
1995: 331). Structuration refers to `the dynamic process whereby structure comes into 
being' (Giddens, 1976: 12 1, cited in Parker, 2000: 6). Thus, it is literally the process of 
producing structures. Thompson (1989: 57) notes that in an attempt to deal with the 
problem of the relationship between action and social structure, there is `the shift 
from a static to a dynamic perspective from a theory of structure to a theory of 
structuration'. Recognising structures as the product of historical processes, i. e. 
structuration, Giddens (1984) argues that, through recursive human social activities, 
agents reproduce the conditions that make the activities possible. 
In their study, Goss and Lindquist (1995) pay particular attention to Giddens' 
concept of the `duality of structure', which is conceived as a dialectical process by 
which the `structural properties of the social system are both the medium and 
outcome of the practices they recursively organise' (Giddens, 1984: 25)29. Rather than 
seeing action and structure as separating entities, Giddens views that both are 
constitutive of each other. Thus, `structure is not `external' to individuals' (Giddens, 
1984: 25) - both are interdependent. 
29 Cf. the dualism of structure and agency (Archer, 1982; Mouzelis, 1991,1995). The critics of Giddens reject the duality of structure and agency, and hold the view that they are logically exclusive 
of each other. Notwithstanding the significance of this debate, I do not intend to discuss the 
controversies associated with structuration theory, for reasons of limited space. 
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Goss and Lindquist (1995) argue that the insight of the Giddens' `dialectic of 
control' is particularly important in understanding the operation of dual relations 
within migrant institutions. Giddens (1984: 16) claims that: 
[w]e should not conceive of the structures of domination built into 
social institutions as in some way grinding out `docile bodies' who 
behave like the automata suggested by objectivist social science. 
Power within social systems which enjoy some continuity over 
time and space presumes regularized relations of autonomy and 
dependence between actors or collectivities in contexts of social 
interaction. But all forms of dependence offer some resources 
whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of 
their superiors. This is what I call the dialectic of control in social 
systems. 
Therefore, according to the Giddens' `dialectic of control', relations between 
domination and subordination are reciprocal, and even `the most seemingly 
"powerless" individuals are able to mobilise resources whereby they carve out "space 
of control" (Giddens, 1982: 197, cited in Goss and Lindquist, 1995)'. 
For Giddens, structures are rules and resources that both constrain and enable 
the actions of individuals. In this respect, structural constraint operates through the 
individual in the cumulative, everyday strategic decisions and actions that they make 
(Giddens, 1984). Human agents acquire a knowledge of structures to realise their 
ends, and through individual and collective actions these structures are reproduced 
and transformed. Even though social knowledge and power are unequally distributed 
and put individuals in a `weak' social position, individuals tend to maintain some 
sense of autonomy and capacity for strategic action. Goss and Lindquist (1995: 333) 
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argue that `even the most marginalized populations are thus able to mobilise 
resources and rules in order to influence the actions of the most powerful towards 
them'. 
Drawing upon Giddens' structuration theory, Goss and Lindquist (1995: 335) 
suggest that `what has previously been identified as migrant networks be conceived 
as migrant institutions that articulate, in a nonfunctionalist way, the individual 
migrant and the global economy, "stretching" social relations across time and space 
to bring together the potential migrant and the overseas employer'. In other words, 
potential migrants as knowledgeable agents use their understanding of the rules and 
exploit their access to allocative (economic) and authoritative (political) resources 
within the migrant institution in order to attain overseas employment. Goss and 
Lindquist (1995) note that `social networks may become migrant networks' since 
successful migration experiences are followed by friends, relatives and others, 
reinforcing the strategies and social relationships on which they are based. 
Goss and Lindquist (1995) conclusively argue that through the routinisation 
of the social practices of migration and the articulation of the strategic goals of 
individuals and institutional agents, international migration becomes institutionalised, 
and access to migration is conditioned by the operation of specific rules and the 
mobilisation of resources. The migrant institution then becomes a permanent feature 
of social life, consisting of knowledgeable individuals and the agents of 
organisations and other institutions - including social networks and the state. 
The concept of the migrant institution emphasises the increasingly significant 
role played by intermediary agencies in international migration. This is particularly 
relevant to the current migration process in Asia, which has become increasingly 
institutionalised. Goss and Lindquist argue that, even though institutionalised 
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migration leads to a corrupt and deceptive system of migration, individuals still seek 
employment overseas. They observe that: 
this is an indication of relative deprivation in the country, but it is 
also the result of the selective flow of information through the 
migrant institution. Institutional agents control knowledge about 
the risks and disappointments of international migration, but it is 
obviously in their interests to hide these and to promote the 
advantages of overseas labour (Goss and Lindquist, 1995: 344). 
Migrant Institutions in the Gendered Process of International Migration 
Goss and Lindquist's adaptation of structuration theory provides us with a dynamic 
perspective on the process of international migration. In particular, the account of 
social reproduction and the enabling character of structure enables us to 
conceptualise an individual migrant as an agent in her or his migratory project. It is 
argued that Goss and Lindquist's application of structuration theory to migration is 
`innovative and constitutes a long overdue attempt to resolve the agency/structure 
impasse of migration theory' (Phizacklea, 1999: 39). Chant and Radcliffe (1992: 19) 
also remark that the structuration perspective is `perhaps the most fruitful way to 
examine the rationality and selectivity of broad movements of population, without at 
the same time losing sight of the micro-social circumstances which give rise to 
participation in migration'. 
Nevertheless, it is important to avoid a holistic approach to the concept of 
`knowledgeable agents'. Clearly, the range of allocative and authoritative resources 
available to individuals are differently distributed and very often structurally 
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circumscribed. Even when the most marginalised interpret their situation and can 
mobilise available rules and resources, the modalities of the strategic use of rules and 
resources by agents may vary between individuals, depending on their position 
within social institutions. This becomes apparent when we consider the different 
levels of knowledge of rules and access to resources between women and men in 
their pre-migration stages. In this case, agency becomes dependent on structurally 
conditioning factors which differentially distribute the capacity to influence 
outcomes (Parker, 2000). Unequal distributions of social knowledge and power as 
well as rules and resources between women and men make women opt for different 
strategic use of resources. Differently `sedimented' practices of women and men - 
who draw selectively on institutional rules and resources in pursuit of their interests - 
become institutionalised and this, in turn, influences the gendered process of 
international migration. 
H. The Structure of Dominance: the State Control of Unskilled Migrant 
Workers in Korea 
As examined in Chapter 2, the structural background of the influx of migrant 
workers to Korea has been formed as a result of the rapid socio-economic 
development of the country and the increasing demand for workers to fill the vacuum 
in 3D jobs in the Korean labour market. Combined with the push factors in the 
sending countries, good employment opportunities for unskilled workers and 
relatively high wages have made Korea an increasingly attractive destination for 
international labour migrants in Asia. Regardless of the demand for migrant labour in 
labour-scarce sectors, until July 2004 the Korean state strictly prohibited unskilled 
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migrant workers from entering Korea for the purpose of employment. Nevertheless, 
since the late 1980s migrant workers have continuously flowed into Korea resulting 
in a large number of undocumented workers. Despite a series of changes in the state 
policy on the control of migrant workers in Korea, the state policy on migrant 
workers has been unrealistic and failed in many aspects. This section aims to 
highlight and provide dynamic insight into the changes in the state policy that have 
occurred between 1991 and the present. 
An Overview of the Changes in the State Control of Migrant Workers in Korea 
The Industrial and Technical Training Programme for Foreigners (ITTP) 
In response to severe labour shortages in labour-intensive industries, during the late 
1980s small and medium firms began to demand that the government should allow 
them to import foreign workers. However, trade unions opposed the import of 
foreign labour, arguing that migrant workers would lead to a deterioration in the 
level of wages and working conditions, and take jobs away from the local workforce. 
There was also no consensus on the issue of foreign workers among government 
ministries, since they had different views on the possible impact that migrant workers 
would have on Korean economy and society (Y-B. Park, 1994; Seol, 1999). On the 
one hand, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy and the Ministry of 
Construction argued that foreign workers should be imported to alleviate labour 
shortages, especially in the mining and manufacturing sectors. On the other hand, the 
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
opposed the importation of foreign labour, arguing that the problem of labour 
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shortages could be resolved by utilising sectors of the domestic labour force, such as 
the female labour force. 
Under these circumstances, the Korean government introduced the Industrial 
and Technical Training Programmes (ITTP) as a compromise in 1991. Based on the 
Japanese model of the Industrial and Technical Training Programme for Foreigners, 
the ITTP allowed foreigners to enter Korea as `trainees', and not workers, for a 
period of six months with a possible extension of an additional six months, subject to 
the consent of the Ministry of Justice. Under the 1991 ITTP, the companies that 
could bring in foreign trainees were restricted to those meeting the following criteria: 
companies, in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Act, investing in foreign 
countries jointly with a foreign company; companies providing technical support to 
foreign countries based on the Foreign Technological Development Act; companies 
exporting industrial supplies to foreign countries based on the Import-Export Act; 
and companies recognised by the government ministries as legitimate for hiring 
foreign trainees (Seol, 2000b). In other words, only those workers who had been 
employed in Korean overseas companies were sent to Korea as trainees for 
apprenticeships of six months to a maximum of a year, and only those companies 
that established overseas branches through FDI or joint venture relationships with 
foreign companies were eligible to apply for hiring foreign trainees. However, 
whereas the 1991 ITTP benefited only those companies meeting the specific criteria 
- which tended to be relatively large-size companies with sufficient capital for 
overseas FDI - many small and medium firms facing severe labour shortages were 
not eligible for hiring foreign trainees. The Korea Federation of Small Business 
(KFSB) asked the government for an extension of the period of training and a 
loosening of the eligibility criteria for companies in terms of the ITTP. As a result, in 
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September 1992 the government permitted small and medium firms without overseas 
FDI to hire foreign trainees. 
Nevertheless, there was still an insufficient number of trainees to supply 
manpower to small and medium firms, while the number of undocumented migrant 
workers dramatically increased to 82% of total migrant workers in 1993 (Ministry of 
Justice, cited in Seol, 2000b). In February 1993 the newly elected government 
decided to stop importing foreign trainees and attempted to crack down on 
undocumented migrant workers. Nevertheless, due to strong resistance from 
employers, in November 1993 the government changed its position and introduced 
slight amendments to the policy, which maintained the ITTP and allowed for an 
increase in the number of foreign trainees and an extension in the length of the 
training period from one year to a maximum of two years. The ITTP was placed 
under the supervision of the Korea International Training Cooperation Corps 
(KITCO) rather than of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy. The 
KITCO, an affiliate of the KFSB, was an imitation of the Japan International 
Training Cooperation Organisation (JITCO) (Seol, 2000b). Seol (2000b) points out 
that, being an affiliate of the KFSB, the KITCO tended to serve the interests of 
employers. 
The government gave KITCO the right to exclusively conduct the 
process of importing and distributing trainees. While JITCO was 
composed of three different parts representing labour, business and 
government, KITCO was a subsidiary organisation of an 
employers' association and thus functioned to meet the interests of 
the employers. Because KITCO was working on behalf of the 
employers, it was inevitable that the ITTP would not be successful 
(Seol, 2000b: 10). 
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The KITCO recruited trainees through 27 international manpower recruiting agencies 
in 14 Asian countries, including Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Iran, China, Vietnam, Thailand, Pakistan, the 
Philippines and Uzbekistan (Ministry of Labour, 2000, cited in J. Kim, 2003)30. 
Trainees had to be between 20 and 50 years of age and had to have no criminal 
records. 
Table 4.1 The Number of Migrant workers in Korea, 1987-2000 (Persons) 
Skilled workers Unskilled workers 
Year 
Professionals tecnnicai 
trainees migrant workers 
1987 6,409 2,192 0 4,217 
1988 7,410 2,403 0 5,007 
1989 14,610 2,474 0 12,136 
1990 21,235 2,833 0 18,402 
1991 45,449 2,973 599 41,877 
1992 73,868 3,395 4,945 65,528 
1993 66,323 3,767 8,048 54,508 
1994 77,546 5,265 24,050 48,231 
1995 142,405 8,228 52,311 81,866 
1996 210,494 13,420 68,020 129,054 
1997 245,399 15,900 81,451 148,048 
199831 157,689 11,143 47,009 99,537 
1999 217,384 12,592 69,454 135,338 
2000* 285,506 19,063 77,448 188,995 
Note: As of December 31, each year, except July 31,1992 
Sources: 1987-1999, Ministry of Justice, cited in Seol, 2000b: 8; *2000, Ministry of Justice, 2005 
J. Kim (2003) notes that the increasing popularity of the ITTP among small 
and medium businesses in the manufacturing sector paved the way for other 
industries. The government allowed the garment and footwear sectors to bring in 
30 Seol (2000: 11) argues that as the KITCO had the rights to selecting those agencies, brokers in 
sending countries bribed staffs in the KITCO to be recruited, and as a result, the KITCO became 'a 
hotbed for many brokers' and bribery. 31 The dramatic decrease in the number of migrant workers in 1998 was due to the economic crisis in 
1997. Around 100,000 migrant workers left Korea at the end of 1997 alone (Seol, 2000). It is 
nevertheless interesting to note that the situation was reversed in a year later. 
Total migrant T. _ , ]..,. a..:.. 1 .. «, ý 
workers illuub. llal 
üllü 
Undocumented 
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20,000 trainees in 1993 and 10,000 additional trainees in the following year. In 1995 
even large enterprises in the footwear sector became eligible to hire trainees (Seol, 
2000b). The government also introduced the ITTP in fisheries in 1996 and the 
construction industry in 1997 (J. Kim, 2003). By 1997, the total number of foreign 
trainees in manufacturing, fisheries and construction industries was 81,451 (see 
Table 4.1) and the training period was extended to a maximum of three years. 
As more trainees entered Korea, the government's incompetence in 
managing the ITTP became apparent. Although there were continuous demands for 
migrant labour to fill labour shortages, rather than introducing an appropriate policy 
for importing migrant workers, the state maintained the ITTP, which had become a 
site for generating undocumented migrant workers. Under the ITTP significant 
numbers of foreign trainees escaped from their designated companies and worked as 
undocumented migrant workers in other companies, which paid them better wages. 
As many firms still experienced labour shortages, it was not difficult for the 
undocumented migrant worker to find a better-paid job. As Table 4.1 shows, this 
resulted in a dramatic increase of undocumented workers. In the absence of any 
willingness to make necessary policy reforms, the government repeatedly extended 
the repatriation period of foreign trainees as a desperate measure to alleviate the 
labour shortages. Lee and Park (2005: 147) argue that the Korean government 
introduced the ITTP as `a side door to bring in unskilled foreign workers'. They posit 
that the ITTP was a failure both in alleviating labour shortages and in cracking down 
on undocumented migrant workers. The following interview with a government 
official in the Ministry of Labour shows how the government failed to control the 
migrant workforce. 
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While the Korean government has stubbornly adhered to the 
prohibition of importing unskilled migrant workers, it has 
overlooked the problem of the severe labour shortages in small and 
medium firms. Even though many foreigners have entered Korea 
with tourist visas and are illegally working in those firms, the 
government does not have a plausible justification for the 
crackdown on the illegal employment because it is so obvious that 
there is no alternative supply of manpower for the firms apart from 
those illegal migrant workers. Repeatedly extending the 
repatriation date for undocumented workers during last 10 years, 
the government has been turning a blind eye to the problem of the 
control of migrant workers. (Deputy Director of Foreign Work- 
force Policy Division, Ministry of Labour, interview with the 
author, August 2005) 
The increase in the number of undocumented migrant workers under the ITTP 
coincided with an increase in the number of human rights violations against both 
trainees and migrant workers. Even though foreign trainees have provided an 
indispensable workforce for essential industries in Korea, they have been treated as 
`trainees' and this legal status has denied them rights as workers. Moreover, as J. 
Kim (2003) notes, most companies failed to provide constructive instructional and 
skill-training programmes. Even where they did, these skills were not easily 
transferable since there was no guarantee that the trainees would be employed in 
similar jobs in their home countries after the apprenticeship in Korea. Under the 
ITTP, trainees were often saddled with a large amount of debt after paying brokerage 
fees to recruitment agencies. The role of intermediaries in migrant institutions 
pointed out by Goss and Lindquist is evident in the process of recruiting trainees. 
Seol (2000b) points out that trainees pay between US$2,000 and US$8,000 for a 
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placement in Korea, and these excessive fees are charged by agencies that often bribe 
the KITCO to be appointed as the recruitment agencies for the ITTP. While trainees 
are working in Korea, the agencies deduct payment from trainees' monthly wages, 
which are in legal terms merely `allowances'. Given the small monthly allowances 
they earn, it proves extremely difficult for trainees to pay back the debts. As a result, 
a significant number of trainees have left their designated companies to find better 
paid employment. Once they leave their sponsors, they become undocumented 
migrant workers and are forced to endure long working hours and poor working 
conditions, without proper legal protection32. 
Under these circumstances, in January 1995 14 Nepalese trainees held a sit-in 
in front of the Myong-dong Catholic Church33 in Seoul, protesting against unjust 
treatment and human rights abuses by their employers and the Korean government. 
This event drew public attention to the problem of the ITTP. During the protest (from 
9 to 17 January 1995) over 38 human rights organisations and NGOs in Korea joined 
rallies and formed the Association for the Human Rights Protection of Foreign 
Industrial and Technical Trainees, which later became the Joint Committee of 
Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK) (Seol, 2000b). The protesters argued that the 
ITTP was a `modem form of slavery' that should be eradicated (J. Kim, 2003; Seol, 
2000b; 2004). 
In 1996 migrant workers and NGOs started a campaign for the Protection 
Act for Foreign Workers. In 1997 two major parties - including the ruling New 
Korea Party and the opposition National Congress for New Politics - submitted a bill, 
which would subsequently become the Employment of Foreign Workers Act 
32 Further details of the employment condition of undocumented migrant workers will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
33 The Myong-dong Catholic Church is the historically famous and popular site of non-violent protest 
in Korea. 
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(EFWA), to the National Assembly. The bill was intended to introduce `the 
Employment Permit Programme for Foreigners'. Academics, human rights activists 
and policy makers considered the EFWA to be an urgent reform that would provide 
an alternative solution to the economic and social problems associated with the ITTP. 
The bill was however not passed by the National Assembly, on account of strong 
opposition from employers (especially the KFSB), government ministries and 
politicians. The KFSB and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy 
in 
particular, strongly objected to the reform of the ITTP, arguing that the Employment 
Permit Programme would increase the wages of migrant workers and consequently 
the cost of production, as migrant workers would be protected by the Labour 
Standard Act under the EFWA34. Undoubtedly, by paying low wages (strictly 
speaking, `allowances') and not being bound by any labour related regulations, 
employers derive substantial benefits by hiring industrial trainees. 
The Working After Training Programme for Foreigners (WATP) 
Finally, in April 2000 after a long dispute over the EFWA, the government 
introduced the Working After Training Programme for Foreigners (WATP) along 
with the ITTP. Once again, the WATP is managed by the KITCO under the auspices 
of the KFSB. It represents a mere extension of the ITTP. As the name indicates, the 
programme consists of two stages: two years of training and one year of paid 
344 Opposing the EFWA, a senior official at the KFSB argued, `with the introduction of the system, 
small firms' labour-cost burdens will rise by 400 billion to 500 billion won a year, further worsening 
their financial difficulties' (cited in Lee and Park, 2005: 152). In an interview with a government 
official in the Ministry of Labour it was noted that: 
At the present, there is a general consensus on the abolition of the trainee 
programme within the government, but we cannot yet make a decision on that 
because of the strong opposition from the KFSB. You cannot imagine how much 
the KFSB has exercised its power of influence over the government policy on the 
employment of migrant workers (interview with the author, August 2005). 
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employment. Under the WATP, foreign trainees, who pass skill tests after the two- 
year training, may work for one year as `workers', thereby changing their `trainee' 
visa into the `working after training (E-8)' visa. During the period of working after 
training, migrant workers are protected by the Labour Standards Act, the Minimum 
Wages Act, the Industrial Accident Compensation and the Industrial Safety Act. In 
December 2000 the government revised the period of working after training to one 
year of training and two year of paid employment. 
In 2002, following the instructions of President Kim Dae-Jung, the ruling 
New Millennium Democratic Party again proposed a bill for the EFWA. Lee and 
Park (2005) note that the bill was intended to safeguard the human rights of migrant 
workers. This reflected President Kim's belief that the violation of the human rights 
of migrant workers should not be allowed in Korea. The second attempt of the 
government to introduce the EFWA was massively supported by NGOs (including 
the JCMK) and civil society. The Ministry of Labour also released a policy report, 
calling for a reform of the current policy, which continuously generated human rights 
abuses and labour exploitation. The proposed EFWA bill was challenged again by 
the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, the two 
opposition parties and the KFSB. Once more, owing to the strong opposition from 
employers and conflicting interests among government ministries, the bill was not 
even submitted to the Standing Committee of the National Assembly (Lee and Park, 
2005). 
After two failed attempts in 1997 and 2000, the EFWA bill was finally 
passed in August 2003 and was enacted in August 2004. Under the EFWA, the 
Employment Permit System (EPS) for foreigners was introduced. Praising the 
EFWA as one of `the advanced pro-foreign workers legislation currently practiced in 
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the world', Lee and Park (2005: 154) argue that `the mobilisation of international 
human rights norms, the growth and the cooperation among Korean civil society 
groups and the strong coalition between government and these civic groups are key 
factors for this success'. It is however important to note that, under the EFWA, the 
ITTP and WATP still remain. Seol (2004) argues that the Korean government could 
not abolish the ITTP because it would be difficult to introduce the EPS unless the 
interests of the employers were protected to a certain extent. 
While the influence and efforts of civil society and political actors on the 
reform of policy should not be underestimated, it can equally be argued that the state 
has strategically changed its position to solve the escalating problems in the control 
of migrant labour. The government began to recognise that the shortage of labour in 
the certain industries was not temporary but a permanent feature of the Korean 
labour market, attributable to the aging population and the higher educational 
attainment of young people that resulted in job and skill mismatches in the labour 
market. Until then, the government had turned a blind eye to the increasing number 
of undocumented migrant workers35. After 13 years of the problematic ITTP, 
establishing a constructive management system for migrant labour based on legal 
guidelines was an urgent matter for the government. The following interview with a 
government official in the Ministry of Labour illustrates the situation at the time of 
the introduction of the EPS. 
In the case of Korea, the policy measure on the management of 
migrant labour was not introduced systematically. The EPS was 
introduced when the problems caused by the `mutant' called the 
35 By the end of 2002,79.8% of the total migrant population were undocumented (Ministry of Justice, 
2005) 
138 
ITTP had been already deeply festered and the number of 
undocumented workers reached 30,000 constituting 80% of the 
total migrant workforce. The foremost priority for the government 
was to curb the number of undocumented migrant workers at that 
time. (Deputy Director of Human Resource Development and R&D, 
Office of the Prime Minister and Former Deputy Director of 
Foreign Work force Policy Division, Ministry of Labour, interview 
with the author, August 2005) 
Following the passing of the EFWA legislation, the government made a 
considerable effort to curtail the number of undocumented workers. In an effort to 
utilise the existing migrant labour force, the government granted an amnesty for 
undocumented workers who had resided in Korea for less than four years at the time 
of March 31,2003. According to official figures, the government's effort to reduce 
the number of undocumented workers was reasonably successful. By the end of 2003, 
the number of undocumented migrant workers reached 35.5% of the total migrant 
population, the lowest point since 1987. Around 64% of the total undocumented 
workforce (184,000 out of 289,239) were granted an amnesty during this period. This 
indicates that the decreased number of undocumented workers was mainly due to the 
legalisation of undocumented migrant workers. However, for undocumented workers 
who had worked for more than four years, there were two choices: voluntary 
departure or forced deportation. A government official in the Ministry of Labour 
explains that the government limited the period to only four years of residency 
because it was seriously concerned about the permanent settlement of those 
undocumented workers who had resided in Korea for a long-period of time. As Seol 
(2004) points out, very few voluntarily returned to their home countries and many 
remained in Korea and continued to work as undocumented workers. Except for a 
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very few, the majority of the respondents in this study are those undocumented 
workers who remained in Korea because they did not qualify for the 2003 amnesty. 
The Current Policy on the Control of Unskilled Migrant Workers in Korea: 
The Employment Permit System (EPS) 
The Principle of the EPS 
After one year of preparation, the Employment of Foreign Workers Act (EFWA), 
which stipulated the introduction of the Employment Permit System (EPS), came 
into force in August 17,2004. The Korean government defines the EPS as follows: 
The Employment Permit System allows employers who have failed 
to hire native workers to legally hire an adequate number of foreign 
workers and is the system that government uses to introduce and 
manage foreign workers in Korea in an organised manner (Ministry 
of Labour, 2007). 
According to the EFWA, the term, `foreign worker' refers to a person who does not 
have a Korean nationality and works or intends to work in business or workplace 
located in Korea with the purpose of earning wages' (Act No. 6967, the Foreign 
workers employment Act, annexed in Ministry of Labour, 2003). However, the 
definition is only applied to unskilled workers who are granted E-9 visas based on 
the Immigration Control Act, and professional or skilled foreign workers and 
140 
industrial trainees under the ITTP are excluded from the EFWA36 (see Figure 4.1). 
As the name of the system indicates, the EPS (cf. the work permit system) allows 
employers to hire migrant workers, who are only permitted to work in the designated 
companies and have no rights to choose or change their workplace once they enter 
Korea. 
Figure 4.1 The Structure of the Foreign Workforce Management in Korea 
Industrial Trainee System (ITTP) 
Employment Permit System 
(EPS) 
II 
Industrial and 
Technical Training 
Programme (ITTP) 
Working After 
Training 
Programme 
(WATP) 
General EPS 
Special 
Employment in 
the Service 
Industry 
Special EPS for 
ethnic Koreans 
Special 
Employment in 
the 
Construction 
The basic principle of the EPS is that the importation of migrant workers 
should complement the Korean labour market. In other words, only businesses that 
are unable to employ native workers are allowed to hire migrant workers. The 
Korean government asserts that this is intended to prevent the deterioration of wages 
and working conditions, and a reduction of employment opportunities for local 
workers. 
36 According to the government policy plan, the ITTP is to be abolished by January 1,2007. However, 
at the time of writing, there was no information on the initiation of the plan provided by the Korean 
government. 
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The basic principle of the EPS is that there should be a 
discriminatory measure in favour of local workers. For example, 
the safeguarding of the employment opportunities for local workers 
is given priority over the interests and human rights of migrant 
workers. (Deputy Director of Foreign Work force Policy Division, 
Ministry of Labour, interview with the author, August 2005) 
Following the principle of the EPS, all employers who want to hire migrant workers 
must initially advertise job vacancies in the Employment Security Centre of the 
Ministry of Labour or in the mass media. When the employer cannot recruit native 
workers after one month of the vacancy notice 37, the Ministry of Labour 
acknowledges the labour shortage in the company and issues the employment permit. 
The employer then recruits suitable persons from the list of foreign job applicants at 
the Employment Security Centre. 
Under the EPS, migrant workers are limited to work in five industries: 
manufacturing; construction; agriculture and livestock; offshore and coastal fishing; 
and service industries. The applicable industries and the number of migrant workers 
are regulated and adjusted by the Foreign Workforce Policy Committee, which falls 
under the control of the Prime Minister. The maximum period of employment is 
limited to three years. 
37 The specified period of the vacancy notice has been reduced over the time, and the government has 
recently relaxed the rule that the companies can apply for the employment permit after three days of 
the job advertisement. 
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The Sending Countries for the EPS 
The Korean case illustrates that the state plays a significant role in the migration 
system. The intervention of the Korean state in the recruitment process of migrant 
workers presents a clear example of the institutionalisation of international migration. 
The government asserts that one of the main aims of the EPS is to eradicate the 
corruption associated with private recruitment agencies in the sending countries, 
which is closely related with human rights violations and the overstay of migrant 
workers. Under the EPS, the entire process of the employment of migrant workers - 
including the vacancy notice, recruitment and hiring - must therefore only be done 
by public organisations in both Korea and the sending countries. The Foreign 
Workforce Policy Committee selects the sending countries and decides the quota of 
migrant workers for each country. The rate of undocumented workers, preference by 
employers, irregularities in the recruitment process, and the political and economic 
relationships between Korea and the labour sending country are taken into 
considerations for the quota. 
Once the sending countries are selected by the Foreign Workforce Policy 
Committee, the government of the sending country and the Korean government (i. e. 
the Ministry of Labour) sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Currently, 
six sending countries have signed a MOU38: the Philippines; Vietnam; Thailand; 
Indonesia; Sri Lanka; and Mongolia. Although the MOU between Korea and the 
38 Considering that Chinese workers are the biggest group among the migrant population in Korea, it 
is rather surprising that China is not included in the list of sending countries. According to a 
government official in the Ministry of Labour (interview with the author, August 2005), China was initially selected as one of the sending countries, but was excluded from the list due to the lack of 
transparency of the Chinese system. The Korean government has suspended the decision on China 
until the Chinese government appoints a fair and appropriate public agency for sending workers to Korea. 
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sending country is not legally binding, the Korean government has decisive power to 
cancel the MOU whenever the sending country does not follow the agreement. Table 
4.2 shows the list of public organisations in each country that recruit and send 
migrant workers to Korea. The EPS requires that a worker in the sending country 
who wishes to work in Korea should apply through the recruitment agencies (see 
Table 4.2) and satisfy the following requirements: be over 18 years old of age; have 
passed a medical examination; have no criminal record; and have passed the 
mandatory Korean language test. 
Table 4.2 The List of the Public Organisations in Six Sending Countries 
Country The Public Recruitment Orianisations 
The Philippines 
Vietnam 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
SriLanka 
Mongolia 
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 
The Centre for Overseas Workers 
The Department for Employment and the Overseas Employment 
Administration Office 
The Recruitment Committee for Indonesian Workers to Korea 
The Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment 
The Mediation Bureau of Foreign Employment 
Source: Ha and Choi (2005: 146) 
The Special EPS for Ethnic Koreans 
The special EPS for ethnic Koreans aims to provide preferential employment 
opportunities for ethnic Korean migrant workers in the construction industry and 
limited occupations39 in service industry. The special EPS was developed from the 
previous `Employment Management System', which was founded under the 
Immigration Control Act in 2002 and incorporated into the EPS in 2004. The aim of 
the special EPS is not only to alleviate labour shortages in the service and 
construction industries, but also to legalise the large number of undocumented ethnic 
39 These occupations include jobs in restaurants, business support, repair work in garages, social 
welfare service, cleaning, nursing, childcare and domestic work. 
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Korean migrant workers working predominantly in the service industry. While other 
foreign migrant workers are to a certain extent also allowed to work in the 
construction industry, the service industry is strictly limited to ethnic Korean migrant 
workers. Like the general EPS, the maximum period of the employment is limited to 
three years. 
The special EPS is only applied to ethnic Korean migrant workers who are 
over 25 years of age and either descendants of Korean citizens or invited by closer 
Korean relatives. These migrants are granted `visiting families'visas (F-1-4) in terms 
of the Immigration Control Act. Under the special EPS, the notion of ethnic Korean 
migrant workers differs from that of `overseas Koreans', as defined in the 
Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Act. According to the 
Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Act, overseas Koreans are (a) 
those who had Korean nationality in the past, but have acquired the nationality of 
another country or (b) those who have acquired the nationality of another country, 
but either of whose parents or grandparents had Korean nationality in the past (Ha 
and Choi, 2005). These overseas Koreans normally enter Korea holding the `Koreans 
overseas' visa (F-4) and can freely engage in any employment activities except 
unskilled manual labour. The Korean government is often criticised for 
discriminating against ethnic Koreans from China, Russia and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) in Central Asia. Until 2004, the Immigration and Legal 
Status of Overseas Koreans Act did not even recognise ethnic Koreans in China, 
Russia and the CIS as `overseas Koreans'. It is still very difficult for them to be 
granted the F-4 visa. Moreover, the majority of ethnic Koreans from China, Russia 
and the CIS enter Korea to work as unskilled manual labour. The F-4 visa status and 
the prohibition of manual labour would therefore not give them any advantage. 
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III. Migrant Women as 'Strategic Agents' 
As discussed above, apart from the ITTP until 2004 there was no other option for the 
legal employment of migrant workers in Korea. Even though special employment 
options in the service and construction industries (the Employment Management 
System) were opened up for ethnic Koreans in 2002, the initial quota of ethnic 
Korean migrant workers was less than 50% of the total number of ethnic Korean 
migrant workers who had already been working in the industries illegally40. 
Furthermore, as the number of undocumented migrant workers increased, the state 
started to impose strict immigration controls on visitors from the countries in which 
these undocumented workers came from. For example, unlike the current situation, 
until the early 1990s it was rather easy for a Filipina to enter Korea with a tourist visa. 
With limited legal employment opportunities and increasingly selective and stringent 
immigration controls, there have been visible structural constraints that leave 
foreigners with very little room to manoeuvre with respect to entering and working in 
Korea. However, there have been constant inflows of migrant workers to Korea and 
the numbers have been increasing every year. Why did those workers, particularly 
women in this study, decide to migrate? Despite increasingly stringent immigration 
controls, why did they decide to come to Korea? Through what kinds of migrant 
channels did they enter and find jobs in Korea? This section aims to find answers to 
these questions. 
40 While there were 58,032 undocumented migrant workers already working in the service industry in 
2002, the initial quota of ethnic Korean workers for the industry was only 25,000 (Unpublished report, 
the Ministry of Labour, September 2002). 
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The Decision to Move 
Economic Motives 
Undoubtedly, individual decisions to migrate are often based on an economic reason. 
All respondents in this study were partially driven by economic motives. In fact, 
when they were asked the reason for migrating to Korea, some women even looked 
at me peculiarly, seeming to wonder why I would ask such an obvious question. 
Jenny who left her son in the Philippines and came to Korea in 1994 stated: 
I have never been married, but I got pregnant and gave birth to my 
first son. His father is a seaman and now lives in the US, but he 
does not support our son. You know, it is typical for a Filipino man. 
When I left my son in the Philippines, he was only 8 months old. I 
was really sad, but I was only thinking about my son's future. I did 
not want him to be a deprived street child being raised without a 
father. When I left, I was so determined to work really hard for his 
future. He is now 14 years old. For almost 14 years, I have 
supported him financially. I sent him to school and bought him a 
house in my hometown, Cebu. 
Most of the responses to my question, "why did you come to Korea? ", echoed those 
of Jenny. Women left home for Korea, expecting to earn money to support families 
and children's education. The majority of the respondents in this study were deeply 
committed to the financial support of their families and children left in their home 
countries. Many argue that such attitudes of migrant women are closely related to 
their roles in the family, following a sense of duty that stems from the strong bond of 
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family, loyalty for family members and filial piety, especially in Asian countries 
(Chant and Macllwaine, 1995; Oishi, 2005; Parrenas, 2001; Paz Cruz and Paganoni, 
1989). 
Why did they choose Korea as their migrant destination? There were a 
number of reasons for economically motivated migrant women to come to Korea. 
The foremost reason was that it was relatively cheap and easy to enter the country. 
This reason was apparent for the workers who had entered Korea with trainee visas 
and among those who resided in Korea for more than eight years, i. e. who had 
entered with tourist visas when the immigration control had not been stringent. 
Since 1992 when Korea and Vietnam established diplomatic 
relations, many Vietnamese have come to Korea to work. Also, 
getting a trainee visa is a safe and cheap way to enter the country. I 
am now undocumented, but came to Korea with a trainee visa. 
These days many people start to go to Malaysia and Taiwan, but 
Korea is still probably the popular destination for Vietnamese 
workers. (Le, Vietnamese, factory worker, 5 years in Korea) 
I came to Korea in 1991 when a Filipina could easily visit Korea as 
a tourist without a visa. So I entered Korea as a tourist. It was quite 
easy for me because I came with my friend who worked for a travel 
agency in Manila and came to Korea for her business trips. I was 
lucky to come to Korea that easily without paying any money to a 
broker. (Brenda, Filipina, domestic worker, 11 years in Korea) 
The situation has changed since the mid-1990s as the Korean government has 
enforced stricter immigration controls for visitors from developing countries in Asia. 
It would therefore be much harder to enter the country as a tourist, as Brenda did in 
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1991. 
Nevertheless, compared to other destination countries, such as the United 
States and Japan, Korea is still very much more accessible and affordable, and 
relatively high wages mean that it remains one of the more attractive destination 
countries. It should be noted that this is directly related to the increasingly 
institutionalised business of migration in Asia, i. e. most of the respondents had paid 
the public or private brokerage services to obtain visas for entry to Korea. Often, the 
level of difficulty to get an entry visa to the country determines the costs of the 
service, and the costs subsequently influence the migrant's choice of destination. 
This is vividly illustrated in the following interviews. 
We [Nina and her husband] worked in the USA for four years. We 
worked in a plastic manufacturing factory in Philadelphia. When 
our visas expired, we left America and went back to Indonesia. 
After 9/11, nowadays, for an Indonesian it has become so hard to 
get a working visa in the US. So we had to find an alternative 
country to work. Going to Japan is also very difficult for 
Indonesians. So, we came to Korea. Entering Korea is not as hard 
as entering the US or Japan, and doesn't cost you much. (Nina, 
Indonesian, factory worker) 
In fact, I didn't know much about Korea before coming here as an 
industrial trainee. It didn't cost much to enter Korea as a trainee. 
That's why I chose Korea. If I went to Japan, I could earn more 
money, but it is almost impossible to go to Japan to work. The 
brokerage service is really expensive for Japan because it is tough 
to get a visa. Entering Japan is simply too hard. (Shilani, Sri 
Lankan, factory worker) 
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Oishi (2005) argues that female migration has become globally stratified. 
According to her, the reason why migrants in the United States, Canada and Europe 
tend to have higher socio-economic status, i. e. high levels of education and 
occupational status prior to migration, is partly attributable to demand-side factors, 
but also to the agency fees that migrants must pay. Therefore, middle class women 
are more likely to be in a position to pay the large brokerage fees required to enter 
the North America, Europe or Japan, whereas women from low-income families tend 
to choose cheaper options, by migrating to Hong Kong, Taiwan or Korea. 
Women's decisions to migrate to Korea were also often facilitated by families, 
relatives and friends who were already working in Korea. Social networks provided 
information and resources, and therefore reduced the costs and risks of movement to 
a foreign country. In addition to the practical role, the social network also provided 
migrant women a `security blanket' for living and working in a foreign country. For 
young single women in particular, the presence of families and relatives in Korea 
helped them to persuade parents, who often opposed their daughter's decision to 
migrate. 
Before coming to Korea, I had just finished high school -I was 
only 20 years old. At that time, my brother was already working in 
Korea and suggested to me to come to Korea. Following his 
suggestion, I decided to come to Korea. I wanted to earn money. 
My parents also agreed with my decision, saying that because my 
brother was already there, I could go to Korea. If he had not been 
working here, I could not have dared to think to come to Korea. 
You know, it is really tough for a single woman to work and live 
alone in a foreign country. (Hong Sam, Vietnamese, 26, factory 
worker) 
150 
Through the establishment and expansion of social networks, migration 
becomes `self-perpetuating' (Massey, 1990: 8) and generates `chain migration'. There 
were a number of cases of chain migration found in this study, particularly among 
Vietnamese and Sri Lankan groups of migrant workers. During a group interview 
with eight Vietnamese male and female workers, it became clear that most people 
either came to Korea through friends and families, or invited their friends and 
families to come to Korea and helped them to find work. One Vietnamese worker 
said in the interview that he helped ten friends from his village to come and work in 
Korea. The following case illustrates an example of the chain migration of a family 
from Sri Lanka. 
A few years after I came to Korea as an industrial trainee, I invited 
two of my brothers to Korea. I also helped my cousins, including 
Lakshika [one of the interviewees] to come to Korea. 1\vo years 
later Lakshika's husband joined her in Korea as well. My partner, 
Leo, helped them to find jobs and places to stay. (Shilani, Sri 
Lankan, factory worker, 7 years in Korea) 
Once they come to Korea, migrants usually share the same house or live close-by in 
the same town. The Vietnamese workers who I interviewed shared the same house in 
a small village called Waoo-ri, located in Hwa-Sung City, which is one of the 
satellite cities of Metropolitan Seoul. One respondent told me that, until recently, the 
village had been a home for the Vietnamese migrant community. It was similar to 
Shilani and her family who lived close by and worked in factories in Pyung-Taek 
City, in which many South Asian communities were found. This shows that as 
migration networks expand through social networks based on interpersonal ties of 
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family, kinship and community, they, in turn, lead to the establishment of migrant 
communities in the host country. 
Lastly, among some of the respondents, a job preference was one of the 
decisive factors in choosing Korea as a destination country. As discussed in the 
previous section, the Korean government limits the range of industries open to the 
employment of migrant workers. As a result, migrant workers - except ethnic 
Koreans - are working predominantly in the manufacturing industry. A preference 
for a factory job paying a relatively high wage was one of the main reasons given by 
a number of the respondents in this study for coming to Korea. 
Many Indonesian women go to Singapore or Hong Kong to work 
as domestic helpers. But those jobs do not pay much. Factory jobs 
in Korea pay far better. That's why I chose to come to Korea. 
(Sandra, Indonesian, factory worker) 
Some women were, however, unwilling to take jobs involving domestic work, 
childcare or nursing, because these jobs required a personalised service and a direct 
relationship with the employer. This was noticeable among younger women who 
were more able to cope with physical challenge involved in other jobs. 
I have never worked as a domestic worker before. I know that 
many Filipino women are working as domestic workers in many 
Asian countries, but I prefer working in a factory. If I were a 
domestic worker, I would have to do all house chores for the 
employer's family like a servant. But, in the factory at least I am 
treated as a `worker'. In the factory where I work, my boss mops 
the floor and cleans his offices by himselfl I feel that I have been 
treated equal. (Jenny, Filipina, 34 years old, factory worker) 
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I have worked as a child carer, but now I only work in a restaurant. 
Working in a restaurant is physically hard, but I am happier. I think 
that care work is much harder than working in a restaurant. It is not 
an easy job to look after somebody's child. The direct relationship 
with child's mother sometimes gives you constant mental stress. 
(Soon-Sun, Korean-Chinese, 43 years old, waitress) 
There was also a concern over social prejudice toward certain occupations in which 
women were employed overseas. For this reason, some women chose Korea as a 
migration destination where they could take `decent jobs' in factories. For example, 
in the following interview, a Filipina worker stated that in the Philippines - from 
which many women migrated to Japan as `entertainers' or sex workers - people did 
not have a positive view of women `going to Japan'. 
Many Filipinas go to Japan. Although you could earn more money 
than working here, I didn't want to go there because in Japan most 
of Filipinas work as entertainers or sex workers. I'm proud of 
working here in a factory because if you are working in Japan as an 
entertainer, you don't get a good image from people in the 
Philippines. You can also go to Hong Kong or Singapore to work as 
a domestic worker, but salaries are not very good. You can earn 
twice more money in Korea. (Jo, Filipina, factory worker) 
Social Pressure 
Apart from the economic motivation, women also migrate to escape from or to 
overcome problems at home. Brenda's case vividly illustrates why some women 
choose migration as a solution for the problem at home. 
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Actually, before coming to Korea, I did not have any plan to go 
abroad. I was a teacher. I was mainly teaching English, but also 
taught PE, Economic and Science in high school. I was happy with 
my job. However, there was trouble at my home. According to the 
local custom in my hometown [Baguio in the Philippines], the 
parent has to choose a partner for her/his child. At that time, my 
mother was nearly forcing me to marry somebody she chose for me. 
I really didn't want to get married following my mother's wish. So 
I decided to escape from the unwanted marriage and the only way 
to escape from that was coming to Korea. My sister also had the 
same problem, so she ran away to Singapore. (Brenda, Filipina, 
domestic worker, 11 years in Korea) 
Scholars in the study of migrant women also point out that many Filipinas choose to 
migrate overseas to escape from problems such as domestic violence (Oishi, 2005; 
Parrenas, 2001). In the case of women who suffer from domestic violence, Parrenas 
(2001: 67) argues that `women, at least those with resources (such as networks and 
funds) emigrate instead of facing ostracism in the community against divorce or 
separation'. Divorce or remarriage for legally separated individuals are restricted in 
the Philippines. Also, the cultural emphasis on the value of family cohesion and the 
influence of Catholicism push those women to leave the Philippines. 
According to my study, social pressure on woman was frequently one of the 
decisive factors influencing cross-border marriage migration. Chant and Radcliffe 
(1992) note that woman's migration for marriage is often associated with economic 
and social mobility. If it is not necessarily economic and social upward mobility, 
these women who have been working hard and supporting their families for many 
years may be looking for at least economic stability through marriage to men in more 
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affluent countries. However, according to my study, an economic motive was not 
entirely the decisive factor in marriage migration. Of the 31 respondents in this study, 
seven were marriage migrants - one from China and six from the Philippines. 
Having full-time jobs either overseas or in their countries, all seven women had 
previously been financially independent and some, especially those who had worked 
overseas, had enjoyed freedom and had been in a gainful position to support their 
families. As will be discussed further in Chapter 7, they were not necessarily poor 
before marriage nor did they marry men who were on a higher socio-economic status, 
since many of their husbands were rural farmers or urban manual workers. 
Constable (2005: 10) argues that to assume that woman's marriage migration 
is simply upward marital mobility is to overlook `the contradictory and paradoxical 
social and economic patterns that are not necessarily linked to geographic mobility 
and to overlook interesting underlying questions about gender'. While the 
interviewees stated that marriage migration to Korea was their own decision, all had 
experienced a certain amount of social pressure associated with marriage. 
When I was single, my life was completely different from now. I 
was a contract worker who registered with the government 
employment agency. So, whenever I wanted to go somewhere, I 
could go. If there was a job in Bangkok, within a minute I just 
decided to go there to work. It was easy. But, as I was getting older, 
my mother really wanted me to get married and so I could settle 
down. (Carol, 40 years old, Filipina, domestic worker, 4 years in 
Korea) 
I got so much pressure from my parents. As I was getting older, 
they really wanted me to get married and have a family. I am the 
eldest daughter and at that time my brother and sister were already 
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married and had children. (Geraldine, 37 years old, Filipina, part- 
time English teacher, 3 years in Korea) 
It was my own decision to migrate to Korea by marrying a Korean. 
At that time, I was divorced from my first husband and left my son 
in the care of his grandmother (my ex-mother-in-law). But, 
nowadays, I keep thinking why on earth I decided to do that [In 
fact, only after a year and three months of her second marriage, 
she has filed a suit for divorce against her violent Korean 
husband. ] Probably, I got too tired of living as a divorced single 
mom in China. It was a tough job. (Hyang-Lim, Chinese, 39 years 
old, Kitchen staff in a restaurant, 1 year and 7 months in Korea) 
For these women, migration to Korea by marrying a Korean man was a means of 
overcoming social pressure as well as a means of economic stability. 
Cultural and Historical Linkages 
One particularly distinctive motive for ethnic Korean migrants in China to choose 
Korea as a destination country can be found in cultural and historical linkages to 
their `homeland' Korea. As discussed in Chapter 2, in the 1910s and the 1920s 
Korean farmers and labourers left for Manchuria and even further up to Siberia in 
order to escape from famine and poverty. During the Japanese colonial period (1910- 
1945), many Koreans - including intellectuals who participated in the national 
independence movement - fled from Korea to China as a result of the repressive 
Japanese rule. The number of Korean migrants in China also increased in 1950 when 
the Korean War erupted. The majority of today's ethnic Koreans in China are 
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descendants of those refugees and migrants from Korea41. Ethnic Koreans in China 
are well known for their strong commitment to the preservation of Korean culture, 
custom and language. This feature is closely correlated with one of Cohen's 
definitions of a diaspora: `a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long 
time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history and the belief in a 
common fate' (Cohen, 1997: 26). All of the Korean-Chinese respondents in this study 
- who were mostly third generation and are part of the Korean diaspora in China - 
spoke fluent Korean. 
It was evident in the case of Korean-Chinese migrants that they had retained 
`a collective memory and vision about their original homeland' (Safran, 1991). 
The biggest reason why I came to Korea is my yearning for a 
homeland. Although I was born and have lived in China for all my 
life, I always had this yearning and wondered to see how my 
homeland, in which my parents were born, would be like. When I 
got a visa and realised that I could step my feet on Korean soil, my 
heart was throbbing with joy and excitement. Korea is my mother 
country. A homeland is like mother's bosom. I didn't come to 
Korea because I was poor in China. Of course, earning money was 
one of the reasons why I am here now. I just thought that like I 
worked hard in China, I would earn more money by doing the same 
in Korea. (Soon-Hee, 70 years old, domestic worker) 
I didn't come to Korea because I was destitute. My family can be 
considered as the middle class in China. Then, one day, I came 
across an article about Korea in a monthly magazine published by 
the Communist Party. According to the article, Korea's 
41 Ethnic Koreans are concentrated in northeastern China; 63% of them live in five counties of Jilin Province, 27% in Heilongjiang Province and 10% in Liaoning Province. The five counties constitute 
the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, which was established in 1952 (Olson, 1998). 
157 
development was a century ahead of China's. It described how 
much Korea is better off as compared to China. After I read the 
article, I decided to see with my own eyes how much my homeland 
was well off and developed. (Choon-Ja, 66 years old, domestic 
worker) 
Their psychological links to `homeland' Korea materialised after the development of 
diplomatic relations between two countries in 1992. They were able to physically 
return to the homeland for which they had longed. Meanwhile, their prosperous 
`homeland' provided them with employment opportunities. For both of these reasons, 
Korea became one of the most attractive migrant destinations for these Korean- 
Chinese migrants. 
In his concept of a diaspora, Safran (1991) argues that members of the 
diasporic group idealise their ancestral home and think that when conditions are 
favourable, either they, or their descendants should return. In the case of Korean- 
Chinese, even though they were second and third generations of the Korean diasporic 
group, they had often been told stories and memories by their parents and 
grandparents. Retaining those stories and memories about their ancestors' homeland, 
they believed that they should return to Korea even though their parents or 
grandparents were not in a position to do so themselves. For example, apart from the 
economic reason for her migration, Young-Sil, a 55 years old Korean-Chinese 
domestic worker, came to Korea to gratify her father's wish. 
My father's home is Namwon [located in the south-west province]. 
He was born there. When the things got bad under the Japanese 
colonial rule, my grandfather left home and came to China with my 
father. My father passed away in the 1960s before the diplomatic 
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relations between China and Korea was established. So he could 
not return to his homeland before he died. It became his lifelong 
regret. His last wish was that on behalf of him we should visit 
Korea someday when it was possible. So I came to Korea to carry 
out his last wish. This was one of the reasons that made me decide 
to come to Korea. (Young-Sil, 55 years old, domestic worker) 
Migrant Institutions 
After the decision to migrate based on the aforementioned reasons, in what ways 
have these migrants entered Korea? This section examines how migrants acquire 
their knowledge of structures and exploit available means to realise their ends in 
migrant institutions. 
Private Recruitment Agencies: the Case of the ITTP 
As discussed in the previous section, under the EPS the private recruitment agencies 
in the sending countries have been replaced by public or government agencies. The 
ITTP nonetheless remains unchanged and private recruitment agencies for industrial 
trainees are appointed by the KFSB. None of the respondents in this study entered 
Korea through any public or government recruitment agencies in their countries. This 
is because when the field research was conducted between April and September 2005, 
the EPS had only been enforced for a year. The respondents were therefore mostly 
undocumented and long-term residents in Korea, who had entered Korea before the 
introduction for the EPS. It was also difficult to find migrant workers who had 
recently entered with E-9 visas and who were available for the interview. This 
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section therefore only focuses on private recruitment agencies as an example of 
migrant institutions. 
Goss and Lindquist (1995: 337) argue that employers and recruitment 
agencies are important organisational agents `who not only provide the employment 
opportunities that motivate migration but may also indirectly recruit workers and 
almost always exert indirect control over recruitment by setting qualifications for 
employment'. The indirect control of organisational agents on the recruitment of 
migrant workers mirrors the recruitment process of industrial trainees for Korean 
firms. As examined in the previous section, the recruitment of industrial trainees was 
supervised by the Korea International Training Cooperation Corps (KITCO), which 
falls under the auspices of the KFSB. The KITCO appoints 27 international 
manpower recruitment agencies in sending countries, which recruit workers, organise 
a preparatory training programme and send these workers to Korea. Thus, overseas 
employment opportunities for workers are indirectly in the hands of the private 
agencies contracted by the KITCO. With the entire recruitment processes controlled 
by the KITCO and private agencies in the sending country, employers achieve 
considerable `time-space distanciation', in Giddens' term, through migrant 
institutions (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). 
All respondents who initially entered Korea with trainee visas were recruited 
through private agencies in their countries. Among the strictly limited channels 
available to potential migrant workers to enter Korea for employment, the ITTP is 
probably the cheapest and most secure route to Korea. However, the cost of 
migration varies among workers. Like the following Vietnamese worker, Thuy 
Duong, a few respondents were charged excessively high brokerage fees by their 
agencies. 
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In order to get a trainee visa I paid the agency about US$7,000. In 
these days, you have to pay the agency between US$10,000 and 
US$12,000. The fee includes a flight ticket and other travel 
expenses. As you know, US$7,000 is really big money in Vietnam. 
I was lucky that my uncle lent me money without interest. I paid 
him back only after two years. But, many people loaned money 
from the bank at high interest. Because of the brokerage fees and 
high interest, trainees escape from their sponsors and move to other 
factories paying them higher wages. With 300,000 won (US$300) 
of trainee's wage, it takes ages to clear off the debts. (Thuy Duong, 
Vietnamese, factory worker) 
Thuy Duong's interview supports Goss and Lindquist's account of private 
recruitment agencies: `private recruitment agencies are organisational entities that 
depend upon access to specific bundles of allocative and authoritative resources and, 
most importantly, control over information that allows them to negotiate the 
modalities of interaction within the migrant institution' (Goss and Lindquist, 
1995: 337). The private recruitment agencies need sufficient capital to set up their 
businesses and to be contracted by the employers' organisation, the KITCO in the 
case of Korea. Goss and Lindquist (1995) note that in some countries, such as the 
Philippines, where the recruitment agencies must receive permission from the 
Philippines Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), they often have to obtain official 
authorisation from the state agencies and this process often requires political 
connections. All this undoubtedly increases the expense of their operation, which is 
passed onto the worker in the form of brokerage fees (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; 
Seol, 2000b). 
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Private Brokers 
Most potential migrants have neither the appropriate knowledge of the procedure for 
migration nor access to proper information on rules and regulations for overseas 
employment. As Goss and Lindquist (1995: 340) point out, `all individuals are 
situated in time-space, both in the sense of the physical location and in the sense of 
their social position, and their knowledge and social contacts are circumscribed 
accordingly'. Therefore, potential migrants seek individuals who have connections 
with potential employers, recruiting agents or government officials, and who may 
therefore assist them to obtain proper documents for entry visas and to eventually 
obtain overseas employment. Private brokers are essential actors in the migration 
institution. As Goss and Lindquist (1995: 341) suggest, private brokers `exploit the 
institution for their individual benefits but in so doing play roles as institutional 
agents by enforcing rules and distributing its resources'. 
50% of the respondents in this study used private brokers to enter Korea, and 
interestingly, Korean-Chinese migrants constituted the majority of these. As 
discussed in the previous section, the Korean immigration Act grants specific 
privileges to ethnic Koreans in terms of the less strict entry control on a family visit42 
and in the form of employment opportunities in Korea. Certainly, Korean-Chinese 
migrant workers made the most of migrant channels available to them to enter Korea. 
The majority of the Korean-Chinese respondents initially entered Korea with a visa 
for a family visit (F-1). 
It is however important to note that most of them are not in contact with their 
42 Korean-Chinese people over the age of 60 can be easily granted a visa for a family visit (F-1) when 
they prove that they have families or relatives residing in Korea. 
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relatives residing in Korea. In this case, the role of private brokers is crucial in 
obtaining a F-1 visa. They have become active agents or `fixers' in the migrant 
institution. Potential migrants are charged agency fees that cover all the formalities 
for entry to Korea, including obtaining passports, visas and travel arrangements. 
Private brokers use a number of personal networks for their business and some of the 
brokers themselves were once migrant workers in Korea (Seol, 1999). Goss and 
Lindquist (1995) note that successful returned migrant workers exploit valuable 
practical knowledge of procedures and contacts with institutional agents from their 
own personal encounters to facilitate the migration of others. Like many Asian 
countries, the process of migration in China is highly institutionalised. The following 
statement of a Chinese migrant worker illustrates how the system works. 
Initially, I came to Korea with a business visa (C-2). I paid the 
broker about US$10,000 to make that visa. Basically, there are two 
brokers - one in China and the other in Korea. Firstly, I had to 
show the broker in China that I had enough money for the 
brokerage fees in my bank account. At this point, I did not have to 
pay him any fees yet. Once I entered Korea, the other broker was 
waiting for me at the airport. As soon as I met the Korean broker 
who confirmed that I successfully entered Korea, I had to telephone 
the Chinese broker to tell him the pin numbers for my bank account. 
Until I called and told him my pin number, the Korean broker 
would not let me go. When the Korean broker confirmed that the 
money was successfully withdrawn by the Chinese broker, he let 
me off. (Young-Sil, 55, domestic worker) 
The central part of the private brokerage service is obtaining entry visas, and 
this frequently involves the fabrication of official documents and the forgery of 
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passports. Most of the Korean-Chinese migrants who initially entered Korea with F-1 
visas used private brokers, who helped them obtain visas with forged official 
documents and passports, as in the following cases. 
I got a F-1 visa as a mother attending a daughter's wedding. I was 
lucky to find a woman who got married a Korean man and the 
broker made me up as a mother of that woman on her birth 
certificate. I was granted one month to stay in Korea, but I am still 
here. (Hoe-ock Baek, 56 years old, domestic worker, 10 years in 
Korea) 
On the document I used for the visa application, I am a mother of a 
woman called `Young-Sil Kim' who lives in Korea with her Korean 
husband. Actually, Young-Sil Kim's mother lives in the town where 
I am from, but she couldn't come to see her daughter because she 
was unwell - she is deaf. So I pretended to be Young-Sil's mother 
who was invited to see her daughter. (Choon-Ja, 66 years old, 
domestic worker, 6 years in Korea) 
The name on my passport is not my real name. She is somebody 
who has her uncle living in Korea. I don't know who she is because 
it was the broker who found the person. (Shin-Keum, 55 years old, 
restaurant staff, 4 years in Korea) 
On the other hand, for younger Chinese women, it is certainly difficult to 
pretend to be someone's mother as in the above cases. Alternatively, a `fake 
marriage' with a Korean man, arranged through the private brokerage service, has 
been a popular choice among young Korean-Chinese women regaining legal entry to 
Korea (Seol, 1999). With increasingly stringent immigration controls on Chinese 
nationalities, marriage to a Korean national is one of the safest migrant routes to 
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Korea. In this case, the private brokers in China are closely connected with brokers 
in Korea. When a woman pays a private broker in China, the broker finds her a 
`suitable' Korean man through a broker in Korea. After the woman registers her 
marriage with the Chinese authorities, she is granted an entry visa to Korea. Once 
she successfully enters Korea, she registers her marriage with the Korean authority. 
This then allows her to be engaged in paid employment without any restriction and, 
after two years of marriage, the migrant can be granted Korean citizenship. During 
the whole process, most migrant women hardly meet their `virtual' husbands. For 
example, a following respondent, Hae-Hwa was one of Chinese migrants who 
entered Korea through a fake marriage and recently obtained Korean citizenship. 
For young people like me, it is really hard to come to Korea to 
work. Fortunately, one of my relatives suggested to me that if I 
managed to get money somehow, he could help me to find a good 
Korean partner to get married, and this could allow me easily and 
legally to enter Korea. When I came to Korea, there were many 
young women like me who entered Korea through a marriage. It 
cost me about US$1,200 for the brokerage service. Because I paid 
for the marriage, I don't live with my husband [in the interview she 
never explicitly mentioned the word, a fake marriage']. Only 
because of a document-related matter, I met him a couple of times 
in China. Since I came to Korea, he [her Korean husband] has 
never contacted me or bothered me. I think that he is not a bad 
person. Because he was under financial hardships, he needed 
money, and he got some money by doing me a favour. I don't know 
how much he got paid. I am not particularly interested in it. (Hae- 
Hwa, 27 years old, Chinese, restaurant staf, 3 years in Korea) 
Although the `fake marriage' option is relatively infrequent among the migrant 
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channels to Korea, they posit an example of how a marriage becomes one of the 
lucrative businesses in the increasingly institutionalised migration system. 
Religious Organisation: the Case of Cross-border Marriage Migration 
The majority of cross-border marriages are arranged by private marriage agencies 
that usually operate the business in the form of a `mail-order' service advertising and 
displaying photos and profiles of women on an Internet website. Nevertheless, 
private agencies or individual brokers are not the only actors in the migrant 
institution. According to the findings in this study, marriages between a Japanese or 
Filipina woman and a Korean man are often arranged by a religious organisation 
called `the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification' - commonly referred 
to as the `Unification Church' (H-K. Lee 2005). The Family Federation for World 
Peace and Unification was founded by the Reverend Moon Sun-Myung. The 
organisation stresses that it aims to build a peaceful world through `true families' 
started by the `blessing of marriage' (see www. tongil. or. kr). The `blessing of 
marriage' is taken in the famous form of a transnational mass marriage. As one of its 
main activities, it operates matchmaking and dating services across the world 
through the web-based `True Love Matching Service'. Although the organisation was 
initiated in Korea, its religious influence within the country has not been significant 
since its beliefs and practices have been rarely approved within Korea. However, the 
Family Federation International has actively extended its influence abroad by 
establishing a large number of local churches in over 185 countries worldwide. Its 
activity is particularly noticeable in the Philippines and there are several Unification 
churches in Manila. 
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Six respondents in this study, mostly Filipina migrant women, met their 
husbands and got married through the arrangements made by the Unification Church. 
Most of the marriage migrants had friends and relatives who had already married 
Korean men through the organisation. The following examples suggest that an 
extensive network of cross-border marriages is being established through the 
Unification Church. 
My best friend got married to a Korean man through the 
Unification Church. She wanted me to marry a Korean man so that 
I can live close by her in Korea. We were really close to each other 
in the Philippines, like sisters. But, since she left to Korea to live 
with her husband she became very lonely. She thought that it would 
be nice for us to live close by each other and brought a guy (who is 
now my husband) with her to the Philippines to introduce to me. 
(Geraldine, Filipina, domestic worker, 3 years in Korea) 
I got married through the Unification Church. I didn't know about 
the Church. I didn't know much about Korea. One day, I met a 
Filipina in my village who told me, "You know? A Korean man is 
kind and will love you. " She was also married to a Korean who 
was very nice and sending her money regularly from Korea. Then, 
I thought that a Korean man would be kind like her husband. She 
told me that I could get married to a Korean man through the 
Unification Church. So, I got married. But, the reality is heart 
breaking. Now, I know that not all Korean men are nice and kind. 
(Lisa, Filipina, factory worker, 5 years in Korea) 
My older sister has already married to a Japanese man through the 
Church. She invited me to join the Church. I'm Catholic, but my 
religion didn't matter with joining the Unification Church. 
(Marilou, Filipina, factory worker, 3 years in Korea) 
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Although those women met their husbands and got married through the 
Unification Church, this does not mean that they have converted from their religion - 
i. e. Catholic in most Filipina cases - to the Unification Church. Both Filipina wives 
and Korean husbands regarded the Church as an inexpensive marriage agency. The 
Unification Church provided virtually all of necessary arrangements for the couple, 
from the matchmaking service and a marriage ceremony to the paperwork required 
for entry visas for Filipina wives. 
Although we got married through the Unification Church my 
husband and I are not really into that religion. He doesn't believe in 
any religion and I am Christian. It was my husband's sister who got 
him involved in the church. My husband was 42. His sister was 
worried that he was getting older without a wife. Although we still 
do not appreciate the religion, it was really convenient for us to get 
married through the Church because it did all the necessary paper 
work for us. We didn't have to fuss about difficult paperwork to get 
me into Korea. (Geraldine) 
I got married through the Unification Church. But, I don't believe 
in that religion. I am Catholic, and my mother-in-law and my 
husband are also Catholic. We just got married through the church, 
and it was and still is nothing to do with our religious belief. 
(Zenaida, Filipina, unemployed - previously domestic worker, 2 
and half years in Korea) 
However, the marriage service provided by the Church is not free of charge. The 
costs of the marriage, air travel and paperwork for an entry visa are paid by a 
husband. The case of cross-border marriage migration will be examined further in 
Chapter 7. 
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Conclusion 
International labour migration is `the outcome of a complex combination of 
individual actions and social structures' (Goss and Lindquist, 1995: 344). As seen in 
the second part of this chapter, measures to control the entry of migrant labour have 
changed continuously according to the interests of the state, the state apparatuses and 
businesses. In the face of strong resistance from businesses and the state apparatuses, 
the Korean state has attempted to extend its authority over the influx of migrant 
workers. In reaction to the continuous flow of irregular migrants and the increasing 
numbers of undocumented workers, the state strategically imposes strict rules and 
regulations, thereby increasing structural constraints on the process of international 
migration. However, the increasingly selective and restrictive measures on the 
immigration control in Korea have not successfully controlled irregular migration, 
but rather increased the likelihood of migrants seeking alternative migration routes 
and placed additional pressures on migrants to turn to illicit businesses, which 
involve additional costs and a higher risk of exploitation. 
At the same time, `knowledgeable agents' undertake strategic action within 
the migrant institution. As seen in the decisive factors influencing the migration of 
women and their choice of migrant channels, unequal distributions of social 
knowledge, power, rules and resources between women and men make women opt 
for different strategic uses of resources. Migrant women use their knowledge of 
structures to realise their ends. Even though social knowledge and power are 
unequally distributed and may put individuals in a `weak' social position, individuals 
tend to maintain some sense of autonomy and capacity for strategic action. 
Last but not least, in order to acquire knowledge of the rules and access to 
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resources, individuals require assistance from other individuals who interpret the 
rules and distribute the resources within the migrant institution. In this case, both the 
potential migrants and recruitment agencies or private brokers draw selectively on 
institutional rules and resources and exploit them in pursuit of their own interests. 
Those practices become institutionalised and inevitably reproduce the system of 
migration. Migrant women who draw selectively on institutional rules and resources 
in pursuit of overseas migration therefore engage in what Giddens calls the `dialectic 
of control' and their `sedimented' practices become highly institutionalised. This, in 
turn, forms a gendered process of international migration that is reproduced and 
transformed over time. In the next chapter, I turn to examine how these migrant 
women are mobilised in the Korean labour market once they have successfully 
gained entry. 
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Chapter 5 
The Transnational Sexual Division of Labour: 
Implications for the Migrant Labour Market in Korea 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was examined how potential migrants act strategically to 
find overseas employment by using different migration channels within the 
institutionalised migration system. This chapter explores the ways in which women 
migrant workers are engaged in certain types of occupations in the labour market 
once they have entered Korea. A noted in Chapter 2, Korea has passed through a 
`migration transition' from a labour sending to receiving country, as a result of 
industrial, demographic and international political changes, as well as increasing 
cultural/social linkages between Korea and other Asian countries. It was shown that 
there is a systematic link between the globalisation of production of Korean firms 
and the influx of Asian migrants to Korea. It was also noted that as industrialisation 
has proceeded in Korea, domestic wage levels have risen and there have 
consequently been serious labour shortages in the manufacturing industry owing to 
the demographic transition and the restructuring of the workforce in the local labour 
market. While Chapter 2 provided a rather comprehensive overview of these 
transitions, which have led to the inflow of migrant workers into Korea, this chapter 
focuses on the changing production and employment patterns in Korea, which have 
increased the demand for migrant workers in certain sectors of the economy and 
generated continuing flows of migrant workers. 
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This chapter is divided into three main sections. First, it conceptualises the 
transnational division of labour and its implication for labour migration. In order to 
examine employment patterns and the characteristics of migrant workers in the 
Korean labour market, it is important to look at how the restructuring of the Korean 
economy has brought changes to the industrial structure and employment patterns in 
the labour market, and thereby located the country in a different position in the 
international division of labour. Changes in the industrial structure have also 
generated demand for migrant workers in certain sectors of the economy. The chapter 
therefore scrutinises the restructuring process of the Korean economy and labour 
market and the manner in which the migrant labour force has become indispensable 
for sustaining the country's economic growth. The second section explores how the 
changes in the Korean female labour force corresponds with the transnational sexual 
division of labour and the increasing flow of women migrant workers into the 
country. Finally, based on the analysis of the empirical data, the third section 
examines the gender and racialised division of labour in the Korean labour market. It 
looks at two industries - the manufacturing and service industries - in which women 
migrant workers are heavily concentrated. It then discusses state policy toward 
women migrant workers in Korea. 
1. The Transnational Division of Labour and Labour Migration 
Critique of the New International Division of Labour 
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The theory of the New International Division of Labour (NIDL)43 was devised by a 
number of German scholars to explain the global relocation of industrial capital from 
the core to periphery establishing `world-market factories' where manufactured 
goods are produced by cheap and unorganised labour (Ernst, 1980; Fröbel, et al., 
1980). Analysing case studies of selected developing countries where the Federal 
German textile and garment factories were relocated in the 1970s, Fröbel and his 
colleagues show how the NIDL creates a new and mainly young female working 
class, which is paid very low wages and which is employed under highly exploitative 
conditions (Fröbel, et al., 1980). The NIDL theorists observe that production 
facilities are divided into different skills and tasks and those different parts of 
production are spatially redistributed across the world. 
In the NIDL, newly industrialising countries (NICs) adopt the strategy of 
export-oriented manufacturing as an alternative to import-substitution strategies for 
development (Cohen, 1987; 2006). In the 1970s and the 1980s governments in NICs, 
such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan started to attract foreign 
investment by establishing export-processing zones (EPZs) and by providing 
unorganised cheap local labour and generous tax holidays. These world-market 
factories in Asian EPZs were owned and operated by local contractors. For example, 
Korean subcontractors ran factories for Reebok, L. A. Gear and Nike in Pusan - the 
second largest city in Korea -, which was known as `the sneaker capital of the world' 
during the 1980s (Klein, 2000: 224). 
The key feature in the NIDL is the `footloose' nature of globally mobile 
43 Cohen (1987) argues that the NIDL theorists took over 'the vocabulary of world system theory' (for the discussion of world system theory, see Chapter 1), such as the concepts of the 'core' and the 'periphery'. Also, for Cohen, the NIDL theorists basically followed the line of analysis suggested by 
the critique of dependency theory (Warren, 1980) and the depiction of 'peripheral capitalism' 
suggested by Amin (1974). 
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capital, which enables transnational companies to easily relocate their production 
lines to countries providing cheaper labour. This creates `the race to the bottom 
syndrome', a tendency towards increased downward pressure on wages and capital- 
labour relations in world-market factories that become more exploitative and 
oppressive. 
The NIDL certainly offers a crucial theoretical tool to understand the 
contemporary map of the globalisation of production, and despite the 30-year time 
lag, some of the analyses of NIDL theories are still applicable to the process of 
global production and to capital-labour relations in today's world-market factories. 
However, Cohen (2006: 157) argues that while NIDL theory provides `a major key to 
understanding some of the processes of capital accumulation in the modem world 
order, there are nonetheless some major limitations and omissions that inhere in the 
theory'. Cohen offers a sharp critique of NIDL theory on two aspects: conceptual 
problems and historical insensitivity. 
Cohen points out the conceptual ambiguity of the term, `the division of 
labour'. Different meanings of the notion lead to different discussions. Originally, 
`the division of labour' was used to describe sectoral divisions in the economy; to 
define the occupational and skill structure of the labour force; and to refer to the 
organisation of tasks, which was characteristically dictated by management (Cohen, 
2006). In addition, Cohen (2006: 158) identifies three `more recent' meanings of `the 
division of labour'. First, he argues that references to gender or racialised divisions 
of labour indicate a new sensitivity to the ethnic composition of the labour force and 
to the role of women in production and reproduction. Second, there is a spatial 
division of production and product (although he admits that this may be far from 
`new'). Third, he notes the process of contracting out production lines into domestic, 
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peasant, or household units, which has always been prevalent - especially among 
female casual workers - both in the developed and developing country. 
Cohen (2006: 159) argues that multiple meanings of `the division of labour' 
raise the question of `the relative weight, or significance, of the different phenomena 
grouped under this particular label' and that there is a paradox in the measurements 
deployed by the NIDL theorists to evaluate changes in the international division of 
labour. He continues that the NIDL theorists' use of `measures of the migration of 
capital' (the aggregate trade and investment figures) `to measure changes in the 
division of labour' can lead to `misleading impressions' (Cohen, 2006: 159). For 
example, he remarks that NIDL theory tends to focus more on changes in the 
location of manufacturing production, rather than on `changes between sectors (in 
particular the movement from industry and agriculture to service and information) 
within the metropolitan economies' (ibid. ). Accordingly, as Cohen argues, this 
misleadingly omits the possibilities for the migrant and immigrant labour force 
working in the service sector in the metropolitan economies. Whereas NIDL theory 
focuses on the relocation of manufacturing sectors to the developing country and the 
subsequent `de-industrialisation' and job losses due to the factory closures in the 
developed country, it does not provide a conceptual tool to explain the industrial 
transformation - or an `economic recomposition', as Sassen-Koob (1983) indicates, 
- in the metropolitan cities that has generated different sectors demanding both the 
professional and low skilled migrant workforces. 
Another conceptual problem of NIDL theory argued by Cohen is that the 
theory is excessively economic-centred. Neglecting the social and political relations 
in the process of production and only relying on the discussion of aggregate trade 
and investment flows, NIDL theory reproduces `the weakness of excessive 
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economism' which can be found in classical political economic theories, such as 
dependency theory and world system theory (Cohen, 1987: 232). Cohen states that: 
[a]11 that happens can, in such a view, be explained by the logic of 
capital without seriously taking into account independent 
institutional forces, the contradictions between merchants, national 
capitalists, transnational corporations and governments, or the 
political and social protests by those who fall victim to the logic of 
capital. Inter- and intra-class conflict within and between 
metropolitan, semi-peripheral and peripheral societies hardly make 
an appearance (Cohen, 2006: 161). 
In this regard, NIDL theory does not fully explain the significant role of strong states, 
i. e. of the role played by Asian NICs, initially in inducing foreign investment from 
developed countries for the export-oriented development strategy and later in 
encouraging the foreign investment of their multinational firms, which resulted in the 
relocation of their production lines and substantial capital flows into developing 
countries providing cheap labour. Also, a notable case in Korea is the impact of 
social and political struggles - i. e. democratisation and the militant labour movement 
- on the country's economic restructuring process, which should not be 
underestimated. NIDL theory relying on the logic of capital highlights the power of 
capital, but fails to take into account the power of the social and political dynamics 
that significantly influence the international division of labour. 
Cohen's second critique of NIDL theory is its historical gap. Cohen's 
critique basically starts with the question: `How new is the "new" international 
division of labour? ' (Cohen, 1987: 233). Cohen states that: 
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[t]here is no way of determining this from the theory itself, as no 
historical comparisons with other international divisions of labour 
are provided. It is as if the NIDL theorists boarded a time machine 
in the mid-19`h century to arrive at Hong Kong and Singapore late 
last night, without bothering to land at any of the intermediate 
airports - notable those marked on the historical maps as 
`imperialism' and `colonialism' (1987: 233). 
I concur with Cohen's argument that the distinction between the `old' and `new' 
international division of labour is not a very useful one because historical patterns 
associated with imperialism and colonialism have deeply affected to the 
contemporary reality. After continuous and rapid changes to the map of global 
production, the `new' aspects depicted by the NIDL theorists cannot be considered 
`new' any more today. Cohen, therefore, remarks that it is preferable to use the 
expression `the changing international division of labour' (Cohen, 2006: 161). Within 
the changing international division of labour, Cohen (1987; 2006) identifies four 
sequential phases44 in terms of the form of hegemonic capital: the mercantile, 
industrial, imperial and transnational divisions of labour. Interlinking these four 
historical phases, he argues that the appellation `new' is misleading in that it fails to 
recognise `the indelible heritage of the past' (Cohen, 2006: 161). He notes that the 
mercantile, industrial and imperial phases have produced the current geography of 
the global population and production facilities, such as Africans in the Caribbean and 
the USA, Italians in Brazil and Indians in South Africa, which is a `silent and 
determinant datum informing migration in the period of modem capitalism' (Cohen, 
2006: 162). 
44 For details of the features of these phases, see Cohen, 1987: 233-241. 
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The Transnational Division of Labour and the Migrant Workforce 
Identifying the above mentioned limitations of NIDL theory, Cohen (2006: 162) uses 
the term `transnational division of labour' in order to embrace changes in 
international divisions of labour and `different forms of labour utilisation' that are not 
depicted in NIDL theory. More importantly, he argues that the transnational phase of 
the division of labour has implications for the contemporary process of international 
labour migration. The key point in the discussion of the transnational division of 
labour is using measurements of the movements of labour in order to indicate 
subsequent developments in the international division of labour. In other words, 
changes in divisions of labour reflect the patterns of migration and vice versa. Cohen 
(2006) notes that one of the visible shifts in international migratory patterns is labour 
migration to the oil-rich countries. The large scale development projects in the Arab 
and other OPEC countries after the 70s oil-price boom has attracted labour migrants 
from neighbouring countries and South Asia. Along with managerial and professional 
labour, the development boom in those oil-rich countries has demanded unskilled 
migrant labour in construction and service sectors. 
Cohen's concept of the transnational division of labour provides useful 
insights into changes in production and employment patterns in industrialised 
countries (i. e. `the old metropoles' in Cohen's term), which generate continuing 
flows of migrant workers. Cohen (2006) notes that although much manufacturing 
production relocates to Asia and results in the increasing movement of labour, there 
are also steady demands for labour in industrialised countries, particularly in the 
service sector. According to him, the transnational division of labour is characterised 
by: `a further shrinking of agricultural employment in the advanced capitalist 
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countries; a stabilisation or slight drop in manufacturing employment in these 
countries; an increase in information-related employment; and a growth in strategic 
world cities of service employment' (Cohen, 1987: 251). All the shifts of employment 
from the agricultural and manufacturing to the service and information sectors in the 
industrialised economy have implications for the flow of migrant workers - in 
particular the large number of unskilled workers from developing countries. 
Therefore, unlike NIDL theory, such insights provided by the notion of the 
transnational division of labour help to explain changing aspects of divisions of 
labour in the developed as well as developing economies and, more importantly, 
changing patterns in the movements of labour. 
The transnationalisation of capital and changes of production, especially in 
developed countries, and the implications thereof for the growing demand for 
migrant labour are underlined in the work of Sassen-Koob (1983). Cohen (2006: 166) 
states that Sassen-Koob `advances a theory, which in important respects should be 
laid side by side with NIDL'. In particular, it is important to note Sassen-Koob's 
emphasis on the growth of employment demand in the service sector as a feature of 
the contemporary division of labour. 
The technological transformation of the work process, the 
decentralisation of manufacturing and of office work, in part made 
possible by the technological transformation of the work process, 
and the transnationalisation of the economy generally, have all 
contributed to the consolidation of a new kind of economic centre 
from where the world is managed and serviced (Sassen-Koob, 
1984b: 140, cited in Cohen, 2006: 166). 
Referring to the cases of New York and Los Angeles, Sassen-Koob (1983: 176) 
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argues that the relocation of the manufacturing sector from the developed to 
developing countries of the world has been a major factor in the decline of traditional 
industries in the economies of old industrial centres. Along with the 
transnationalisation of capital, this has generated a rapid expansion in the demand for 
`advanced specialised services', such as legal, managerial, financial, and technical 
services. The production of these advanced services is disproportionately 
concentrated in a few global cities at the core, such as London, New York and Los 
Angeles (Sassen-Koob, 1983; Sassen, 2002). Sassen-Koob's argument implies that 
even though goods are produced in the world-market factories of developing 
countries, the production and products are managed and controlled in a `new kind of 
economic centre' at the core. In other words, while designer cloths and electronic 
goods are manufactured in factories in Guangdong, China, these products are 
designed, developed and distributed by the metropolitan cities in Europe, the United 
States and Asian NICs. 
One of the key features highlighted by Sassen-Koob is a shift in the 
employment pattern and social structure of New York and Los Angeles that is the 
prominent growth of both the high paid professional and the low wage, `dead-end' 
jobs. Sassen-Koob (1983: 176-177) argues the international division of labour 
generates a decline in old industrial centres but, at the same time, generates `an 
economic recomposition' to the benefit of a few global cities and high-income 
professional workers in these cities. On the other hand, an expansion of `advanced 
services' - occupied by the professional workforce - demands an expansion of low- 
wage ancillary services, such as clerical, cleaning, delivering, repairing and caring. 
Here, it is worth noting the latter feature of employment in the global cities. Cohen 
(2006: 166) remarks that this characteristic constitutes `a surprising and important 
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finding in that conventional wisdom and other assumptions about restructuring'. 
Many observers assume that `de-industrialisation' in the cities of developed countries 
would mean a more extensive decline in low wage jobs, but in fact these jobs have 
not disappeared, but have been `available for the more dispossessed segments of the 
labour force' such as women, ethnic minorities and migrants (Cohen, 2006,167). 
Today, we still witness an expansion of low-wage jobs associated with growing 
sectors rather than with declining ones in global cities. 
Sassen-Koob (1983: 177) argues that `the new migrations to the core are 
primarily associated with this recomposition, rather than with the decline of 
traditional economic sectors as is usually argued in the migration literature'. The 
migrant workforce becomes the chief source of supply for low wage service jobs 
generated by technologically advanced service sectors, because migrants are cheap, 
willing to work for 3D jobs and less likely unionised. According to Sassen-Koob 
(1983), for the same reason, there is, in fact, a reorganisation of the work process in 
the declining manufacturing sector and this makes a city like New York competitive 
with other locations. Noting the example of an expansion of Chinese-owned 
manufacturing shops in New York's Chinatown, she posits a trend towards the 
operations of sweatshops and industrial home-working replacing unionised factories. 
Companies have the option of locating factories not only overseas, but also in areas 
with high immigrant populations such as New York and Los Angeles (Sassen-Koob, 
1983). The migrant workforce, in this context, becomes `a factor promoting location 
of plants and shops in core areas' (Sassen-Koob, 1983: 199). Undoubtedly, there has 
been a feminisation of both the supply of jobs and the labour force in these 
manufacturing shops as most of the jobs are low paid and typically associated with 
women (migrant) workers. 
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On the whole, in the transnational division of labour, as Smith (2001) argues, 
the dichotomy between `global economy' and `local agency' is rather misleading. In 
this sense, world system theory's classification of economies into core, semi- 
periphery and periphery is simplistic as, by means of the international movement of 
labour, the core and periphery of the world system co-exist within a single country 
and even a single metropolitan area, like global cities. Hardt and Negri (2000: 256) 
remark that `just when the proletariat seems to be disappearing from the world stage', 
the proletariat shifts geographically and `in each society and across the entire world 
the proletariat is the ever more general figure of social labour'. Korea is no exception 
for this tendency. As we will see in the following sections, the restructuring of the 
Korean economy has generated the coexistence of the core and periphery within a 
single territory. In the next section, we will focus on changes in the Korean economy 
related to the transnational division of labour, and the implication of these changes 
for the increasing flow of labour migrants into the country. 
A 'Recomposition'of the Korean Economy: Implications for Labour Migration 
As the NIDL theorists argue, during the 1970s and the 1980s Korea successfully 
altered its development strategy from import-substitution to export-oriented growth 
and became one of NICs in Asia. As mentioned above, by establishing export- 
processing zones (EPZs) in major cities, Korea promoted substantial `world-market 
factories' for labour-intensive manufacturing production. However, during the late 
1980s the rapid industrialisation of Asian NICs changed the feature of the 
international division of labour. The multinational corporations (MNCs) of Japan and 
Asian NICs began to locate the labour-intensive parts of their overall operations in 
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developing countries in other parts of Asia, thus creating `world-market factories'. 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, Korea is not an exception in this process. Klein's 
study (2000) vividly illustrates this changed division of labour. As mentioned above, 
Pusan in Korea was once `the sneaker capital of the world'. However, between 1987 
and 1992,30,000 factory jobs in Pusan were lost, and in less than three years one- 
third of jobs in the shoe factories had disappeared (Klein, 2000). For example, in 
1985 Reebok produced almost all its sneakers in Korea and Taiwan, but by 1995 
`nearly all factories had flown out of Korea and Taiwan' and 60 % of the company's 
production had relocated to Indonesia and China (Klein, 2000: 224). 
In the transnational division of labour, with neighbouring China growing 
rapidly as a global manufacturing hub, Korea has lost its competitive edge in 
manufacturing-driven economic growth. Alternatively, Korea has strived to maintain 
its international competitiveness through its economic transformation from old 
manufacturing industries to high tech and knowledge-based service industries. The 
notable example is the transformation of cities, such as Incheon and Pusan, which 
were once EPZs at the centre of world manufacturing. These cities have been 
renamed as `the free economic zones (FEZs)' and are being developed into global 
cities. Songdo City in the Incheon FEZ is currently the largest privately run global 
city development project in Korea. Lee, the CEO of the Incheon FEZ Authority, 
states that FEZs are part of Korea's survival strategies to cope with rising 
competition with other countries in the global economy. They are expected to 
develop `the nation's knowledge-based new growth engines', replacing 
manufacturing businesses (H-S. Lee, 2006). By 2020, Songdo City will be developed 
as Asia's new financial and logistic hub hosting Asia-Pacific multinational 
headquarters, global businesses and a knowledge-based information technology 
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complex (H-S. Lee, 2006; Hwang, 2006). Foreign companies locating in the FEZs, 
will be granted generous reductions in or exemptions from national and local 
government taxes of up to 100% during the first three years of business and up to 
50% during the subsequent two years (Korea IT Times, 2006). 
Even though industrial structures and economic profiles vary among 
countries, Korea nevertheless reveals a similar tendency towards changing 
occupational profiles, as evident in the global cities identified in Sassen-Koob's work. 
For example, there have been constant decreases in the employment rate in the 
agriculture/fishery and manufacturing industries in Korea. In the manufacturing 
industry, the employment rate decreased from 27.8% in 1987 to 17% by 2006 for the 
first time (Oh, 2007; KLI, 2007). On the other hand, from an employment 
perspective, there has been a rapid growth in the service industry in Korea. The 
employment rate in the service industry was 62.5% in 2001 and increased by 65% in 
2006 (Oh, 2007). Interestingly, while there is a visible increase of the employment of 
local workers in the advanced service sector, such as information technology (IT), 
finance, insurance and real estate, there is a decrease in the employment of local 
workers in the personal service sector such as hotel, restaurant, entertainment, 
housekeeping and care. 
Oh (2007) notes that from an employment perspective it seems that `de- 
industrialisation' started in Korea during the early 1990s. However, he argues that the 
`de-industrialisation' of the Korean economy has not yet happened in reality, since 
the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the country's GDP is still substantial. 
There has been a steady increase in manufacturing production and in 2001 it 
accounted for 33.4% of GDP, contributing to the country's economic recovery after 
the financial crisis of 1998. Nevertheless, there have been noticeable changes in 
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different sectors of the manufacturing industry. While there has been a dramatic 
decline in labour-intensive manufacturing production, such as garments and leather, 
there has been a steady increase in the forms of manufacturing production that 
require both labour and capital investment, such as machinery, electronics and 
chemicals. 
From the data presented above, one can easily notice the contrast between 
the decline of employment in the manufacturing industry and the continuing 
substantial weight of manufacturing production in the Korean economy. With the 
rapid decline of the employment in manufacturing, the operation of the industry has 
been sustained by alternative forms of labour, notably local irregular workers and 
migrant workers. As seen in Chapters 4, the strictly selective Korean immigration 
policy for migrant labour is used strategically to restrict migrant labour to the 
specific industries - manufacturing, construction, agriculture/livestock, 
offshore/coastal fishing and service industries - that suffer from labour shortages. At 
the same time, the employment of Korean workers becomes increasingly 
concentrated in the advanced service industry. This is well described in the following 
response by Sassen-Koob to Petras' argument. 
Border enforcement emerges as a mechanism facilitating the 
extraction of surplus value by assigning a status of formal or 
informal powerlessness to foreign workers generally and criminally 
to illegal immigrants (Petras, 1980, cited in Sassen-Koob, 
1983: 184). 
The recomposition of the Korean economy therefore generates substantial increases 
in the employment of local workers in the advanced service sector, while 
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simultaneously forcing the manufacturing industry - and increasingly the personal 
service sector - to rely on the supply of migrant workers from developing countries. 
These migrant workers therefore constitute a labour reservoir in the transnational 
division labour. 
To what extent is the recomposition of the Korean economy in the 
transnational division of labour relevant to migration of female workers to Korea? 
While the theory of the transnational division of labour provides us with a valuable 
account of the relationship between industrial restructuring and international 
migration, Cohen's account is basically lacking in gender sensitivity. Thus, taking a 
gendered account, the next section will discuss the transnational sexual division of 
labour and its implication for the Korean case. 
II. The Transnational Sexual Division of Labour 
The Convergence of the Transnational and the Sexual Division of Labour 
One of the key features of the transnational division of labour is the `feminisation' of 
the labour force. Whether in the manufacturing factories of EPZs in developing 
countries or in the service industries of developed countries, women are increasingly 
participating in the global labour force. It is important to note that `feminisation' 
refers not only to the increasing numbers of women workers, but also to the types of 
jobs and employment structures. Numerous studies by feminist scholars show the 
prominent relationship between the international division of labour and the sexual 
division of labour (e. g., Chant and Mcllwaine, 1995; Mies, 1998; Nash and 
Fernandez-Kelly, 2001). For instance, women workers are mostly concentrated in 
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labour-intensive manufacturing sectors, such as garments, textiles, shoes and 
electronics, and within these sectors the sexual division of tasks is prevalent. Also, 
employment structures have been `feminised' in the sense that it is increasingly 
casualised and flexibilised. Women are increasingly engaged in informal and home- 
based work, which is less secure, less (or mostly not) protected and lowly paid. 
Mies' (1998) account for the `feminisation' of the labour force in the 
transnational division of labour is based on her concept of `housewifization'. Mies' 
`housewifization' is a double-sided notion. On the one hand, women are the `optimal' 
labour force for the global capitalist accumulation process because they are 
`universally' defined as `housewives' and not as workers (Mies, 1998: 116). With 
women seen as housewives, their contribution to production (much less 
reproduction) is not considered to be `free wage labour', but rather an `income- 
generating activity' (ibid. ). Mies argues that the `housewifization' of women enables 
the capitalists not only to exploit women's cheap labour, but also to gain political and 
ideological control over women workers, who are less likely to be unionised. 
Therefore, being housewifized and marginalised, women become the `optimal' 
labour force in the global production. Mies (1998: 116) remarks that: 
[t]his tendency is based on an increasing convergence of the sexual 
and the international division of labour; a division between men 
and women - men defined as `free' wage-labourers, women as non- 
free housewives - and a division between producers (mainly in the 
colonies and mainly in the country-side) and consumers (mainly in 
the rich countries or the cities). 
On the other hand, Mies makes the point that within this division there is a 
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further division between women as producers and as consumers. In this sense, 
women in the West become `real' housewives who consume the products produced 
by women workers in the Third World. As Mies (1998: 134-135) highlights in her 
study of the women lace-makers of Narsapur: 
the working-class women in our countries [the West] can afford a 
lifestyle formerly only possible for bourgeois women because poor 
women in India make these things for a wage below their own 
subsistence level. 
She continues that `this relationship thrives on the definition of women as 
housewives at both ends of the globe' (Mies, 1998: 135). On the other side of the 
international division of labour, while women in the West are increasingly losing 
their jobs on production lines, they are being mobilised as `housewives, consumers 
and sex objects' in marketing strategies for the sale of commercial products produced 
by Third World women (Mies, 1998). This echoes Eisenstein's (1996) observation 
that women in the West are used to symbolise the market's consumerist possibilities 
for women in the Third World. 
According to Mies (1998: 120), the universal `mystification' of women as 
housewives is `not an accidental side-effect of the new IDL, but a necessary 
precondition for its smooth functioning'. Housewifization makes women's labour in 
global production invisible and marginalised, and justifies low wages and 
exploitative labour conditions. At the same time, it `gears their attention to a sexist 
and patriarchal image of women, namely the `real' housewife supported by a man' 
(Mies, 1998: 120). On the whole, Mies' `housewifization' thesis highlights the 
convergence of the transnational and the sexual division of labour, which is a 
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valuable account with significant implications for the discussion of the feminisation 
of labour migration and the `optimal' utilisation of women migrant labour forces in 
advanced economies. 
Korean Women in the Transnational Division of Labour 
Between the 1960s and the early 1980s, Korean women workers were highly 
`housewifized' and certainly were the `optimal' labour force in the transnational 
division of labour, producing large proportions of garments, textiles, shoes and 
electronics for exportation to the world market. Young and inexperienced women 
workers, often recruited fresh from rural areas, were mobilised for the country's 
export-oriented development strategy because they were considered docile and 
obedient, and therefore suitable workers for the labour-intensive, low paid and 
exploitative production sectors. In 1970 92% of women in the production sector were 
employed in the manufacturing industry and within manufacturing 80% of women 
were working in the labour-intensive light manufacturing industry, notably garments 
and textiles (K. A. Park, 1995). In the same year more than 70% of textile workers 
were women (ibid. ). These manufacturing products produced by women workers 
constituted over 45% of the total exports of the country in the 1970s (The Korean 
United Women Workers' Association, 2000). Considering their roles in the successful 
export-led development, the contribution of Korean women workers to country's 
rapid industrialisation cannot be over-emphasised. 
As seen in Chapter 2, with the introduction of the heavy and chemical 
industries (HCIs) as the core component of the country's development strategy, the 
transformation from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive industrial structure was 
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intensified in Korea. During this period, export commodities became more capital- 
intensive and the Korea's export structure reached a turning point, as manufactured 
exports shifted decisively towards skill-intensive products such as motorcars, steel, 
electronics, shipbuilding and machinery. While women's labour in the light 
manufacturing industry remained substantial, women workers were almost 
completely excluded in HCI - which became the country's core industry. With 
industrial restructuring, the occupational structure of sectors employing women 
workers has also changed. The growth of the production sector slowed down in the 
1980s, reflecting the decline of labour-intensive manufacturing industries, while 
simultaneously the service and clerical sectors continued to grow rapidly. With 
expanded educational and economic opportunities for women in the 1980s, women's 
employment shifted to the area of clerical and administrative work. K. A. Park 
(1995) notes that changes in the structure of the female labour force are evident in 
the age distribution of women workers. According to K. A. Park (1995), in 1970 the 
15-19 age group constituted the largest proportion of economically active women 
followed by the 20-24 age group. The percentage of the 15-19 age group among the 
population of economically active women nevertheless fell dramatically by 1980, 
and dropped even further by 1991, to become the smallest among all age groups. K. 
A. Park argues that this rapid decrease of the young female labour force was mainly 
due to an increased period of schooling. Export-led industrialisation therefore 
brought economic and educational opportunities to women, reducing the proportion 
of teenage women workers in the labour force by the late 1980s45. 
Barrientos et al. (2004) describe the shift in female employment from the 
as However, this tendency caused shortages of young, single women workers and this, in turn, an increasing demand for married women workers in the manufacturing industry (K. A. Park, 1995). 
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manufacturing into service industries in East Asian countries such as Japan and 
Korea as the `de-feminisation' of the manufacturing industry. Large-scale 
manufacturing industries, facing tightening labour markets and increasing real wages, 
started to adopt automation of production or to relocate their production lines to 
neighbouring countries providing cheaper labour. Thus, the decline in female 
employment in manufacturing is a part of the restructuring processes within the 
transnational division of labour. However, as we will see later in this chapter, the 
manufacturing industry has not in fact `de-feminised', but rather remained deeply 
feminised. While local women no longer work on production line, the jobs in 
manufacturing industries are being occupied by migrant women from poorer 
countries. 
At the same time, there have been noticeable shifts in the occupations of 
Korean women in recent years. Between 1990 and 2001, the population of the 
women workers in the manufacturing industry has declined by 10.6% - from 28.1% 
to 17.5% (Kuem, 2003). On the other hand, since the 1990s the proportion of women 
employed in the service industry has dramatically increased from 51.5% in 1990 to 
71.4% in 2001 (ibid. ). Kuem (2003) argues that women's increasing employment 
participation is directly related to the concentration of the Korean women's labour 
force in the service industry. This trend also has implications for the absorption of the 
large proportion of the female labour force in manufacturing into the service industry. 
In the next section, we will examine how these changes in the Korean women's 
labour force imply the gendered and racialised division of labour in the Korean 
labour market. 
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III. The Gendered and Racialised Division of Labour in the Korean Labour 
Market 
The Migrant Labour Market 
As seen in Chapter 4, Korean state policies aimed at controlling the inflow of 
migrant workers reflect the interests of state bureaucrats, politicians, businesses and 
local workers. The labour market for unskilled migrant workers is tightly managed 
by the state. The Korean state strictly controls the number and the period of the 
residence of migrant workers and very narrowly limits the range of industries 
available for migrant labour. As noted in Chapter 4, the Korean government is also 
very selective with respect to labour sending countries. In his dual labour market 
approach to international migration Piore (1979) observes that migrant workers 
become the reserve army of labour by supplying the secondary segment of the labour 
market and helping to secure the jobs of local workers in the primary labour market. 
The use of migrants in the secondary labour market therefore provides `a reason why 
[non-immigrant] workers, as well as their employers, might have an interest in the 
continuation of the migration process' (Piore, 1979: 41, cited in Bauder, 2006: 20). 
Nevertheless, the dual labour market approach, which divides the labour 
market into primary and secondary segments (Gordon et al., 1982; Piore, 1979; 
Reich et al. 1973), provides a rather limited account of the labour market situation of 
migrant workers. As Bauder (2006) argues, neither primary nor secondary labour 
markets are as homogenous as the dual labour market theory implies. In particular, 
within the secondary labour market increasingly occupied by the migrant labour 
force, migrant workers are not widely dispersed across occupations, but they are 
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concentrated in certain occupations and niche industries. Within these occupations, 
migrant workers are employed at low wages, in precarious jobs - which local 
workers are reluctant to take on - and without proper labour protection. In the sample 
of this study, with the exception of cross-border marriage migrants, most of migrant 
workers are temporary sojourners who are "target earners" (Bauder, 2006: 21), i. e. 
aiming to earn and save a certain amount of money in Korea before returning home. 
Indeed, the periods of residence in Korea for some workers - especially many 
Korean-Chinese workers who have stayed over five years - would seem to be rather 
longer than what might be considered `temporary'. The common reason for the long- 
term residence is debt, due to brokerage fees, and unreasonably high interest rates. 
Thus, even if the working conditions and the intensity of labour are exploitative, their 
tolerance levels are inconceivably high. Moreover, the undocumented status of 
workers makes them vulnerable to exploitation and maltreatment by employers and 
Korean co-workers. If the employment conditions become intolerable, migrant 
workers simply leave the job and move to another one, rather then resisting the 
situation. Or if wages are lower than they expected, they stay longer or work more 
shifts to meet their target earnings. Undocumented migrant workers are vulnerable, 
and for this reason they are valuable for the labour market. 
Migrant workers become `flexible labour' within the secondary labour 
market and thereby create `the migrant labour market'. Bauder (2006) notes that the 
use of migrants as secondary labour helps explain the cyclical demand for a migrant 
labour force. The demand for migrant workers continues until the cyclical and 
seasonal jobs in the secondary labour market are filled, but the demand declines in 
periods of economic slowdown (Bauder, 2006). In Korea the state regulation of the 
migrant labour force explicitly illustrates the country's use of migrants as flexible 
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labour. For example, the Korean government set an annual quota for migrant workers 
in the service industry. In an interview, a government official in the Ministry of 
Labour stated that: 
The Korean government sets a strict quota within the boundary in 
which the number of migrants does not take jobs over local 
workers. Normally, the quota is set at within 1-2% of economically 
active population. So, if the unemployment rate increases, the 
quota for migrants goes down. Because service and construction 
industries are particularly susceptible to the unemployment rate, the 
quota for the migrant labour force can be always changed (Deputy 
Director of Foreign Work force Policy Division, Ministry of Labour, 
interview with the author, August 2005). 
In the migrant labour market, the education and skills attained by migrants in their 
home countries are often irrelevant to their employment prospects. Even highly 
educated and experienced migrant workers are most likely to work in occupations, 
which do not require their specific skills. Rather, the employment of migrant workers 
is decided by employer preferences in terms of ethnicity, gender and age. 
The Gendered and Racialised Division of the Migrant Labour Market 
In the segmented labour market unskilled migrant women are employed in a limited 
range of occupations. With narrow occupational options and limited opportunities for 
further training, women migrant workers are in a weak position in the labour market 
and therefore unable to bargain for better employment positions. The `feminisation' 
of the labour force is evident in certain industries, such as the manufacturing and 
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service industries. While recent changes in the employment profile of Korean 
workers seem to indicate the `de-feminisation' of the manufacturing industry, certain 
manufacturing sectors remain deeply feminised. As discussed in chapter 2, a 
significant number of manufacturing sectors in Korea have not relocated overseas, 
but have been increasingly operated by subcontractors in Korea. Those 
subcontracting firms are mostly small and medium businesses, which have overcome 
their serious labour shortages by employing migrant workers. Although male migrant 
workers in the manufacturing industry still outnumber their female counterparts in 
Korea, the gendered division of labour between male and female migrant workers is 
evident. For example, in the manufacturing industry female migrant workers tend to 
be concentrated in textiles, garments and leather industries - which were previously 
dominated by Korean women workers - while their male counterparts are 
concentrated in chemical compound, rubber goods and plastics industries. In the 
sample of this study, 16 out of 31 women migrant workers are working or used to 
work in the manufacturing industry. The majority of those women are employed in 
electronic assembly factories, with a few in garments, metal and plastics factories. 
In the service industry, the gendered division of labour is more apparent. In 
2005 women migrant workers in the service industry constitute 85.8% of the total 
migrant labour force (Ministry of Labour, 2005). As seen in Table 5-1, migrant 
women are predominately employed in catering, care and domestic work. The 
numbers in the following Table merely represent the numbers of ethnic Korean 
migrants who have legally obtained the special employment permit. The total number 
of migrant workers who have applied for the special employment permit is 20,254 in 
total and among them 16,034 are migrant women. Considering the large number of 
undocumented workers who are already working in the industry, the total number of 
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migrant workers in the service industry would be far higher. In the sample of this 
study, 16 out of 31 migrant women are employed in the personal service sector, 
including catering, hotel cleaning, private care and domestic work. 
Table 5.1. The Number of Migrant Workers Employed under the Special 
Employment Permit System 
(people) 
Caterin Cleanin Public Sewage/wast Car Private Domesti 
gg servic e disposal mechani nursin c service 
ecg care 
Femal 5,81 4,961 32 6 13 - 225 574 
e1 
Male 1,01 785 25 5 154 7 24 15 
5 
Total 6,82 5,746 57 11 167 7 249 589 
6 
Source: Ministry of Labour, unpublished data (2005) 
The migrant labour market is also divided by nationality. One of main 
factors in the racialised division of migrant labour is the state regulation of the labour 
market for migrant workers. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Korean government 
introduced the special employment permit system for ethnic Koreans in an attempt to 
provide preferential employment opportunities for ethnic Korean migrant workers in 
the service and construction industries. These two industries are restricted to ethnic 
Korean migrant workers. A government official in the Ministry of Labour explains 
the reason as follows: 
The jobs in the service industry require employee proficiency in 
Korean and cultural similarity to deal with people. In this case, 
foreigners with dark skin would be hard to be employed in service 
jobs. For example, Filipinos seem to have a good chance because 
they speak English, but they are unlikely to be employed because 
they lack cultural similarity due to the racial difference. For this 
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reason, the government restricts the service jobs only to ethnic 
Koreans who speak the language and look similar to Koreans 
(Deputy Director of Human Resource Development and R&D, 
Office of the Prime Minister and Former Deputy Director of 
Foreign Work force Policy Division, Ministry of Labour, interview 
with the author, August 2005). 
It is questionable whether `cultural similarity' should be one of the qualifications for 
service jobs, such as cleaning or serving in restaurants. It is also hard to justify the 
relation between phenotypical appearances and cultural similarity. Underneath the 
regulation of the migrant labour market, there are serious implications for the 
mythical assumption of homogeneity of Korean society and xenophobic attitudes of 
Koreans towards `foreigners'. The sample of this study also shows a similar 
racialised division of labour: all Korean-Chinese migrants worked in the service 
industry and, except for three Filipinas, the rest of the migrants worked in the 
manufacturing industry. As will be discussed further below, within the same industry 
jobs are differentially allocated on the basis of nationality and wages vary between 
different nationalities. 
The Empirical Analysis 
1. Manufacturing Industry 
Worker Profiles 
12 out of 31 respondents in this study were currently working in the manufacturing 
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industry and three others had previously worked in this industry. The nationalities of 
the respondents were Filipina, Vietnamese, Sri Lankan and Indonesian. Except for 
the two Filipinas, who were marriage migrants, and two Indonesians, who had been 
granted an amnesty in 2003, all of them were undocumented. There were three 
Korean-Chinese workers who used to be employed in the manufacturing sector 
before moving to service industries. The majority of respondents employed in the 
manufacturing industry worked in subcontracting firms, producing electronic 
products, notably mobile phone handsets. Nevertheless, since migrant workers tend 
to be mobile and frequently shift between factories, many of them had also 
previously worked in various factories producing garments, leather, metal or plastics. 
Gender Relations and the Racialised Division within the Migrant Labour Force 
Although there is a variation between industries, most factories are subdivided into a 
series of different departments or production-line sections: pre-assembly, assembly, 
post-assembly/finishing and packing. Women workers tend to be concentrated in 
certain sections of the production line and the gendered division of labour within 
factories is therefore apparent. For example, in garments factories - as one would 
expect - the majority of women are employed in the assembly section consisting of 
machine-operated sewing. Similarly, in electronics, workers in the assembly line are 
predominantly women. The jobs in this section usually involve the fitting, moulding 
and splicing of electrical components. The other heavily female-dominated 
department is post-assembly or finishing. In fact, the majority of the respondents 
worked in this post-assembly section, which involved quality control, i. e. checking 
the finished products and removing the faulty ones. 
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The following case of a Filipina worker shows a clear example of gender 
segmentation in a manufacturing factory. 
The factory where I'm working is producing keypads and screens 
for mobile phones and other small electronic goods. I pick faulty 
products at the end of the assembly line. There are many Filipinos 
in the factory. On the ground floor assembly line, there are 40 
woman workers, including 8 Filipinos. On the first floor packing 
line, there are about 35 women workers, only Koreans and Chinese. 
And on the Second floor, there are only Korean male workers who 
work as machine operators. It is very clear about men's jobs and 
women's jobs in the factory. Men tend to do physically hard work, 
and women do the jobs requiring close and careful attentions. 
(Marilou, 30, Filipino) 
As seen in Marilou's factory, maintenance departments and engineers are 
reserved exclusively for male workers, because men are thought to be physically 
`stronger' and more adept at heavy and technical jobs. Another respondent also stated 
that there was a clear division of labour in the factory. She described her husband's 
glass factory where only male workers were producing and cutting glass, which was 
physically demanding labour. On the other hand, female workers in the glass factory 
tended to work only in the finishing department, when they checked the finished 
products. The explanation given for women's concentration in the assembly and 
post-assembly sections is the usual stereotype of women workers being `more 
meticulous' and `careful' on the job. Chant and MclLwaine (1995) remark that 
women comprise over 90% of operatives in the assembly section, which is regarded 
as the `most tedious' set of tasks in the factory, because they are thought to be more 
patient and to have a higher boredom threshold. 
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Wages and working hours are different between female and male migrant 
workers. In an interview with a couple from Indonesia, the wife - working in a 
mobile phone assembly factory - was not happy with her job because she earned less 
than her husband despite working longer hours. Her job involved injection moulding 
for mobile phone handsets. While her salary was about US$860 per month and 
additional US$4 per hour for overtime, her husband - who sprayed paints on 
electronic products - earned US$1,100 per month. According to data provided by H- 
K. Lee (2003a), on average women migrant workers work 62.9 hours and men 60.7 
hours per week. Although women workers work almost two hours longer than their 
male counterparts, their average monthly wage is about US$20 less than men's. 
However, many women workers in this study responded that because their jobs in the 
factory were not as hard as men's, relatively lower wages for women workers were 
explicable. 
My first job was packing electronic goods in a manufacturing 
factory. It was hard because some electronic goods such as fans 
were too heavy for me to handle. Putting them in boxes and 
finishing packing were a hard job. Then, I moved to a different 
factory where I did injection moulding. The job was easier than 
packing. But, it was not an easy job for women. Now, I am working 
in the mobile phone assembly factory. Comparing other jobs I've 
done before, it is the easiest job. It is woman's job. So salary is not 
as high as man's job. Some men are doing really hard and 
dangerous jobs in factories. (Sandra, 37, Indonesian) 
According to Marilou's interview above, in her factory workers are allocated 
to the shop floor based on their nationalities. While Filipina workers are only 
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working in the finishing department on the ground floor, Korean and Chinese 
workers are in the packing department on the first floor. For employers, hiring 
workers with the same nationality or with a similar cultural background is justified in 
terms of productivity and efficiency on the shop floor, as it makes them easier to 
manage and control. One of the respondents from Sri Lanka stated that: 
I am working in the factory producing cosmetic bottles with 6 other 
women workers from Sri Lanka. We cook our lunch together and 
became close friends. Like my boss, employers normally prefer to 
hire a group of workers having same nationality because they speak 
the same language and share the same culture. (Lakshika, 27, Sri 
Lankan) 
Employers also tend to give preference to certain nationalities. 
I assemble mobile phone sets in the assembly line in the Incheon 
industrial complex. There are 5 Indonesian women workers in my 
factory. Our boss prefers to hire Indonesian women workers because 
we are obedient. We do as we are told. If the boss says, "Do this" to 
Korean-Chinese workers, they often disobey. (Nina, 41, Indonesian) 
The preference for specific nationalities may nevertheless vary between employers. 
In general, employers prefer to hire Korean-Chinese migrant workers due to the 
workers' command of Korean. In fact, some of the Filipina and Vietnamese 
respondents mentioned in their interviews that Korean-Chinese workers were 
normally treated differently from other migrant workers within the factory. These 
respondents stated that the Korean-Chinese workers' competence in Korean provided 
them with an advantage in building rapport with Korean co-workers and managers 
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on the shop floor and employers. On the other hand, like Nina's employer, some 
employers may avoid hiring Korean-Chinese workers because wages are generally 
higher than other migrant groups46 and they are considered to be relatively `less 
obedient'. 
Wages and Working Conditions 
Women migrant workers work for very low wages and for very long hours under 
poor working conditions. A majority of the respondents worked weekends because 
they got paid for overtime. Many women complained about tiredness due to the 
nature of their jobs, which were repetitive and required a great deal of concentration 
for long hours. Women working for quality control in the finishing department are 
placed under particular stress because they get blamed for faulty products in the end. 
Workers are usually assigned daily quotas of products to assemble or quality-check, 
and if those quotas are not met at the end of the day, they have to complete their jobs 
by working overtime without additional pay. 
The following interview data illustrate women migrant workers' archetypal 
jobs in the factories. 
My job is very hard, but O. K. At least, for this job I can sit while 
I'm working. But, it's very tiring. Until the conveyer belt stops, 
you have to keep working. You cannot talk or think other things in 
your head. You really have to concentrate on finding faulty ones on 
the moving conveyer belt. I work eight hours a day - between 8.30 
46 For example, according to the data provided by H-K. Lee (2003a), while Korean-Chinese workers' 
average monthly wage is 620,000 won (US$620), Vietnamese workers' average monthly wage is 520,000 won (US$520). 
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a. m. and 5.30 p. m. with one hour lunch break. If I work overtime, it 
finishes at 8.30 p. m. I earn 1,200,000 won (US$1200) including 
overtime payment. If you don't work overtime, you'll get paid 
900,000 won (US$900). I work overtime on Sunday for an extra 
income. I want to stay at home at weekends, but I work for money. 
I work on Sundays from 2 to 5 o'clock in the afternoon. (Marilou, 
30, Filipino) 
I'm inspecting faulty products in an automobile accessories 
manufacturing assembly. I work for 10 hours per day - from 8.30 
a. m. to 6.30 p. m. with a 30 minute lunch break. I also work on 
Saturdays till 2.30 p. m. My monthly salary is only 800,000 won 
(US$800). My job is very tiring. I check faults in very small nuts 
and bolts, which are parts of cars. I do about 10 boxes - one box 
contains 500 nuts and bolts. My job needs concentration for all day. 
My eyes hurt. If I don't finish the checking 10 boxes, I cannot go 
home and have to do unpaid overtime to finish. (Lisa, 36, Filipino) 
I work as a machine operator in the mobile phone manufacturing 
factory. I assemble a screen into a mobile phone handset. The 
factory is a subcontractor of major mobile phone companies in 
Korea. I work 12 hours a day - from 8.30 a. m. to 8.30 p. m. It's 
hard and tiring. I'm the only one doing this job in the factory. So 
it's quite stressful because I've got a responsibility for faulty 
products. If there is a faulty screen, it's my fault. So you have to 
carefully concentrate on your job. At the same time, I have to do 
the job in speed. My monthly salary is 1,000,000 won (US$ 1,000). 
It is four months' salary of a military general in the Philippines. (Jo, 
45, Filipino) 
I feel stressed because my supervisor always tells me to do my job 
quickly. Koreans are short-tempered. They want us to do 
everything at speed. This causes many faulty products in the 
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factory. When the boss finds out many faulty products, he blames 
us. (Sandra, 37, Indonesian) 
It is worth noting that not all women migrant workers are employed in 
traditional `women's jobs. I found that some of the respondents also worked or had 
previously worked in physically demanding and precarious production, such as 
furniture, metal and plastic. Migrant workers often work without proper protection or 
safety instructions. Industrial accidents are common in these industries. One 
respondent who was employed to sand wood in a furniture factory complained about 
breathing dust while she was doing her job. Also, surprisingly many women worked 
in metal industries, where they moulded metal to make bath tops or other metal 
components. One Filipina worker described her previous work in a foundry as the 
hardest job she had ever done. One Korean-Chinese woman, who previously worked 
in a factory producing metal furniture, cut her finger with a metal press machine. 
Women migrant workers often took jobs in these industries because they were 
misinformed about the particular job assigned to them in the hiring process, and 
because these jobs paid relatively better than other factory jobs, such as assembly 
and quality control. 
As the majority of women workers were undocumented and worked without 
proper contracts, they were in a vulnerable position. None of the respondents in this 
study were members of trade unions. Therefore, even though they were aware of 
their longer working hours and lower wages when compared to Korean co-workers, 
they tended to passively put up with these unfavourable conditions. As mentioned 
above, most of the respondents were `target earners'. Their primary aim was to earn 
and send money to their family back home. Rather than attempting to change the 
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present condition - for instance by complaining to their employers or asking for a 
pay raise - their preferred act of resistance was to move to another factory with 
slightly better pay and conditions. 
The Dilemma of Industrial Trainees 
As seen in Chapter 4, under the Industrial and Technical Training Programme (ITTP), 
foreigners are allowed to enter Korea for training in Korean firms. While they do the 
same work as other `workers' in manufacturing factories, they do not receive any 
training. They are ostensibly `trainees' in terms of their legal status, and for this 
reason do not have the same rights as regular workers. Owing to extremely low 
wages and poor employment conditions, many trainees escape from their designated 
companies to find better-paid jobs in other factories. Trainees frequently suffer verbal 
abuse, such as swearing and racist or sexist insults. One respondent was hit by a 
Korean co-worker because she did not respond to his question. Under these 
circumstances, trainees often choose to leave their sponsors and become 
undocumented. The following two respondents had entered Korea as `trainees', but 
worked as undocumented workers after escaping from their sponsor firms. 
I came to Korea as a trainee. I worked day and night for long hours, 
but my monthly wage was only 280,000 won (approx. US$280). 
Although the company provided me free accommodation and food, 
it was still a very low wage and work was really hard. I had almost 
no money left when I sent most of my wage to my family in my 
country. So I decided to escape the factory after two years. Since 
then, I have shifted from one job to another a few times. (Thuy 
Duong, 29, Vietnamese) 
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When I was a trainee, I worked in a cloth factory. I didn't know 
how to sew, but because I couldn't speak Korean I couldn't 
understand the instruction. So I had to learn by myself by looking 
at how Korean workers were doing. Because the work was really 
hard with a very low wage, I quit the factory after one year and 
moved to another factory. (Hong Sam, 26, Vietnamese) 
However, for some of the women trainees, escaping from the designated 
company was not an easy option. With a lack of competence in Korean and being in 
a foreign country, they had no choice but to stay in the job until their contracts end. 
When they were deployed to isolated factories in suburban areas, it was difficult for 
them to obtain information on alternative jobs, which were more likely to be 
available in metropolitan cities. 
When I came to Korea as a trainee, I was deployed in a factory in 
Jinju [a small city in the south west province]. Although it was 
really hard work and the wage was bad, I stayed in the job until my 
three-year training contract terminated. I wanted to quit, but I 
didn't know where to go. I was afraid of moving to another new 
place in this foreign country where I had nobody. I think that it was 
harder for me because I was a woman. (Shilani, 30, Sri Lankan) 
On the other hand, many trainees tend to be forced to stay in their designated 
companies. Being aware of the tendency for a large number of trainees to escape 
from their sponsor companies, employers often try to manage the workforce in a 
manipulative manner. The following experience of two Korean-Chinese workers 
illustrates why the industrial training programme is commonly criticised as `modem 
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day slavery'. 
We worked in a textile factory for two years as trainees. It was one 
of big Korean fashion companies. Both of us knew nothing about 
sewing before coming to Korea. We started to work straight after 
very brief induction. For the first six months, our monthly wage 
was 540,000 won (US$540). Even though the work was hard and a 
wage was low, we couldn't move to another factory because except 
small monthly allowance (100,000 won), rest of our wages were 
automatically paid into our bank accounts. Employers made us 
unable to get hold of the savings during our contract. We received 
them when we left the job after two years when the training contact 
ended. 
We worked for 12 hours a day from lam to 7pm. After 5pm, 
Korean workers could claim overtime pay, but we were not entitled 
to receive overtime pay until 7pm. The manager in the factory was 
a Korean man who always swore and shouted at us. 
There was no freedom. It was an apartment type factory: an office 
and shops on the ground floor; factories on the first and second 
floors; and workers' accommodation on the fourth floor. After 
midnight, we were locked inside the building. Then, nobody could 
go out. If you went out and returned after midnight, you were fined 
5,000 won (approx. US$5), which would be deducted from your 
next month's wage. This was all because the employer worried that 
we could escape from the factory at night. There were total 120 
migrant workers in the factory and most of them were Korean- 
Chinese trainees like us. There was one Vietnamese woman who 
was undocumented, but paid a lot more than us. We didn't realise 
that our wages were much less than other migrant workers who are 
mostly undocumented. As we were confined in the factory, we 
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didn't have much contact with the outside world. When we finished 
our training contract, we decided never to take a job paying a low 
wage. (Dani and Myung-Hwa, 25 and 22, Korean-Chinese) 
2. Service Industry47 
Worker Profiles 
As mentioned above, migrant workers employed in the service industry are 
predominantly women. Eight out of 31 respondents were employed in the service 
industry in the formal sector. However, it is important to note that among those 
workers some were also employed as part-time domestic workers in private 
households. Some of the data examined in this section are also based on interviews 
with the respondents who were employed in domestic work, but who had previously 
worked in the formal service sector. All the respondents employed in the service 
industry were Korean-Chinese migrants, who were mostly undocumented and long- 
term residents in Korea. The majority of the respondents were employed in catering, 
involving table waiting, cleaning, washing-up and kitchen assistance. Some had also 
previously worked as hotel cleaners. Compared to workers employed in private 
households, workers in this sector tend to be relatively young (ages between 20s and 
40s). Although the pay in catering is better than in domestic work, as the labour 
intensity is higher in this sector, migrant women tend to move to domestic work 
when they get older. 
47 Here, the service industry refers to service jobs in the formal sector, such as cleaning and catering 
services. Service work, especially care and domestic work in private households will be examined in 
Chapter 6. 
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Wages and Working Conditions 
Those workers having worked in hotel cleaning expressed negative views on the job, 
owing to long working hours and the intensity of labour. In fact, among the 
respondents hotel cleaning was regarded as a notorious job, which they all wanted to 
avoid. One of respondents described her previous cleaning job as follows: 
I have worked as a cleaner in a small hotel in the outskirts of Seoul. 
I found that job on the local paper, but left the job after one week. 
Cleaning hotel is one of the hardest jobs. If somebody offers me a 
job in hotel, I would never take it again. There were 50 rooms in 
the hotel, which should be cleaned by only three of us. My job was 
to clean all toilets in hotel rooms. There were so many glasses in 
each toilet and I had to clean them every time when guests checked 
out the room. The work was endless for all day. Although it was 
hard labour, I was paid 120,0000 won (US$1,200) for working 16 
hours a day. Compared to the cleaning job, working in a restaurant 
is much better. (Sin-Keum, 55, Korean-Chinese) 
On the other hand, employment in catering was generally regarded 
preferable among Korean-Chinese workers, because the wages were higher than 
those in manufacturing jobs and less different from those of Korean workers. The 
monthly wage of the respondents in this study was in the range of 1,200,000 and 
1,300,000 won (US$1,200 - 1,300), while Korean workers in the same industry were 
paid about US$100 more per month than migrant workers. Most workers lived in the 
accommodation provided by employers, which was often a small room shared with 
other migrant workers. The working hours varied between workers, depending on the 
types of restaurants. The full-time migrant workers interviewed in this study 
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normally worked 12 hours a day in restaurants. Many respondents stated that, unlike 
factory work, they were allowed a break during the working hours when restaurants 
were less busy. However, as these workers commonly lived in the restaurant, they 
often worked during non-business hours, arranging tables, sorting out cutlery, folding 
napkins or washing vegetables before and after opening hours. 
Migrant workers tend to work in large restaurants, which can more easily 
provide them with accommodation. Generally, catering in Korea is distinct from 
other cultures. Working in large restaurants demands greater intensity of physical 
labour for long hours due to cultural uniqueness. Customers expect to be served their 
orders with great speed - even if they are not in a fast-food restaurant - and 
especially during lunch hours. Korean cuisine is made up of a number of different 
dishes including main dishes and several small dishes, which are normally served at 
the same time. More importantly, unlike Western restaurants, the layout of tables and 
seating in most Korean restaurants is arranged in rooms without chairs - i. e. 
customers take off their shoes and sit on the floor. This means that each time workers 
serve customers they have to take off their shoes and carry all the dishes into the 
rooms. 
I once worked in a traditional Korean restaurant. Korean food is 
normally served on heavy porcelain plates. And the restaurant was 
big and had many rooms on multiple floors. It was physically 
demanding to go up and down the stairs carrying all the dishes with 
a big tray. I had to do that about 20 times per table. I was so 
exhausted especially during the dinner when you had to serve 
several tables at once. (Hyang-Lim, 39, Korean-Chinese) 
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Gender Relations and Racial Discrimination in the Service Industry 
Apart form the physical challenges of the job, service work requires workers to deal 
with customers. Owing to the nature of service work, there are certain patterns of 
gender relations and the racialisation of the workforce in the service industry. Firstly, 
gender and age divisions of labour are apparent in catering. Young and well- 
presented women migrant workers are predominantly deployed to jobs involving 
table waiting. Accordingly, catering work is divided in terms of ages. It is evident 
among the respondents that while young women did table waiting, older women 
tended to work in the kitchen where they were `invisible' to customers. Secondly, 
many respondents stated that they experienced communication problems with 
restaurant customers. Although Korean-Chinese workers have a good command of 
Korean, due to cultural differences workers commonly face difficulties 
understanding modem Korean, which often contains English terms. On the other 
hand, customers often find it hard to understand the foreign accents of Korean- 
Chinese workers. As these problems often result in wrong orders and customer 
complaints, some restaurants are reluctant to hire Korean-Chinese workers for table 
waiting. Many respondents stated that they felt insulted when they found many 
restaurants explicitly indicating `No Korean-Chinese workers' in their job vacancy 
advertisements in local newspapers. 
The gender relations and the racialisation of the workforce in catering have 
significant implications for sexual and racial harassment, which are frequently 
experienced by women migrant workers employed in restaurants. Many respondents 
reported sexual and racial harassment by customers. As most Korean restaurants are 
licensed, women migrant workers are often distressed with having to serve drunken 
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customers late at night. Since Korean-Chinese workers' accent is noticeable, their 
Korean-Chinese identity becomes a target for sexual and racist comments by drunken 
or uncouth customers. More importantly, given her undocumented status, when a 
migrant worker is sexually harassed by a restaurant manager or an employer, she is 
reluctant to confront the situation. The following case illustrates how, under difficult 
situations - such as harassment -, migrant women could be located in a vulnerable 
position due to their undocumented status. 
When I was working in the previous restaurant, there were 12 
Korean-Chinese women including me sharing the accommodation 
provided by the restaurant. The restaurant manager kept harassing 
us [Korean-Chinese women employees]. For example, he rang our 
lodgings every night and talked to us in turn on the phone for 3 or 4 
hours. All of us were in distress day and night because of his 
behaviour. After putting up with him for a long time, we finally 
decided to report him to our boss. But, just before we talked to the 
boss, he resigned by himself with an excuse of his ill health. After 
that, one night while we were sleeping, three immigration officers 
raided our accommodation. Immediately, 12 of us were arrested on 
that night. We found out that it was the manager who reported us to 
the immigration bureau. He knew that we were undocumented and 
our lodgings were located in the basement where there was only 
one exit, so there was no way out. (Soon-Sun, 43, Korean-Chinese) 
Soon-sun was confined in the immigration detention centre for 24 days and, with the 
help of NGOs, was released after being granted a postponement of her deportation. 
Many respondents complained about discriminatory treatment based on their 
Korean-Chinese identities. Migrant workers experienced unfair treatment from their 
employers and Korean co-workers in the restaurant. While Korean-Chinese workers 
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were in a relatively advantageous position in terms of payment and employment 
opportunities within the migrant labour force, according to the findings in this study, 
they showed the lowest level of satisfaction with respect to their relationship with 
local workers and Korean employers in the workplace. Being Korean descendants, 
Korean-Chinese workers have a high level of expectation to be treated equally as 
`local Koreans'. However, in reality many Korean-Chinese workers experience racist 
attitudes on the part of local people and as a consequence, their identities become 
confused. This, in turn, results in their feelings of disillusionment and resentment 
towards Korea. For example, Soon-Sun who had been arrested by the immigration 
authority (see the interview above) commented that since the incident, she had felt 
anger and born a grudge against Korean people. 
When working in the restaurant, I often experience discrimination 
against Korean-Chinese workers. Many Koreans despise the 
Korean-Chinese with no reason. Hard and dirty work is always 
assigned to us in the restaurant. Korean co-workers and our boss do 
not usually talk to Korean-Chinese workers. As soon as I feel 
despised by Koreans, I just quit my job and move to another one. I 
left the previous restaurant because of that. For this reason, I have 
never worked in the same restaurant for a long period. (Bong-Sun, 
52, Korean-Chinese) 
I still believe that 95% of Koreans are good people, but it was the 
rest of them who upset me. If I work hard, Koreans demand me to 
work harder. In the previous restaurant, the employer who was a 
woman of my age always called me a `Chinese bitch'. There were 
also Korean women workers in the restaurant, but she only called 
us [Korean-Chinese employees] using the words. I was a cook in 
the Kitchen and was frequently offended by her racist comments. I 
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had put up with her insults for 15 days and decided to quit. (Soon- 
Hee, 70, Korean-Chinese) 
Since I came to Korea, I feel that I become a bad person. Because I 
have gone through so many unpleasant experiences of Koreans, I 
have so much anger and hatred against some Korean people. It is 
not easy to forgive. When I worked in a restaurant, I was once 
accused for stealing money from the counter. At that time, I was 
not paid wages for two months because the restaurant was not 
doing well. When I asked the employer to pay me overdue wages, 
the employer got angry and said to me, "after you stole money 
from us, how could you demand me to pay you overdue wages 
now? " Eventually, I reported the employer to the Ministry of 
Labour and got paid all the wages. For 50 years, I had lived with 
integrity in China, but I was really sad to be contempt like that in 
Korea. (Sin-Keum, 55, Korean-Chinese) 
State Policies towards Women migrant workers 
Under the Employment Permit System (EPS), migrant workers have the same rights 
as Korean workers. In principle, when a foreigner is regarded as a 'worker 148 , she or 
he is entitled to the three basic labour rights of unionising, collective bargaining and 
collective action. Migrant workers are also protected under the Labour Standards Act, 
the Minimum Wages Act and the Industrial Safety and Health Act. Accordingly, 
migrant workers have access to four forms of national insurance: the National Health 
Insurance; the Industrial Accident Compensation; the Employment Insurance; and 
48 Article 14 of the Labour Standard Act defines a 'worker' as 'a person engaged in whatever 
occupation offering work to a business or workplace for the purpose of earning wages'. 
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the National Pension49. In addition, state policy specifies four types of EPS insurance. 
The employer must provide the Departure Guarantee Insurance (for severance pay) 
and the Guarantee insurance (for overdue wages) to the migrant employee, while 
migrant workers are expected to insure themselves by means of the Return Cost 
Insurance (for return flight ticket) and the Casualty Insurance (for accident and death 
unrelated to work). The employment contract period of the EPS is one year at a time 
and the maximum period of employment in Korea is three years. A change in 
business or workplace of the migrant worker is strictly prohibited. Dependent family 
members of migrant workers are not allowed to enter the country. 
Chapter IV, Article 22, of the Employment of Foreign Workers Act 
(EFWA) specifies that an employer shall not give unfair and discriminatory 
treatment to migrant workers `on grounds of their status'. It is however very doubtful 
whether this provision is followed in reality. First of all, industrial trainees are not 
recognised as `workers'. According to the Immigration Control Act, their legal status 
is strictly that of `trainee' and industrial trainees under the ITTP are therefore 
excluded from the Employment of Foreign Workers Act (EFWA). As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, during two years' working period granted under the Working 
After Training Programme (WATP), migrant workers are protected by the Labour 
Standards Act, the Minimum Wages Act, the Industrial Accident Compensation and 
the Industrial Safety Act. However, this provision does not cover the full period of 
their employment, i. e. during the first year of their apprenticeship these provisions 
are not applied because they are in the `training' period. On the whole, even though 
they do the same work as other migrant workers do, trainees do not have the same 
49 The National Pension is however based on the principle of reciprocity. Thus, it is only applied to 
migrant workers from countries that apply it to migrant workers in their own countries. The pension is 
not applied to workers from Vietnam and workers from Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Thailand are 
provided with a lump sum payment when they leave. 
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rights as legal migrant workers. Secondly, in terms of the Labour Standards Act, 
those who work with an undocumented status are, in principle, recognised as 
`workers'. However, while an undocumented migrant worker can claim her or his 
right, the labour supervisory authority that handles the problems of workers is 
required to report their `illegal' status to the Immigration Bureau. In addition, the 
three basic labour rights are less likely to be applicable to undocumented migrant 
workers in practice. In most cases, the majority of migrant workers work in small 
firms where labour unions hardly exist. Although they may freely join general trade 
unions, their public activities and official memberships are restricted to a great extent 
because, being `illegal' migrants, exposing themselves could result in deportation. 
In principle, women migrant workers are eligible for the paid maternity 
leave of 90 days and the unpaid childcare leave to take care of an infant child aged 
less than one year. The majority of women migrant workers are however not aware 
of their legal protection. Even though they acknowledge their rights, it is difficult for 
them to exercise these rights as most of migrant women are employed in small firms, 
which are generally not sympathetic to these provisions. Moreover, because of their 
illegal status, undocumented women migrant workers cannot benefit from Maternity 
Protection under the Equal Employment Act. A government official from the 
Ministry of Labour describes the situation of women migrant workers employed in 
small businesses as follows: 
Undocumented women migrant workers do not have any right for 
the maternity or childcare leave. While their labour related rights 
could be protected under the Labour Standards Act, they are not 
eligible for the maternity protection. Even when they are legal 
migrant workers, if they are employed in small firms hiring less 
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than 10 employees, those rights are hard to be applied. In small 
businesses, even Korean women workers are difficult to exercise 
those rights. (Deputy Director of Foreign Work force Policy 
Division, Ministry of Labour, interview with the author, August 
2005) 
Undocumented women migrant workers find themselves in a blind corner in 
terms of state policies. A government official from the Ministry of Gender Equality 
and Family stated that: 
In pursuit of gender equalities in the workplace, we recommend 
and propose policies towards women workers and `gender' related 
issues, such as the protection for irregular women workers and the 
effective implementation of the maternity protection, to the 
Ministry of Labour. However, as the Ministry of Labour is in 
charge of the matters regarding `workers in general', including 
`migrant workers', we cannot interfere with their affairs. Besides, 
our ministry views that if a woman migrant worker is illegal, she 
does not have legal rights to be protected. (Deputy Director of 
Family Support Division, Ministry of Gender Equality & Family, 
interview with the author, August 2005) 
The two ministries seem to shift the responsibility for issues concerning 
undocumented women migrant workers to each other. While the Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family has shown serious interests in support for cross-border marriage 
immigrants and their families in Korea, women migrant workers are excluded in any 
of its undertakings because they are `workers' who are not the concern of the 
Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. On the other had, because they are `illegal' 
migrant workers, the maternity protection for these women workers is of no concern 
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to the Ministry of Labour. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, through international labour migration, social and spatial dichotomies 
are reconfigured. In the transnational division of labour there is a blurring of the 
dichotomy between `global economy' and `local agency'. The transnationalisation of 
capital and changes in production - especially in developed countries - increasingly 
demand unskilled migrant labour in order to sustain the positions of these countries 
in the global economy. Generating `the migrant labour market', migrant workers 
become `flexible labour' within the secondary labour market and, as a result, the core 
and the periphery have come to co-exist within a single country. Given limited labour 
protection and the ineffective implementation of state policies toward migrant 
workers, Korea has been able to reduce possible economic and social costs, while, at 
the same time, enjoying the benefits of the significant economic contribution of 
migrant workers. 
This chapter has highlighted the extent to which the migrant labour market is 
segmented by gender, class, race and age. It has also underlined the gendered and 
racialised state regulation of the migrant labour market. Through the feminisation of 
labour migration, the sexual division of labour has been extended to the transnational 
level. It has been shown that migrant women are mainly concentrated in certain 
occupations - such as labour-intensive manufacturing work and service work - 
which have been traditionally reserved for local Korean women. Gender relations 
and racial discrimination in the workplace, along with conflicting state policies have 
been noted. The chapter has also drawn attention to the unlawful treatment of women 
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migrant workers owing to their `multiple vulnerability' as women, migrants and 
undocumented workers. The feminisation of labour in the aforementioned 
occupations has significant implications for the sexual division of labour in the 
private and public spheres. Given the occupational segregation by gender in the 
labour market, for many women, migration may simply transfer them from one form 
of patriarchy to another, leaving gender relations within the family and society 
essentially unaltered. This argument will be further developed in the next chapter, in 
which the gendered and racialised division of social reproductive labour is examined, 
by way of a case study of migrant care and domestic workers. 
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Chapter 6 
The Transnational Division of Social Reproductive Labour: 
Migrant Care and Domestic Workers 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that the feminisation of labour migration has 
resulted in a gendered and racialised segmentation of the transnational division of 
labour. As discussed earlier, the restructuring of the Korean economy has led to the 
`de-feminisation' of the local manufacturing labour force and to an increase in the 
participation Korean women in the service industry. Migrant women have filled the 
gap in the labour-intensive manufacturing and certain service sectors, which had 
traditionally been reserved for local women. The feminisation of labour migration 
has significant implications for the existing sexual division of labour in the private 
and public spheres. By means of the international migration of women, the sexual 
division of labour has also been extended to the transnational level. The sexual 
division of labour cannot be fully understood without considering the sexual division 
of reproductive labour, since the sexual division of social reproductive labour 
interacts with and reinforces the sexual division in the labour market. In the case of 
Korea where the sexual division of reproductive labour has been robustly imposed by 
traditional social and cultural norms, the interpenetrative relations between women's 
reproductive and productive labour is particularly interesting. This chapter examines 
in what ways the traditional sexual division of reproductive labour in the private 
sphere has been extended into the transnational level, through the commodification 
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of reproductive work that is increasingly done by migrant care and domestic workers. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. Firstly, it discusses why it is 
important to consider the interpenetrative relations between reproductive and 
productive labour in the discussion of the sexual division of labour in general. The 
second section then examines the economic and social implications of the 
commodification of reproductive work that is increasingly done by migrant women. 
It identifies changes in the Korean family structure and the economic participation of 
married women both of which have increased the demand ' for paid reproductive 
labour in Korea. It also considers the specificity of the Korean case, where - 
compared to other Asian countries - there are relatively fewer migrant domestic 
workers employed in the Korean household. Third, by analysing the empirical data it 
examines a number of central issues related to migrant care and domestic labour: 
working conditions; class relations between employers and migrant workers; racial 
prejudice against migrant domestic workers; the emotional aspect of care work; and 
state policies on migrant care and domestic workers. 
I. Interpenetrative Relations between Reproductive and Productive Labour 
The feminist concept of social reproduction challenges the traditional Marxist 
approach to social reproduction. Laslett and Brenner (1989: 383) argue that for 
traditional Marxists social reproduction is viewed as `the perpetuation of modes of 
production and the structures of class inequality inscribed within them'. Criticising 
the limited scope of the Marxist definition of social reproduction, Laslett and 
Brenner argue that social reproduction refers to mental, manual and emotional labour 
`aimed at providing the historically and socially, as well as biologically, defined care 
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necessary to maintain existing life and to reproduce the next generation' (ibid. ). 
Viewing the recreation of life as a form of work and a kind of production, Laslett and 
Brenner (1989: 383) define `the organisation of social reproduction' in terms of `the 
varying institutions within which this work is performed, the varying strategies for 
accomplishing these tasks, and the varying ideologies that both shape and are shaped 
by them'. The social organisation of reproductive work is `the set of social 
relationships through which people act to get it done' which is `central to the 
organisation of gender relations and gender inequality' (Laslett and Brenner, 
1989: 383). Therefore, social reproduction does not merely refer to societal 
reproduction of class relations, but also to the `creation and recreation of people as 
cultural and social, as well as physical, beings' (Glenn, 1992: 4) and the perpetuation 
and reproduction of systems of gender relations. 
The significance of and the value of reproductive labour done mostly by 
women in the household has been central to feminist understandings of patriarchy 
(Little, 1994) and resulted in a tendency to question the androcentric distinction 
between productive and reproductive work in the public and private spheres. 
Relations of production could not exist without being reproduced. In capitalist 
societies, the unpaid domestic work of women converts wages into a means of 
subsistence without which waged workers could not continue to engage in productive 
work (Laslett and Brenner, 1989; Luxton, 1980; Smith, 1987). For example, Elson 
(1999) argues that labour markets are gendered institutions operating at the 
intersection of the productive and reproductive economies. She states that: 
as feminist economists have pointed out, unpaid, unmarketed 
caring activities are also critical for the functioning of the 
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"productive economy", since they reproduce, on a daily and 
intergenerational basis, the labour force which works in the 
productive economy. Moreover, feminist economists have argued 
that unpaid caring activities entail work, even though they are not 
market-oriented (Elson, 1999: 612). 
Elson further argues that although labour markets operate at the intersection of the 
productive and reproductive economies, they fail to acknowledge the contributions of 
the reproductive economy. Women who carry out most of the work in the 
reproductive economy are disadvantaged, since the benefits produced by 
reproductive economy are treated as `externalities' and therefore not reflected in 
market prices and wages (Elson, 1999: 612). Furthermore, labour market institutions 
are built on the premise that women should bear the burdens of the reproductive 
economy. From this point of view, `labour market institutions are not only bearers of 
gender, they are also reinforcers of gender inequality' (Elson, 1999: 613). Yeoh and 
Huang (1998: 583) also note that `negotiations in the reproductive sphere are as 
crucial as, and cannot be divorced from, those within the productive sphere in 
producing hierarchies and matrices of domination and subordination which undergird 
gender relations'. Therefore, the sexual division of reproductive labour 
interpenetrates with and reinforces the sexual division in the labour market. 
While reproductive labour has long been commercialised, the organisation of 
reproductive work has mostly remained in the private sphere and constructed as a 
`female job'. Paid domestic labour has a significant implication for the asymmetrical 
and intersecting relations of gender, class and race. Glenn (1992) observes that 
without challenging the gendered division of reproductive labour, white middle-class 
women in the United States have historically freed themselves from reproductive 
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labour by hiring another woman - an immigrant, a working class woman, a non- 
white woman or all three - to perform domestic work. Accordingly, `reproductive 
labour has divided along racial as well as gender lines and that the specific 
characteristics of the division have varied regionally and changed over time as 
capitalism has reorganised reproductive labour, shifting parts of it from the 
household to the market' (Glenn, 1992: 3). 
Focusing attention on the case of migrant care and domestic workers extends 
Glenn's argument of the `racial division of reproductive labour' to the international 
level. The migration and engagement in paid domestic work of women from 
developing countries have constituted the transnational division of reproductive 
labour. Given the interpenetrative relations of reproductive and productive labour, an 
adequate analysis of the transnational division of labour should consider not only the 
transnational division of productive labour as discussed in the previous chapter, but 
also an account of the transnational division of reproductive labour. Parrenas 
(2001: 62) describes the transnational division of reproductive labour as `the 
international transfer of caretaking', which refers to `the three-tier transfer of 
reproductive labour among women in sending and receiving countries of migration'. 
In her study of Filipina domestic workers in Rome and Los Angeles, Parrenas (2001) 
observes that while middle-class women hire the low-wage services of migrant 
Filipina domestic workers, migrant Filipina domestic workers, at the same time, hire 
the even lower-wage services of poorer women left behind in the Philippines50. In 
this case, increasingly commercialised reproductive labour in one country is closely 
linked with reproductive labour in another country and migrant domestic workers are 
50 Parrenas's discussion of the international transfer of caretaking bears a closer parallel to the 
concept of global care chains, which is discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
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in the middle of `the three-tier hierarchy of the international transfer of reproductive 
labour'. Parrenas (2001: 72), therefore, argues that `the migration of women connects 
systems of gender inequality in both sending and receiving countries to global 
capitalism', and this process occurs in `the formation of the international division of 
reproductive labour'. 
II. Economic and Social Implications of the Commodification of Reproductive 
Work 
Yeoh and Huang (1998: 584) note that `the growing number of Third World female 
migrants who cross geopolitical borders to take up paid reproductive work has major 
economic, social and political implications for both sending and receiving countries'. 
[G]overnments of sending countries are primarily concerned with 
enhancing the women's remittances as measures to overcome 
deficits in balance of payments, rather than with drawing up 
policies on wages and conditions of service to protect these women 
in the sphere of paid work. Similarly, in receiving countries, state 
policy often treats foreign domestic workers as no more than a 
form of commodified labour to be bought and sold in the open 
market, and a short-term solution to the crisis of social 
reproduction in newly industrialising countries (Yeoh and Huang, 
1998: 584). 
One of the rapidly increasing flows of migrant women within the Asian region has 
been that of women from developing countries migrating to work as paid domestic 
workers in the newly industrialising countries, where female migrants are in demand 
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as substitutes for reproductive labour, as a result of the increasing number of local 
women entering the productive economy. 
In Korea, women's paid employment participation has increased 
continuously from 28% in 1960 to 45% in 1988,48.3% in 1995 and 50.3% in 2006 
(Hwang, 2003; KLI, 2007; K. A. Park, 1995). In particular, there has been a steady 
increase in the employment participation of married women. While single women's 
employment participation was 10% higher than that of married women in the 1980s, 
in 2000 married women's economic participation accounted for 48.7%, which was 
1.7% higher than that of single women. Furthermore, in 2005 married women's 
economic participation increased to 53.6% (National Statistical Office, 2006a). 
Hwang (2003) argues that the main reason for women's - especially married 
women's - increasing employment participation is changes in the patriarchal social 
norms of Korean society. In the past, it was `natural' for a woman to stay at home 
once she got married, and the paid employment of single women therefore 
constituted a `temporary phase' before marriage. On the other hand, the recent 
increase in the employment participation of women in Korea has coincided with the 
higher educational attainment of Korean women. During the last decade, the rate of 
women's attendance in higher education has increased ten times. In 2000,44% of 
female high school graduates entered colleges or universities, compared with 47.4% 
of their male counterparts (Hwang, 2003). The higher educational attainment of 
women has partly influenced the change in women's attitudes toward continuing 
their careers after marriage. Whereas in 2006 50.8% of women responded that they 
would continue their careers regardless of marriage and having children, in 1988 
only 16.7% of women considered continuing their careers after marriage and 17.8% 
of women in the same year responded that they intended to give up their careers after 
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marriage (National Statistical Office, 2007a). 
Also, since the late 1980s there have been a series of institutional and legal 
changes, which have encouraged the employment participation of women. In 1987 
the Gender Equality Employment Law, which was later amended as the Equal 
Employment Act in 2001, was introduced, and in 2001 the Ministry of Gender 
Equality (later renamed as the Ministry of Gender Equality & Family) was 
established. While the effectiveness of legal protection and gender related policies 
are admittedly still questionable in many respects, the employment participation of 
women is increasingly acknowledged as economically and socially valuable and 
significant for the Korean economy. 
As a result of the growth of married women's employment participation in 
the last decade, the dual-income household has become a common family model in 
Korea. Dual-income families have become an economic necessity for the individual 
household, particularly for young families in urban areas, owing to rising housing 
prices and living expenses. At the same time, the nuclear household has become the 
dominant family structure in Korea. In 2005, the average number of family members 
per household was 2.83 (Hankook Daily newspaper, 2007). In 2005, among 12,490 
Korean households 71.7 % were nuclear units constituting by either married couples 
or parents and unmarried children, whereas three-generation cohabitation accounted 
for 5.7% (National Statistical Office, 2007b). The recent change in the attitudes 
toward responsibility for the care of the elderly is remarkable. According to an 
official social survey, in 2006 46.3% of respondents expressed the opinion that the 
elderly should support themselves, whereas in 1998 8.1% of the respondents 
expressed the same opinion and 89.9% of the respondents stated that children should 
take care of aging parents (National Statistical Office, 2007a). 
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Nonetheless, while women's participation in paid employment has increased, 
the burden of reproductive labour carried by women in the private sphere has not 
disappeared. In fact, in the conventional sexual division of labour Korean women 
now face a double burden of accomplishing both non-paid reproductive work and 
paid employment. The nuclear family system involves more roles for mothers in 
childcare and housework, when compared with the traditional system where 
grandparents or co-habiting extended kin were present to share childcare 
responsibilities. Moreover, the redistribution of economic responsibility has not 
necessarily been accompanied by a redistribution of domestic and caring 
responsibilities between couples in dual-income families (Drew, et al, 1998). Choi 
(1994) points out that despite women's achievement in education and economic 
participation, the idea and practice of sexism and paternalism strongly persists within 
the family and society in Korea. Most working women have taken jobs due to 
economic necessity and their employment in the paid economy has not changed the 
patriarchal structure of the family. Toiling at home and work increases the burden on 
women without producing any progressive change in gender roles in the family and 
society. Under these circumstances, middle-class women with college degrees tend to 
stay at home after marriage, often against their wishes (Choi, 1994). This is one of 
the major reasons why, despite women's high education attainment, the level of 
married women's economic participation in Korea is lower than that in other newly 
industrialising countries in Asia. 
Along with those changes in the family structure, the absence of appropriate 
state welfare provisions has also put a great deal of strain on women. Marchand and 
Runyan (2000) suggest that in the process of global economic restructuring, the 
private realm becomes `hyperfeminised' in relation to the state and the market. As 
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was found in the case of Korean women, the global economy demands that women 
simultaneously carry out both their productive and reproductive labour under 
conditions of limited public welfare provision. Regarding this, Marchand and 
Runyan (2000: 15) argue that there is `contradictory rhetoric and public policies' in 
the United States where `women are caught between neoliberal rhetoric which casts 
women as the "new entrepreneurs" by devaluing women's traditional family roles 
and neoconservative views which emphasise "family values" and cast women as 
selfish and irresponsible if they do not fulfil their mothering roles'. This, in turn, 
leads to `a crisis in social reproduction' (Brodie, 1994: 58). 
In Korea where patriarchal Confucian cultures' is acutely embedded in the 
social, economic and political relations, `care' is predominantly a `personal' matter - 
concerning women in the family. In Confucian culture, the family is regarded as the 
primary social institution, which is responsible for the economic and social welfare 
of family members in the individual household. This certainly explains the lack of 
state welfare provision for care in Korea. Traditionally, care was the responsibility of 
the extended family. Similarly, care for the elderly is the foremost indicator of filial 
duty in Korea and this is conventionally considered to be the duty of the daughter-in- 
law - particularly with respect to the first son's wife. Although many Korean 
working women still leave their children in the care of grandmothers, as more 
middle-aged women now have careers in paid employment or engage in social 
activities after retirement, daughters have to look for alternative carers for their 
51 Chun (2003) argues that the influence of Confucianism provides the key to understand and explain the nature of Korean thoughts and the `Korean character' in the every aspect of the society. According to Chun (2003: 68), `the teaching of Confucius were first introduced into Korea from China during the Yi Dynasty in the 14th century and although it ceased to be the official, state-endorsed, creed in 1894 its tenets had so permeated Korean society that its influence remains strong to this day'. In particular, 
the Confucian emphases on women's submissive roles and rigid patrilineal kinship relations are `more Confucian' in practice than their Chinese origins (Chun, 2003). 
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children. Nor can these daughters readily undertake elder care while they have their 
own careers. With the absence of a public care regime provided by the state, the care 
burden devolves to individual women - many of whom turn to commercial care and 
become `private consumers' (Runyan, 1997: 26) of commodified care work. 
As Pettinger, et al (2005: 7-8) correctly argue, the commodification of care 
work not only affects individuals and households, but also has `global ramifications' 
as it is the migrant labour force which makes up for `the care deficit' in developed 
countries. Compared to many countries in East Asia, migrant domestic workers 
constitute a relatively small number of the total population of migrant workers in 
Korea. This tendency can be explained by a number of reasons: the relatively lower 
level of the employment participation of married women; a lack of state welfare 
provisions; and the Korean immigration policy, which prohibited the employment of 
domestic workers in private households until 2002, when the special EPS for ethnic 
Koreans was introduced (see Chapter 4). Recently however, Korean women have 
increasingly relied on paid care work carried out by migrant domestic workers. In her 
study of the relations between female employers and migrant domestic workers in 
Taiwan, Lan (2006) argues that both Taiwanese female employers and migrant 
domestic workers are engaged in what Kandiyoti (1991) calls `patriarchal 
bargaining', a concept that explains how women work out different strategies to 
maximise security and optimise life options under various forms of patriarchal 
oppression (see Chapter 1). Lan's following account aptly describes how various 
`patriarchal bargaining' strategies are devised by different groups of women in the 
transnational sexual division of labour: `some women ease the gendered duty of 
domestic labour by hiring a maid, but others escape gender constraints at home by 
becoming one' (Lan, 2006: 15). Lan's account is closely related to the case of middle- 
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class Korean women, who increasingly seek to ease the burden of domestic duties by 
employing migrant women. 
III. The Empirical Analysis: Migrant Care and Domestic Workers 
Worker Profiles 
Eleven out of 31 respondents in this study were employed as domestic workers in 
private households. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a few of them also worked 
in the service industry in the formal sector. Most respondents found their jobs 
through their social networks or through employment agencies. These agencies 
required commission fees, which were usually 10% of worker's monthly wage. The 
majority of the respondents were live-in workers. These respondents worked mainly 
as nursing-carers for the elderly, child-carers or domestic workers. All of the Filipina 
respondents were employed by American professionals residing in Korea52. Two of 
them worked as child carers for American families in Seoul and one had left her job 
due to pregnancy. 
Unlike migrant domestic workers in other newly industrialising countries in 
Asia, migrant domestic workers in Korea tend to be middle-aged Korean-Chinese 
women. The main reasons for the popularity of Korean-Chinese migrants as 
domestic workers in Korean households are language and `cultural similarity'. More 
52 The Korean immigration regulation allows foreign professionals - including foreign diplomatic/consular personnel and expatriates employed in foreign firms - to hire foreign domestic 
workers. Once they are employed by foreign professionals, migrant workers are issued a `visit and 
stay with family visa (F-1)' and restricted to work with the contracted family. Most of migrant 
workers employed by foreign professionals are English-speaking Filipinas. Among the three Filipina 
respondents, two were marriage migrants who were not restricted to any paid employment and one 
worked as a domestic worker with a F-1 visa. 
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importantly, Korean employers prefer Korean-Chinese migrants - who are mostly 
middle-aged married women - to young Filipina workers - who have predominated 
the domestic service sector in other Asian countries. In this study, except for three 
Filipina migrants, the rest of the migrants working in the domestic service sector 
were Korean-Chinese the age of over 50. Many of the respondents had worked in 
hotels or restaurants prior to their current jobs, but as they got older they chose 
private care work over cleaning or catering work in the formal sector. While the 
foremost reason was the general view of employers that middle-aged women were 
more experienced in domestic work and child caring, this age preference was also 
explained in terms of the concern of female employers about having a young 
domestic worker living in her home. The following employer who hired a 49 year old 
Korean-Chinese migrant explained the reason why she avoided hiring a young 
domestic worker. 
I am reluctant to hire a young domestic worker. Once I was about 
to hire a 36 years child carer because I thought that a younger 
person would work better. But, one of my friends told me to think 
again. After all, I started to doubt how well a 36 year-old woman 
could take care of my baby. My husband is 36 year old, and he is 
not very good at looking after my son. (Laugh) And my friend told 
me a story of her friend who employed a young carer. One day, she 
came back home and saw that her husband and the carer were 
watching T. V. sitting on the sofa. Obviously, it was not like 
something going on between them, but the next day she fired the 
worker because she did not like the picture of her husband and the 
young woman sitting together in her living room. If that was my 
husband, I would not like the picture either. Although our carer is 
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not young, husband does not seem comfortable to be around her at 
home and neither the carer. (Hong, 30, Housewife) 
Wages and Working Conditions 
Care work - whether it is caring for the sick or for children - generally demands 24- 
hour labour. The time required for care is spread throughout day and night, often 
outside normal working hours depending on the needs of the individuals being cared 
for. More importantly, as care work is centred on an intimate relationship with 
people, it involves emotional engagement as well as physical tasks. In the case of 
childcare, migrant workers are required to deal with both the individuals whom they 
care for and those who hire them. Migrant workers employed in other jobs responded 
that although private care paid better and involved less labour intensity, they chose 
their current jobs - either factory work or catering work - over care work owing to 
the stress of dealing with intimate relationships. Also, migrants who were not 
employed in care work tended to argue that working for somebody in the private 
household made them more conscious of the class difference between the employer 
and the worker. One Filipina worker stated in her interview that she chose factory 
work because she did not want to work "as a servant in somebody's private house". 
The respondents caring for the sick mostly worked for old people suffering 
from Alzheimer's. All of them were live-in care workers, as migrant workers 
preferred to live in employers' homes to save money for accommodation and food. 
Their patients also generally needed to be nursed 24 hours a day. Wages for live-in 
carers for the sick were between 1,800,000 won (US$1,800) and 2,100,000 won 
(US$2,100). Wages of the respondents varied between patients depending on the 
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condition of a patient and the experience of a worker. Employers are normally 
children of the patients, who are not able to take care of their sick parents for 24 
hours. While the number of private nursing homes is increasing slowly, sending sick 
parents to a nursing home is not a popular choice among young Korean people. 
Owing to the influence of Confucian culture, sending sick parents to a nursing home 
is considered contrary to filial duty, which demands that children should be 
responsible for taking care of their elderly parents. More importantly, despite the 
rapidly increasing number of elderly people in Korea, there is a lack of proper state 
welfare provision for the aging society. Under these circumstances, the relationship 
between employer and migrant care worker in this study was to some extent 
complementary. Employers tended to be appreciative and, in some cases, even 
grateful, to migrant workers for caring for the patients, in contexts where they as 
children could not perform their duty to their sick parents. 
Most problems and hardship experienced by migrant carers are likely to be 
caused by patients' conditions. Owing to the nature of Alzheimer's disease, carers 
have to deal with patients suffering both in terms of limited physical mobility and 
mental disorder. Thus, unlike other patients, caring for Alzheimer's patients usually 
entails constant attention. One respondent mentioned that she suffered from sleep 
deprivation when she took care of a 74 year old, because the patient did not sleep 
during the night. Many respondents also experienced verbal abuse, in the form of 
swearing and shouting from patients. Although carers understood that verbal abuse 
and volatile or violent behaviour were both unintentional and common symptoms of 
Alzheimer's, they nevertheless admitted that this was the hardest part of the job. 
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For one and half years between 1998 and 1999, I had taken care of 
an old woman suffering from Alzheimer's. The second daughter of 
the patient asked me to care for her sick mother, and I agreed. But 
at that time she did not mentioned about her mother's condition in 
detail. She just said that because her mother is not physically 
mobile due to serious back pain, she wanted me to cook for her and 
clean the house. But when I arrived at the house, I realised that I 
had to take care of an Alzheimer's patient who could not even go to 
the toilet by herself. It was really hard work and I was paid only 
550,000 won (US$550) a month. 
[Author: Then why didn't you quit immediately but continued to 
work? ] 
Actually, at that time, I had no choice because it was during the 
financial crisis. There were not many jobs available, especially for 
migrant workers. So, even though the wage was very low, I was 
really desperate. Beside I got free accommodation and food. 
The old woman had eight children but they didn't live with her. So 
there was no one to take care of her. When the children visited their 
mother on holidays, they paid me little extra cashes. (Seok-Bok, 61, 
Korean-Chinese) 
Before this job [child care], I worked as a carer for an old male 
Alzheimer's patient. But, I left the job only after three months 
because it was hard to deal with the patient. The employer 
[patient's daughter-in-law] told me that I was the carer who had 
worked for the longest in that house. There had been five carers 
before me. I was told that some Korean carers could not stay for the 
job even for one day. The patient's condition was quite severe and 
he also had a strange behaviour of stripping off his clothes in front 
of people. (Soon-Hee, 70, Korean-Chinese) 
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The majority of the respondents were employed as child carers for middle- 
class Korean families. In general, migrant workers took care of infants and small 
children. Employers were either young mothers who had professional careers or 
young middle-class housewives who had newborn babies. The monthly wages for 
child carers were between 1,000,000 won and 1,200,000 won (US$1,000-1,200). 
Taking care of younger children - infants and toddlers - paid more. Most live-in 
carers were allowed a day off at the weekend once a fortnight. As most of them were 
live-in carers, their working hours were not fixed. Workers were not usually 
provided with a separate room, but tended rather to share the rooms with children. 
Migrant child carers in this study were commonly expected to do domestic 
chores, including cleaning, laundry, ironing and cooking. Additional domestic work 
was in fact part of a child carer's job, especially when the carer was a migrant worker. 
In most cases, domestic work was tacitly agreed between employers and migrant care 
workers. Most of the respondents doing domestic chores while taking care of 
children considered it to be an inevitable duty. One employer stated in her interview 
that apart from the cheaper cost, she preferred to hire a Korean-Chinese care worker 
because Korean care workers were very particular about the tasks that they would or 
would not be prepared to do. Macdonald (1996: 248-249) points out that domestic 
workers experience `two primary sets of demands for invisible labour: to tailor their 
work to meet flexible "family norms" and to display a perpetually deferential 
demeanour'. Macdonald notes that as domestic work is the performance of personal 
services, it becomes difficult to distinguish `between work-related duties and those 
necessitated by the eccentricities of certain employers' (Dill, 1988: 35, cited in 
Macdonald, 1996: 249). 
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Class Relations and Racial Prejudice Against Migrant Care Workers 
Eisenstein (1996: 63) argues that `race is engendered while gender is racialised' and 
`the sexual division of labour is racially encoded along class lines'. This argument 
aptly describes the relations between employers and migrant care workers in Korea. 
Korean-Chinese care workers are racially stereotyped as being more submissive and 
having a more deferential attitude. Moreover, employers believe that because 
Korean-Chinese migrants are in an economically desperate situation they will do 
whatever they are told as long as they are paid adequately. The racial stereotype of 
Korean-Chinese migrant women also reflects the hierarchical relationship between 
the employer and the migrant worker. This hierarchical relationship is conspicuously 
presented in linguistic terms. While employers are addressed with respectful terms 
like `Madam' and `Sir', domestic workers are universally called `Azumma' in Korean. 
The original meaning of the word `Azumma' is merely a middle-aged married 
woman, but when it is used in a private household it signifies a woman employed for 
domestic work. In the following interview, an employer with a six-month-old son 
explained why she decided to hire a Korean-Chinese child carer. 
The foremost reason for hiring a Korean-Chinese azumma is 
because it is cheaper than hiring a Korean azumma. Also, Korean- 
Chinese azummas have a number of attributes that complement the 
shortcomings of Korean azummas. Because Korean carers are 
normally middle-age women who are much older than young 
mothers like me, it is difficult to order them to do something. It is 
not comfortable to manage an azumma who is older than you. But, 
once they are employed and paid well, Korean-Chinese azummas 
treat respectively me as a `Madam'. Korean azummas often act like 
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mothers-in-law, given the reason that they are older than me and 
know much better about caring babies than me. But, Korean- 
Chinese azummas are submissive. That's why young mothers 
prefer Korean-Chinese to Korean carers. (Hong, 30, housewife) 
Korean employers commonly held Korean-Chinese domestic workers in 
contempt, describing them as culturally and socially backwards and uncivilised. The 
employers' racial prejudices against Korean-Chinese workers are largely influenced 
by the anti-communist/socialist attitude, which is pervasive in Korean society. 
It is a serious misjudgement to think that the Korean-Chinese and 
the Korean are homogeneous. We don't share the same culture. 
Rather, it is correct to think that the Korean-Chinese are just 
Chinese people who can speak Korean a little better than other 
migrants and understand a bit of Korean culture. They [the Korean- 
Chinese] don't have a good manner. For example, when my 
husband comes home from work, our azumma is just sitting on the 
sofa so comfortably without bowing him politely. Because of their 
socialist culture, they are really assertive and straight talkers. I 
think that they are unflinching. Seeing that they came all the way to 
Korea to earn money, they would never be starved to death. They 
are tough people. So, I try to avoid confrontation with them 
because if they were cross with me, they would repay me in some 
ways. Who knows? And all they care about is money. They easily 
quit and move to the next house paying more money. They don't 
have affection toward people. The behaviours and attitudes of 
Korean-Chinese workers clearly show that they have grown up in 
the socialist country. (Hong, 30, Housewife) 
There was also a common prejudice among employers that the Korean- 
238 
Chinese had no sense of hygiene. In an interview one of the employers complained 
that her Korean-Chinese worker's unhygienic life style got on her nerves - especially 
when the worker took care of her baby. One live-in child carer expressed her feeling 
of humiliation in the following incident. 
Because my employer does not want me to go out with her baby, I 
cannot normally go for grocery shopping for my food. One day, I 
asked a friend of mine who were also working as a child carer in 
the neighbourhood to bring me some vegetables. When my 
employer came home after work, she saw the vegetables, which I 
stored in the refrigerator. She asked me where those were from and 
I explained that my friend brought them over for me. Then, she 
became furious and said to me, "what are you going to do, if your 
Korean-Chinese friend gave my baby a harmful virus when she 
came into my house? " (Seok-Bok, 61, Korean-Chinese) 
Some employers directly instructed Korean-Chinese workers about hygiene, dress 
and make-up. An employer stated in an interview that women employers did not 
want their domestic workers to wear V-neck t-shirts or short trousers because these 
clothes were not suitable, either to take care of children or to do domestic chores, and 
they also made their husbands embarrassed. Employers did not, on the other hand, 
want their workers shabbily presented in their homes. Many respondents stated that 
they started to wear make up for the first time while working in Korea, because 
employers preferred them to be well presented in moderate dress and make-up. 
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Emotional Engagement in Care Work 
Care cannot be quantified in terms of physical labour. Care workers are guided by an 
ethic of care and are expected to work that exceeds the physical tasks involved. 
When domestic work involves childcare, migrant workers often become attached to 
the children they look after. Wolkowitz (2006: 166) argues that the worker's 
subjective experience of working with people may `lead her to feel more powerful 
than is warranted by her structural position'. She cites Bartky's argument: 
a woman responsible for "feeding egos and tending wounds" in her 
personal relations, though "ethically and epistemologically 
disempowered by the care she gives", often experiences the 
outflowing of care she gives as a "mighty power" (Bartky, 1990, 
cited in Wolkowitz, 2006: 166). 
Despite the contempt and oppression experienced in relations with employers, 
migrant carers were often emotionally rewarded and empowered by providing love 
and care to the children. 
I am taking care of a 16 month-old baby. I have been doing this job 
since the baby was only 3 month-old. He is so pretty and lovely. I 
feel like being young again when I am with him. I am on a summer 
break at the moment, but I want to go back to work because I miss 
him. He is like a grandson to me. He didn't eat much before. He 
was really fussy about his food. But now he eats a full bowl of rice. 
I am proud of myself for raising him as a healthy baby. His mother 
is so happy for that. (Choon-Ja, 66, Korean-Chinese) 
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On the other hand, this emotional attachment and sense of loyalty to the 
children often put child carers in a difficult position to negotiate wage raises and 
better working conditions and made it more difficult to leave the job. 
I am tang care of employer's two children. Because the work is 
too hard, I want to quit. But, I am hesitating at the moment. I am so 
attached to these children. The older child who is 6 year-old has 
taken to me by calling me `grandma'. I feel sorry to abandon the 
children by leaving this employer. (Soon-Hee, 70, Korean-Chinese) 
Unlike middle-aged Korean-Chinese domestic workers, younger Filipina 
domestic workers tended to face another emotional dilemma. Three of the Filipina 
domestic workers interviewed were also young mothers. They provided physical 
work and emotional attention to the employers' children that might otherwise so to 
their own children at home. 
I'm working for an American Jewish family in Seoul. The father is 
a major of the US Military based in Seoul. My main job is taking 
care of the employer's daughter. My work is organised according to 
the daughter's morning and afternoon routine. I clean the house and 
do some chores while the daughter is at a nursery school. When she 
comes back from the school at 11 a. m., there are reading time, 
painting time and playing time. Whenever I do these things with 
her, I'm thinking about Soo-jin, my daughter. I cannot do these 
things with her. I read for her at night, but not for very long. I am 
putting more efforts for the major's daughter. But, I'm doing this 
job for a financial reason - I'm doing for my kids' sake and for my 
family's happiness. (Carol, 40, Filipina) 
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These Filipina workers took care of their employers' children while their 
own children were in the care of others. Accordingly, a `care chain' was established 
(Hochschild, 2001; 2002). In Carol's case, her two children were looked after by her 
Filipina friend, who lived in the neighbourhood while she was working for the 
major's daughter. The following case is similar to that of Carol. Brenda also worked 
as a domestic worker for an American employer, who was a US diplomat in Korea. 
She took care of the employer's two children. In Brenda's interview it is interesting 
to observe multiple layers of care chains and the bitter reality of care gaps between 
those who can and those who cannot afford paid care work. 
While I am at work, I leave my daughter with a friend of mine -a 
Filipina. My friend takes care of my daughter as well as other 
Filipino workers' children while we are working. I pay her 350,000 
won (US$350) a month. She actually gave a birth of her third child, 
but she sent her baby to the Philippines because of this care work - 
if her baby is here with her, she could not take care of our children. 
Sending her own child to the Philippines to take care of other 
children... yes, it is quite irony, isn't it? I thought about bringing a 
carer from the Philippines, but it was not possible to provide a 
proper visa for the carer. (Brenda, 37, Filipina) 
`The hierarchy of womanhood' (Parrenas, 2001) in terms of race and class is 
represented in the global care chain. Global care chains indicate the extent to which 
the transnational division of labour links women in an interdependent relationship 
and the extent to which `the transfer of reproductive labour moves beyond territorial 
borders to connect separate nation-states' (Parrenas, 2001: 78). 
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State Policies towards Migrant Care and Domestic Workers 
The state policy toward migrant domestic workers manifestly reflects a naturalised 
dichotomy between productive and reproductive work in the public and private 
domains. The Labour Standards Act is not applicable to migrant domestic workers. 
The official reason for excluding domestic workers from the Labour Standards Act is 
that the contract between the employer and the domestic worker is recognised under 
the Civil Act. 
Due to the unique form of their employment, domestic workers 
cannot be recognised as `workers'. In order to apply the Labour 
Standards Act and the Minimum Wage Act, the employment must 
be supervised by the state authority. But, because domestic work is 
taken place in the autonomous private domain, the state cannot 
intervene. Unlike the relations between the business and the wage 
labourer in the public domain, the relations between the employer 
and the domestic worker is regarded as personal affairs. It is not a 
labour contract but a social contract between two individuals. So, it 
becomes civil affairs and if there was a problem, the case should be 
forwarded to a civil trial. (Deputy Director of Foreign Work force 
Policy Division, Ministry of Labour, interview with the author, 
August 2005) 
However, none of the respondents were employed by means of written contracts. 
Most of the respondents stated that they did not perceive the lack of a written 
contract as necessarily disadvantageous. Without the binding force of contracts they 
may leave a job for a better one. Those workers who found their jobs through 
employment agencies did not have written contracts with the agencies either. 
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Employment agencies also did not get involved in problems or disputes between the 
employer and the migrant worker. 
It is a discrepant feature of policy that while the state strictly regulates the 
entry and placement of migrant domestic workers, it officially refuses to recognise 
them as `workers' and to legislate domestic work. This significantly highlights a 
gendered aspect of the patriarchal state whereby reproductive work is conventionally 
restricted to the private household and defined as merely `domestic service' done by 
women, as opposed to productive work in the formal sector. As Chin (2003: 60) 
argues, there is a persistent assumption that the performance of care and other 
aspects of housework is an individual's - in particular a woman's - personal 
responsibility `within the innermost sanctum of society' and the state shies away 
from intervening in the private realm. 
Conclusion 
With the commodification and transnationalisation of care work, the boundaries 
between work in the public and private spheres becomes blurred. The increasing 
number of migrant women employed in paid domestic work, care and service work 
has opened up debates on public and private work and drawn attention to the `global 
reshaping of reproductive work' (Pettinger, et al., 2005). While the notion of private 
work as unpaid service in the household is obscured by paid domestic work, the 
conventional assumption and practices of domestic work as women's duty is 
unchanged. While the state encourages middle-class Korean women to pursue their 
careers in the formal sector to sustain the country's economic growth, responsibility 
for housework and the care of children and the elderly is still regarded as women's 
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responsibility. By maintaining the patriarchal idea that care and domestic work are 
women's personal responsibilities, the Korean state responds to the function of 
reproduction and to the need to maintain the household by importing migrant women 
- rather than by providing proper state welfare provision. The state therefore 
manipulates both local and migrant women to fulfil its own need for sustaining 
economic and social development. Consequently, just as the feminisation of migrant 
labour in the manufacturing and service sectors has significant implications for the 
sexual division of labour in the public sphere, the traditional sexual division of 
labour in the private sphere remains intact. 
Gendered and racialised state policies toward women migrant workers are 
demonstrated in its contradictory approach to migrant domestic workers. While the 
state stringently regulates the entry and allocation of domestic workers, it refuses to 
consider them as `workers' and legalise domestic work. In this way, migrant 
domestic workers become `visible bodies' to be controlled by the state, but perform 
`invisible work' in the private realm (Chin, 2003). On the whole, women migrant 
workers in Korea are `outsiders within' the core economic and social structure of the 
country. They play crucial economic and social roles, but remain socially and 
politically marginalised in Korean society. As Anderson (2000: 191) argues, `migrant 
domestic workers are enabling female citizens to participate in the public sphere, 
thereby taking full advantage of their rights attached to their citizenship status, but 
they themselves are often formally denied citizenship rights'. While migrant 
domestic workers solve the care deficit and sustain social reproduction for national 
development, they are treated as disposable labour and temporary residents. In the 
next chapter, I will explore how the immigration status of these migrant women 
signifies the social structural division in terms of citizenship rights and how this 
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structure is `embodied' in terms of race and ethnic divisions in Korea. 
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Chapter 7 
Contesting Citizenship of (Im)migrant Women: 
Gender, Racialisation and the Embodiment of Rights 
Introduction 
As mentioned earlier, the central aim of this study is to avoid the simple addition of 
`gender' to the discussion of the experiences of migrant women. The transnational 
sexual division of labour, accelerated by international migration of women, is 
`racially encoded along class lines' (Eisenstein, 1996: 63). As seen in Chapters 5 and 
6, despite their vital economic and social roles, migrant women are marginalised and 
their labour is rendered invisible in Korea. The experiences of migrant women can be 
adequately explained, not simply by noting the gendered structure of society, but also 
by considering race, ethnicity and class. For example, although a Korean-Chinese 
woman and a Filipina woman can be represented as the same group under the label 
of `migrant women', the experiences of the two women would vary in terms of race, 
ethnicity, nationality and class. A synchronized understanding of gender, race and 
class helps us to see the systematic exclusion of and discrimination against migrant 
women. 
This chapter examines how gender, race and class are socially constructed 
and embedded in the institutional structure, which results in different experiences for 
different groups of migrant women. Immigration status signifies the social structural 
division in terms of citizenship rights, and this raises the question of how this 
structure is `embodied' in terms of race and/or ethnic divisions (Morris, 2002). The 
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unequal and discriminatory treatment experienced by migrant women in Korea is 
generated through the differential granting of rights by the state, which cannot be 
understood without considering of interconnections of racialisation, nationalism, 
class and gender. 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. In the first section, I present 
an integrative framework for analysing how gender, race and class are socially 
constructed factors in the interlocking system of multiple discriminations 
experienced by migrant women. The second section explores the discussion on 
racism and the racialisation of migrant workers. It attempts to apply an integrated 
framework for dealing with gender, race and class to the analysis of the racialisation 
of migrant workers in the specific context of Korea. The third section examines to 
what extent Korean nationalism fosters racism. It discusses how the Korean `nation- 
state' is characterised and fortified by a national identity based on a myth of 
`common origin' and `cultural homogeneity'. In particular, it closely looks at how the 
ethnicity of Korean-Chinese migrant workers is politicised and constructed as 
`others'. Taking marriage immigrants as a case study, the final section then critically 
examines the issues relating to the citizenship of (im)migrant women in Korea. It 
examines in what ways the gendered nature of citizenship implies exclusion and 
racialisation based on gender and class. 
I. An Integrative Framework for Examining Gender, Race and Class 
In order to explain the institutional structures positioning migrant women as visible 
bodies and invisible workers in the host society, it is necessary to bring gender, race 
and class into the same frame of analysis. Glenn (2002) remarks that labour and 
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citizenship are intertwined institutional arenas in which non-white American women 
have contested their exclusion, oppression and exploitation. She argues that to 
examine how labour and citizenship constitute or are constituted by race and gender, 
`we must conceptualise race and gender as interacting, interlocking structures and 
then consider how they are incorporated into and shaped by various social 
institutions' (Glenn, 2002: 6). For Glenn, the first challenge in conceptualising 
`interacting, interlocking structures' is to bring race and gender within `the same 
analytic plane' (ibid. ). 
Earlier feminists have attempted to bring race and gender into the same 
analytic frame by observing the two as separate, independent factors. Beale (1979) 
introduces the term `double jeopardy' to describe the dual discriminations of racism 
and sexism that subjugate black women (King, 1988). Adding economic class 
oppression as a third jeopardy, Lindsay (1979) argues that triple jeopardy, the 
interaction of sexism, racism, and economic oppression, is `the most realistic 
perspective for analysing the position of black American women; and this 
perspective will serve as common linkage among the discussions of other minority 
women' (Lindsay, 1979: 328 cited in King, 1988: 46). King (1988) notes that the triple 
jeopardy of racism, sexism and economic oppression is widely accepted and used in 
the conceptualisation of black women's status in the United States. Triple jeopardy is 
now also commonly used to describe migrant women's disadvantaged positions in 
the host country. 
However, treating gender, race and class as separate and independent axes 
does not embrace the simultaneous and interlocking systems of oppression 
experienced by migrant women. King (1988) also criticises that the concept of triple 
jeopardy does not fully deliver the dynamics of multiple forms of discrimination. 
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Unfortunately, most applications of the concepts of double and 
triple jeopardy have been overly simplistic in assuming that the 
relationships among the various discriminations are merely additive. 
... This simple 
incremental process does not represent the nature of 
black women's oppression but, rather, I would contend, leads to 
non-productive assertions that one factor can and should supplant 
the other (King, 1988: 47). 
In this regard, the additive concept of triple jeopardy could easily overlook the fact 
that gender, race and class have in fact simultaneous and interdependent effects on 
discrimination and oppression. 
Rejecting an additive analysis of gender, race and class, a number of 
feminists offer integrated concepts such as `multiple jeopardy', `intersectionality', 
`the simultaneity of oppression', `interlocking structures of oppression', and 
`racialised gender' (Brewer, 1993; Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1989; Glenn, 1992; 
King, 1988). For instance, emphasising the multiplicative and interlocking 
relationships between various discriminations, King (1988) introduces an interactive 
concept of `multiple jeopardy'. In King's understanding of multiple jeopardy, the 
equivalent formulation is racism multiplied by sexism multiplied by economic 
oppression53. Similarly, arguing that gender, race and class should be understood as 
simultaneous forces and theorising must be historicized and contextualised, Brewer 
(1993) introduces the concept of the simultaneity of oppression (and struggle). She 
highlights that avoiding additive analyses (gender + race + class) leads to an 
53 King (1988) illustrates the sexual exploitation of black women in slavery as a historical example of 
multiple jeopardy. Black women workers not only suffered the same tough physical labour and 
violence as their male counterparts, but were also subject to sexual exploitations such as rape. 
Moreover, black women workers were faced with burdens of reproductive labour such as `breeding 
new slaves' to maintain cost effectiveness in a slave economy (Potts, 1990). 
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understanding of the embeddedness and relationality of race, class and gender, as 
well as the multiplicative nature of these relationships: race x class x gender (Brewer, 
1993: 16). 
Such interactive concepts provide an integrated framework, analysing one to 
see gender, race and class as socially constructed and intrinsic to each other. In 
particular, Glenn (2002: 7) adopts a social constructionist approach to examine how 
gender and race are intrinsically constituted such that `gender is racialised and race is 
gendered'. She argues that social constructionism provides an alternative notion `to 
biological and essentialist conceptions that rendered gender and race static and 
ahistorical' (Glenn, 2002: 7). Glenn highlights the structural concepts of racial and 
patriarchal social orders, which provide the key to her integrated framework on 
gender and race. 
There are important points of congruence between the concept of 
racial formation and the concept of socially constructed gender. 
These convergences point the way toward a framework in which 
race and gender are defined as mutually constituted systems of 
relationships - including norms, symbols, and practices - organized 
around perceived differences. This definition focuses attention on 
the processes by which racialization and engendering occur, rather 
than on characteristics of fixed race or gender categories (Glenn, 
2002: 12). 
According to Glenn, the processes of racialisation and engendering take place at 
multiple levels: 1) representation (the deployment of symbols, language and images 
to express and convey race and gender meanings); 2) micro-interaction (the 
application of race/gender norms and spatial rules to organize interaction within and 
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across race/gender boundaries); and 3) social structure (rules regulating the 
allocation of power and resources along race and gender lines). In Glenn's 
framework the processes constituting race and gender take place in various aspects of 
social life and at all levels of political, economic and social structures. Race and 
gender are relational and involve representations and material relations. They are also 
constituted through power relations. Glenn (2002: 15) also discusses how class 
formation in the United States continues to `be infused with racial as well as gender 
meanings'. 
Acker (2006: 39) nevertheless argues that Glenn `does not theorise class in a 
way that is comparable to her theorising of gender and race'. Conceptualising class 
as also socially constructed, gendered and racialised, she argues that `class is 
gendered and gender is produced through class by adding processes of racialisation' 
(Acker, 2006: 45). Acker (2006) therefore introduces the notion of gendered and 
racialised class practices as an alternative to conceptualising gender, race and class as 
intersecting or interlocking systems or structures. The term, `gendered and racialised 
class practices' signifies that gender and racial divisions and inequalities are 
generated as part of the material and ideological (re)construction of class practices 
and relations. 
Acker (2006) distinguishes between 1) class practices, which are activities 
that organise and control production and distribution; 2) gendering and racialising 
processes, which shape class practices and 3) effects of gendered and racialised class 
practices, which are diverse forms of inequality such as gender and racial segregation 
in employment, unequal distributions of power, types of work and wages. She gives 
an example of employers in certain restaurants who tend to hire young, white women 
as waitresses. Similarly, gendered and racialised practices in employment are also 
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found in the cases examined in the previous chapters: restaurant owners in Korea 
who have difficulties hiring local women tend to hire young Korean-Chinese women 
as waitresses instead. On the other hand, in Korean manufacturing firms, supervisors 
or managers on the shop floor are mostly Korean male workers. Accordingly, these 
gendered and racialised practices generate a gender- and racially stratified workforce 
(Acker, 2006). Acker also remarks that the effects of these practices change over time 
and vary between localities and nations. 
Importantly, Acker (2006: 50) points out that the naturalisation of inequality 
`influences subsequent gendering and racializing processes as assumptions about 
what is natural shape perceptions and actions'. Therefore, influences between 
gendering and racial effects and practices are reciprocal. Likewise, Anthias and 
Yuval-Davis (1992: 18) argue that `gender and racialised ethnic divisions are both 
underpinned by a supposedly "natural relation"'. For gender, necessary social effects 
are postulated at the base of sexual difference and biological reproduction. For ethnic 
and racialised groups, the natural boundaries of collectivities or the naturalness of 
culture are assumed. This naturalisation of gender and racialised/ethnic groups then 
affects the legitimatisation of class inequalities and class processes affect 
racialisation and engendering practices (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). The 
reciprocal relations of gender, race and class are evident in the racialisation of 
women migrant workers, which results in the unequal distribution of material 
resources and power. 
The application of an integrated framework allows the discussion of gender, 
race and class to be historicized and contextualised. As the concept of gender covers 
historical differences across racial/ethnic groups and class, racialised/ethnic groups 
are historically and locally defined in different ways. The diversity of 
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racialised/ethnic groups must be considered. Moreover, the experience of racism is 
heterogeneous in terms of class, gender, generation and citizenship-status even 
within the same racialised/ethnic group. 
II. Conceptualising Racism in the Korean Context 
Looking beyond the Black-White binary 
Hall (1992: 255) argues that racism operates by constructing `impassable symbolic 
boundaries between racially constructed categories'. However, the binary categories 
of racism are considerably complicated by diverse ethnic categories, which are 
distinct from each other in terms of histories, cultures and experiences (Hall, 1992). 
Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992: 15) also point out that the dichotomous categories of 
`Blacks as victims, and Whites as perpetrators of racism' tend to homogenise the 
nature of racism, without considering the different experience of women and men in 
different classes and ethnic groups. Moreover, the Black-White binary fails to take 
account of different articulations of racism towards Jews, the Irish, migrants, 
refugees and various ethnic minorities. Criticising the static notion of Black identity, 
hooks (1991: 20, cited in Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 102) emphasises more `fluid 
notions of black identity' from `marginal perspectives' and `assertions of identity that 
bring complexity and variety to constructions of black subjectivity'. 
In the black-white binary, `black' and `white' should not be understood as 
essentially fixed oppositional categories. Understanding racism beyond colour, Miles 
(1989, cited in Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 15) points out that the executors of 
racism are not only whites, and blacks can be racist. This is apparent in the example 
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of tensions among Asian American groups in the United States (Glenn, 2002). Glenn 
argues that there is a division along ethnic, class, generation and political lines 
between long settled Japanese and Chinese immigrants and more recently arrived 
Filipinos and other Southeast Asians. Among new Asian immigrants, rich and poor 
groups are also `racialised' within the black-white binary in the United States (Ong, 
1996 cited in Glenn, 2002: 11). According to Ong's observation, well-educated 
professional Chinese immigrants are `whitened' and assimilated into the American 
middle class, while poor Khmer immigrants, often reliant on welfare, are `blackened'. 
However, it is important to note that even though these middle class Chinese 
immigrants are `whitened', this does not mean that they do not experience any racist 
practices from the dominant white group. In the United States `white' has been 
primarily in opposition to `black', but it can also be positioned in opposition to 
various `other' ethnic groups, such as Mexicans, Chinese and Vietnamese (Glenn, 
2002). This complex reality cannot be reasonably explained by the fixed Black- 
White binary. The limitation of the fixed dichotomy in elucidating racism becomes 
more apparent when we look at the Korean case in which the clear binary of black 
and white is absent. Ethnic Koreans can be positioned as the dominant `white' 
against various `other' ethnic groups residing in Korea, but the black-white binary 
does not reflect the complexity of racial boundary constitution in the Korean context. 
For example, even though Korean-Chinese migrant workers are, strictly speaking, 
ethnic Koreans, they are not identical in meaning to the dominant category `white' in 
Korea. As discussed in the earlier chapter, unlike other overseas ethnic Koreans, the 
Korean-Chinese are not even legally recognised as ethnic Koreans. There is 
pervasive racism against the Korean-Chinese and to a certain extent the racialised 
connotation of `blackness' has been attributed to them in relation to native Koreans. 
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On the other hand, the Korean-Chinese appear to be `raceless' in relation to other 
non-Korean ethnic minorities. 
Here, the concept of `relationality' is more useful to explain the complexity 
of the race relations in the Korean context. Glenn (2002) argues that race and gender 
categories are positioned and, therefore, gain meaning in relation to each other. In 
other words, woman as a category gains meaning in relation to man and black in 
relation to white. The category `Korea-Chinese' is constructed in relation to both 
native Koreans and non-Korean ethnic groups, and draws different meaning from 
each relation. In this case, meaning is constructed in terms of dichotomous 
opposition or contrasts (Glenn, 2002). 
Oppositional categories require suppressing variability within each 
category and exaggerating differences between categories. Since 
the dichotomy is imposed over a complex "reality", it is inherently 
unstable. Stability is achieved by making the dichotomy 
hierarchical, that is, by according one term primacy over the other. 
... The opposition also disguises the extent to which the categories 
are actually interdependent (Glenn, 2002: 13). 
Glenn argues that in race and gender dichotomies, the dominant category is rendered 
normal while the other is problematic, i. e., white appears to be `raceless' and man 
appears to be `genderless'. 
The Social Construction of `Race' and `Racialisation' ofMigrant Workers 
The term race is generally used to signify physical variations, notably skin colour, 
which were used by 19th century scientists to identify distinct physical types (Miles, 
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1982). Thus, race is categorised on the basis of phenotypical differences, and to a 
certain extent social significance and meaning are constructed by racial 
categorisation. According to Miles (1982: 157), the concept of racial categorisation is 
used to refer to `a process of delineation of group boundaries and of allocation of 
persons within those boundaries by primary reference to inherent and/or biological 
characteristics'. 
Miles (1982) argues that conventional notions of race and race relations, 
which merely indicate relations between `races', are problematic and that racism 
should be contextualised within economic, political and ideological relations. He 
points out that it is an error to refer to phenotypical variation by using the term `race'. 
Physical differences between people can only gain socio-economic significance `if 
they are given social recognition and if social interaction is structured by such 
recognition' (Miles, 1982: 20). Miles suggests that it is, therefore, more appropriate to 
use the term social construction of `race' or racial categorisation. 
It is sociologically significant to scrutinise the social meanings attributed to 
differences classified on the basis of physical variation - rather than the differences 
per se. Miles (1982) argues that 'race'54 has no biological reality but is a social 
construction. The main analytical task is, therefore, `to identify the conditions for the 
generation and reproduction of the idea of `race', which is to explain why certain 
sorts of situation and relations appear (i. e. are socially constructed) as `race 
relations" (Miles, 1982: 43). It is also insufficient to simply recognise the social 
sa Miles (1982) use the terms `race' and `race relations' in inverted commas as he claims that the 
concepts of race and race relations have neither descriptive utility nor analytical value. He argues that 
common sense discourse - that is the world of everyday/political discourse identifying a `race/race 
relations situation/problem' - has come to structure and determine academic discourse so that it too 
admits to the existence of 'races' and `relations between races' (Miles, 1982: 3). Therefore, `their 
continued academic utilisation serves to legitimate their continued utilisation in the everyday world' 
(ibid. ). However, disagreeing with Miles, Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992: 2) argue that 'from a 
sociological point of view, 'race' denotes a particular way in which communal differences come to be 
constructed and therefore it cannot be erased from the analytical map'. 
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categorisation of `race' as being the basis for the generation and reproduction of 
racism, and one should therefore inquire `why that process of categorisation has 
occurred only in specific context and at specific points in historical time' (Miles, 
1982: 204). 
In his analysis of the political economy of migrant labour in Britain, Miles 
(1982) provides arguments for the social construction of race and the political and 
ideological determinants of racism. For him, the basis of racism lies not in the 
attribution of meaning to phenotypical difference, but in the economic, political and 
ideological conditions that construct the attribution of meaning. Miles emphasises 
that the generation and reproduction of racism should be understood as a process 
labelled `racialisation'. For Miles, racialisation is grounded in material production, 
which is also closely related to ideological and political relations. In particular, the 
economic relations associated with the emergence of British capitalism - by means 
of the colonial exploitation of slave/indentured labour - have an ideological legacy 
(i. e. reproducing inferior imagery of the African), which should be taken into account 
when examining racialisation in contemporary Britain. However, he also highlights 
that racism is generated and reproduced as a real phenomenon and is not simply an 
ideological imposition of the ruling class in the logical pursuit of its economic 
interests (cf. Cox, 1970). He argues that by the end of the 19th century racism within 
the dominant class had become a systematised and scientific racist ideology, and was 
subsequently reproduced within the working class. 
By the end of the nineteenth century ... an explicit set of ideas and 
arguments (i. e. racism) ... had a circulation throughout the class 
structure of Britain. These ideas ... postulated the existence of 
`races' by reference to phenotypical characteristics and had their 
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prime focus upon persons who were the victims of British 
colonialism. The idea of `race' was therefore materially grounded 
in the production relations of British capitalism and `demonstrated' 
simultaneously the inferiority of the colonial subjects and the 
superiority of the British `race' by reference to colonial exploitation 
(Miles, 1982: 120). 
Miles (1982: 184) argues that racialisation becomes `the site of subsequent 
struggles between classes and of the formation and reproduction of class fractions'. 
The term `class fractions' refer to the main lines of division within class boundaries 
resulting from the coincidence of different positions in terms of economic, political 
and ideological relations within previously identified class relations (Miles 1982; 
Phizacklea and Miles, 1980). There are different interests within classes, which lead 
to struggles between class fractions. Miles bases his argument on the Marxist view: 
`as an ideological process, racial categorisation must arise upon and within the 
context of a material process of production' (Marx, 1971: 20-21, cited Miles, 
1982: 157-158). He suggests that the process of racial categorisation is secondary to 
the essential process of class formation, unless the boundaries established by the 
process of racial categorisation are coincidental with class boundaries. Nevertheless, 
he cautions that the process of racial categorisation and its effects should be analysed 
according to a particular historical and material context as there have been a few 
exceptions to the causal relationship between class formation and racial 
categorisation - such as the case of South Africa and of the slave mode of production. 
According to Miles, the process of racial categorisation then affects the allocation of 
materials and other rewards to groups categorised within the class boundaries 
established by the dominant mode of production. Such effects, however, do not 
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change the existing structure of production relations since the fractionalisation occurs 
at the level of relations between individuals occupying positions which share the 
same structural relationship with the other main classes (Miles, 1982: 159). Under 
these circumstances, capital has specific interests deriving from the use of migrant 
labour and the racialisation of migrant workers, and results in the creation of a 
racialised fraction within the working class. Miles goes beyond an economically 
determined Marxist understanding of racism by claiming that the ideology of racism 
and the practices of racial discrimination are `central components' of the formation 
and reproduction of class fractions, which has determinate effects on ideological, 
political and economic relations (Miles, 1982: 184). 
In the case of class fractionalisation in Britain, Miles illustrates three main 
characteristics of the labour migration from the Caribbean and the Indian sub- 
continent in the period after 1945. First, the majority of those migrants who came to 
Britain were engaged in wage labour, they entered production relations in a 
proletarian class position. Second, these migrant workers were employed in certain 
sectors of production, which were suffering from labour shortages. They were 
employed mainly in declining industries - e. g. textiles and metal manufacturing 
industries - that had become less competitive on the world market. These migrant 
workers were paid low wages owing to tight profit margins in the industries. As 
native workers withdrew from these sectors of the economy in a period of full 
employment, migrant labour became replacement labour, filling a particular position 
in production - manifested in the form of manual labour, low wages and 
unfavourable working conditions. Third, migrant labour was recruited from colonies 
and ex-colonies. Given that racism as an ideology was an element of British national 
culture, which served as a rationalisation of colonialism, those migrants were `not 
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entering a neutral ideological context when they came to Britain to sell their labour 
power' (Miles, 1982: 165). Those migrants therefore occupied a structurally distinct 
position in the economic, political and ideological relations of British capitalism - 
one situated within the boundary of the working class, and constituting a racialised 
fraction of the working class. 
Miles (1982) further remarks that the concentration of migrant workers in 
the disadvantaged labour market is an indication of racial discrimination and has its 
own ideological effect of generalising the particular `suitability' of `racialised' labour 
for low skilled, low paid manual jobs. In this case, physical appearance becomes 
equated with a disadvantaged position in the labour market. `Negative connotations 
of "blackness" come to overlap with and reinforce the negative connotations of much 
semi- and unskilled manual work' (Miles, 1982: 172). The process of racialisation has 
subsequently led to the reproduction of material inequality and disadvantage of 
migrants. This process coincides with the ideological and political significance 
attached to phenotypical differences. Consequently, the material disadvantage of the 
migrants misleadingly appears as disadvantage caused by `race'. 
Miles' study of the social construction of `race' and the racialisation of 
migrant labour provides a valuable account for understanding racism in Korea. 
Although his study is focused on Britain in a specific historical period, Miles' 
analysis is still closely relevant to the process of racialisation of migrant workers in 
Korea. When we look at the racial and economic stratification of the labour market - 
as examined in chapters 5 and 6- this process is evident. Negative connotations 
associated with `Southeast Asian' or `Korean-Chinese' workers come to overlap with 
the negative association attributed to unskilled manual waged labour in 3D sectors in 
Korea. Labelling them as `migrant labourers' has political and ideological 
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implications associated with their phenotypical differences. The following statement 
by a male migrant worker from Sri Lanka illustrates how a migrant worker is 
stereotyped as an `unskilled manual labourer' based on his/her phenotypical 
difference. 
I have been living in Korea for 9 years and working as a glasscutter 
in the same factory for 5 years. I am now one of the most 
experienced employees in my workplace and am responsible for 
training a couple of Korean trainees who call me `brother'. But 
customers usually don't know about this, especially new customers 
who don't know me. When they enter the factory to order glass 
cutting, they approach to my trainees but never to me. For them, I 
am just a foreign worker who cannot speak Korean and do the job 
as told. [He fluently spoke Korean and this interview was held in 
Korean]. Then, those customers are usually very surprised when 
my trainees ask me to confirm the order. [laugh] (Leo, 32) 
Unequal wages and unfair treatment between native and migrant workers 
within the same economic sector illustrates the racially fractionalised nature of the 
working class in Korea. Han (2004) remarks that migrant workers, in particular those 
from Southeast Asia, are picked on in unjustified quarrels by their Korean co- 
workers and are often targets of violence in the workplace. According to Han, 
Korean workers located in lower class positions in Korean society try to establish a 
dominant position over migrants through discriminatory treatment, which 
occasionally involves violent behaviour towards migrant workers. In Han's interview 
data with a Korean owner of a small manufacturing firm, who had been a manual 
worker during the 1970s and 80s, he points out that Korean workers - who had long 
been working under exploitable conditions and low wages during Korea's rapid 
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industrialisation and fought for their labour rights for three decades - often 
(ironically) do not understand why the current predicament of migrant workers in 
Korea should be seen as a `problem'. Compared to the `old days', these Korean 
workers perceive that migrant workers have far better conditions, and as migrants 
from a poor country they should endure difficulties, just like Korean workers did in 
the past (Han, 2004). The racialisation of migrant workers is partly constructed by 
this prevailing sentiment on the part of Korean workers, and influences the formation 
and reproduction of racialised fractions in the working class. 
Miles' theory of racialisation and racism as ideology is nevertheless of 
limited utility in understanding the racialisation of migrants in the Korean context. 
First, his theory focuses largely on the single, `racialised' fraction within the working 
class without considering other elements affecting fractionalisation. Although he 
acknowledges this and suggests that `additional bases of division', such as `sex, skill 
levels, manual/non-manual labour, religious belief and country of birth', can support 
the formation of class fractions (Miles, 1982: 187), he does not discuss these elements 
further in his book. As argued in the first section, the gender aspect should not be 
considered `an additional base of division' but as a simultaneous base along with 
racialisation. As noted in the discussion of women migrant workers in the service 
sector, those workers are racialised and sexualised in the allocation of jobs in the 
labour market and in relations with their employers. Phenotypical differences and 
gender are decisive factors in the employability of migrant workers in the service 
sector as was evident in the extract from the interview with a government official in 
the Ministry of Labour: `foreigners with dark skin would be hard to be employed in 
service jobs. For example, Filipina migrants seem to have a good chance because 
they speak English, but they are unlikely to be employed because they lack cultural 
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similarity due to racial difference' (see Chapter 5). 
Second, Miles' theory focusing on the economic, political and ideological 
determinants of racism does not take into account cultural forms of racism, or what is 
termed `neo-racism' or `new racism' (Balibar, 1991a; Barker, 1981; Solomos, 1989). 
New racism refers to `racism without races' (Balibar, 1991a: 21), which is not based 
on the pseudo-biological concept of race, but on cultural differences. Citing Solomos 
(1989), Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992: 14) argue that `the most common forms of 
racism are to be found not as explicit ideologies or discourses of biological 
inferiorisation, but as different forms of exclusion, on the basis of a group not 
belonging to the culture of origin of the dominant ethnic group within the state 
apparatus'. Certainly, the discriminatory treatment of Korean-Chinese or Chinese 
migrants is not based on supposed racial categorisation, but on the cultural boundary 
constructing them as `outsiders' who cannot belong with Korean nationals. In this 
case, the notion of cultural difference, rather than the notion of physical difference, is 
the basis for excluding and discriminating against those migrant groups. 
On the whole, racism is to be understood in a broader sense as `modes of 
exclusion, inferiorisation, subordination and exploitation' on the basis of 
phenotypical difference or a set of boundaries that is constructed between those who 
can and those who cannot belong to a particular construction of a collectivity or 
population in different social and historical contexts (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 
1992: 2). The experience of racism varies among different class, gender and ethnic 
groups. This heterogeneous nature of racism requires an examination of the ways in 
which difference and exclusion on the basis of class, gender and ethnicity 
incorporates racialisation and are entangled in producing racist discourses and 
practices. Furthermore, as Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) indicate, racism is not 
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only about beliefs, but also related to the imposition of those beliefs - or of cultural 
hegemony as Weltanschauung - resulting in a denial of rights or equality to certain 
groups. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992: 15) argue that exclusionary practices, which 
are formulated in the categorisation of individuals into groups, are `endemically 
racist', even if they are unintentional. This aspect of racist practices is commonly 
defined as institutional racism and needs to be included in the analysis. Therefore, for 
an adequate analysis of racism, it is important to embrace the intersection of class, 
gender, ethnicity and the practices of the nation-state, which naturalise the hegemony 
of one collectivity to the exclusion of the `other'. 
III. National Identity and Constructing 'Otherness' 
Korea, a 'Nation'Based on the Myth of `Common Origin' 
In a Korean language dictionary, `nation' is defined as `the social group with a 
common ethnicity or a common territorial origin sharing historical destiny, cultural 
tradition, in particular, language, religion, history and a way of life' (Shin and Shin, 
1989: 1290, cited in Ju, 2004: 244). Here, it is explicitly stated that `nation' is based 
on the precondition of both `common origin' and `common destiny' of the `common 
ethnicity'. This manifests itself in members of the `nation' having a sentiment of 
collective, mutual identity, which has emerged as strong cultural unity. The national 
collectivity is constructed in the basis of `common origin', and one typically joins the 
collectivity by being born into it. 
Historically, Korean national identity has been articulated in terms of both 
ethnic and cultural homogeneity based on a `pure blood' ideology. `Nation' was the 
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mythical entity that made up for the void of the state during the Japanese 
colonisation and, the `nation' has therefore become manifested in `us, Koreans' in 
opposition to `them', especially the Japanese colonisers. The term, `nation', can be 
translated into Minjok in Korean. The first character, min, refers to a term for 
`people' whereas the second character, jok denotes `clan', `tribe' or `family' (Schmid, 
2002). Schmid (2002: 175) observes that under the control of the Japanese, `the 
[minjok] presented an alternative locus for national existence and autonomy'. Later, 
the notion of `nation' was combined with the `state' - which refers to `the political 
organisation that displays sovereign entities within geographic borders and in 
relation to other sovereign entities' (Ingram, 1996: 331) - creating the political and 
ideological term `nation-state'. Since independence from 35 years of Japanese 
occupation, the political ideology identifying the nation with the state has been a 
crucial part of the nation-building project in Korea. During the Cold War, referring to 
Korea as a `nation-state' allowed government elites to secure the legitimacy of their 
power, and to promote political stability by building a sense of internal cohesiveness 
against the Communist enemy, North Korea. Despite political and ideological 
differences between North and South Korea, the idea of ethnic homogeneity has been 
heavily politicised in both Korean states in the name of future `national' reunification. 
The notion of a `nation-state' assumes a complete concurrence `between the 
boundaries of the nation and the boundaries of those who live in a specific state' 
(Yuval-Davis, 1997: 11). However, the concept of the `nation-state' is an intuitive and 
fictional idea. The nation is `an imagined political community' (Anderson, 2006) and 
a mythical unity constituted by `fictive ethnicity' (Balibar, 1991c). Until very 
recently, it has commonly been argued by Korean scholars and historians that `Korea 
is one of the most homogeneous nations in terms of its history, culture, blood and 
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language' (M. L. Park, 1996, cited in Ko, 2002: 126-127). Nevertheless, the ideology 
asserting the cultural and ethnic homogeneity of the Korean nation derives from state 
elites and dominant bourgeoisies, which have restructured the state in the national 
form and modified heterogeneous forms of class into one singular `nation'. The idea 
of cultural homogeneity is based merely on the cultural hegemony of the dominant 
group in the society, which overlooks the cultural diversity between different classes 
or regions in the Korean territory. The `pure blood' ideology is an imaginary 
narrative as there has been a long history of contact with the Chinese, Manchurian 
and Japanese (Ko, 2002). As Balibar (1991 c: 96) argues: 
[n]o nation possesses an ethnic base naturally, but as social 
formations are nationalised, the populations included within them, 
divided up among them or dominated by them are ethicised - that 
is, represented in the past or in the future as if they formed a natural 
community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and 
interests which transcends individuals and social conditions. 
This imaginary concept of the `nation-state' forms the basis for nationalism 
(Yuval-Davis, 1997). The `nation-state' is characterised and fortified by a national 
identity that homogenises a stratified national population and naturalises the 
hegemony of one collectivity. Balibar depicts (1991c: 96) `fictive ethnicity' as the 
collectivity instituted by the nation-state as follows: 
By constituting the people as a fictively ethnic unity against the 
background of a universalistic representation which attributes to 
each individual one - and only one - ethnic identity and which thus 
divides up the whole of humanity between different ethnic groups 
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corresponding potentially to so many nations, national ideology 
does much more than justify the strategies employed by the state to 
control populations. It inscribes their demands in advance in a 
sense of belonging in the double sense of the term - both what it is 
that makes one belong to oneself and also what makes one belong 
to other fellow human beings. ... The naturalisation of belonging 
and the sublimation of the ideal nation are two aspects of the same 
process. 
In this regard, ethnic homogeneity (volknation) and cultural homogeneity 
(kulturnation) become important dimensions of nationalist projects. Yuval-Davis 
(1997: 21) argues that volknation - which on the genealogical dimension is 
constructed around the specific origin of the people - tends to construct `the most 
exclusionary and homogeneous visions' of `the nation'. On the other hand, 
kulturnation is based on `the cultural dimension in which the symbolic heritage 
provided by language and religion and other customs and traditions is constructed as 
the `essence' of `the nation", and tends to have little tolerance of `non-organic' 
diversity (ibid. ). Importantly, women play crucial roles in the construction and 
reproduction of these nationalist projects, not only as biological reproducers of the 
members of the collectivity but also as carriers of the cultural artefacts and symbolic 
figures of the nation (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). 
The Politicisation of Ethnicity Constructing the `Other' 
Balibar (1991b: 37) argues that racism develops `within the field of nationalism' and 
`nationalism would be, if not the sole cause of racism, then at least the determining 
condition of its production'. Balibar's view on the relationship between nationalism 
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and racism becomes convincing when the concept of ethnicity, which is commonly 
grounded in ideas about culture, is critically interpreted in the political context. 
Fenton (1999: 90) states that `part of the rhetoric of public political ethnicity, as of 
nationalism, is the language of family and kindred'. `Ethnonationalism' is deeply 
embedded in the words `blood, family, brothers, sisters, mothers, forefathers, home', 
which are commonly used in the political rhetoric of ethnicity (Connor, 1993, cited 
in Fenton, 1999: 90). The fictive and ideological sense in which Korean ethnicity is 
regarded as one big family - carrying the same `pure blood' of shared ancestry - has 
been an inherent characteristic of Korean nationalism. Ethnonationalism develops 
alongside ethnocentrism, naturalising and normalising the culture of a dominant 
ethnic group, which is considered to be the `national culture'. Constructing 
commonalities, ethnocentrism transcends differences in gender, class and region. At 
the same time, differences in physical and cultural codes, such as language, accent, 
food and dress, become boundary signifiers differentiating `us' from `them' and 
constructing `otherness'. Racism occurs `when the construction of `otherness' is used 
in order to exclude and/or exploit the immutable `other" (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 
1997: 49). 
The term, ethnicity, has two aspects to its meaning. On the one hand, 
ethnicity is defined by a group itself based on the group's self-identity constructed by 
shared language, history, religion, and traditions. On the other hand, ethnicity is 
constructed outside the group as a result of the dominant group's use of its power to 
impose social definition on subordinate minority groups (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 
1992; Castles, and Davison, 2000). As Castles and Davison (2000: 62-63) remark, the 
other-definition of a minority ethnic group by the dominant group `leads to the 
racialisation and ethnicisation of social relations' through the `ideological process of 
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stereotyping as well as discriminatory structures and practices in the legal, economic, 
social and political arenas'. Castles and Davison specify three markers constructed 
by dominant groups to differentiate minorities: phenotypical characteristics; culture; 
and national origin. The racialisation and ethnicisation of migrant workers is one of 
clearest examples of stigmatised `otherness' in Korea. In particular, the racialisation 
of Korean-Chinese migrants illustrates the ambiguities and contradictions in the 
political rhetoric of ethnic homogeneity. While in the nationalist discourse the 
Korean-Chinese are considered to be part of the Korean ethnic community - sharing 
`blood' and `ancestry' - as migrant labourers they are located in a disadvantaged 
social, economic and political position and constructed as `the other' by native 
Koreans. 
The ethnicity of the Korean-Chinese is deeply politicised in three 
dimensions. First, under the Immigration Control Act, the Korean-Chinese are 
officially Chinese citizens. As mentioned above, the national origin of a migrant 
worker is taken as a predictor of social characteristics (Castles and Davison, 2000) 
and origin in China -a `poorer country' - is constructed as a significant marker for 
marginalising the Korean-Chinese group from the dominant group in Korea. In the 
following interview, this Korean-Chinese migrant raged at her Korean relatives who 
treated her disrespectfully when she visited them. 
I once visited my distant relatives who are living in the South. But, 
I don't want to see them ever again. They despised me completely 
because I was from a poor country. For one of episodes, I was 
wearing a silver ring given by my grandmother when I got married. 
They made fun of me, saying `are people still giving a silver ring as 
a wedding present in China? ' I was so humiliated and angry with 
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them who were degrading my precious thing. (Soon-Sun, waitress, 
5 years and 8 months in Korea) 
When we are working in the restaurant, we can overhear 
conversations between customers. Sometimes, what they are saying 
gets on our nerves. For example, some middle-aged men are 
talking like `I went to a business trip to China, and the country was 
really dirty', `In Yanbian [the Korean Autonomous Prefecture in 
China], if you pay just $10, you can easily sleep with a Yanbian 
girl' and so on. It is really unpleasant and offensive to hear these 
conversations. (Dani & Myung-Hwa, waitresses, 2 years in Korea) 
Second, Korean-Chinese migrant workers, who are mostly employed in 
manual, unskilled occupations in the Korean labour market, are located in a 
disadvantaged position within the wider working class. As discussed above, just like 
migrant workers from Southeast Asia, Korean-Chinese workers are also racialised in 
the labour market. Under the current legal system, they are not allowed to engage in 
any jobs other than designated manual and unskilled ones. The racialisation of 
migrant workers and their resultant disadvantaged class position makes the 
nationalist rhetoric recognising the Korean-Chinese as part of the Korean ethnic 
community an empty concept. Moon (2000: 159) points out that: 
[t]he government and media [depict] Korean Chinese as illegal 
migrant workers and criminals. With regard to Korean Chinese 
women who had married South Korean farmers when the Seoul 
government initiated its policy, ... the Korean public portrayed 
them as "women obsessed with material wealth who are willing to 
transgress all moral principles and threaten the very basis of 
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Korean identity"55. It appears that when Korean Chinese no longer 
resigned themselves to what Ernest Renan called the "spiritual 
family" of the past and ventured into the everyday economic and 
social life of South Korea, they became unwanted strangers. 
Third, the ethnic connection with the Korean-Chinese - conceived in terms 
of blood ties - makes native Koreans reluctant to accept cultural differences between 
them and the Korean-Chinese. When cultural differences between two groups are 
perceived, both groups often explain it in terms of ideological differences, 
specifically between capitalism and socialism. As mentioned in Chapter 6, Korean 
employers commonly hold Korean-Chinese domestic workers in contempt, seeing 
them as culturally and socially backward and uncivilised, based on their prejudice 
against the country from which these workers have migrated - that is `socialist' 
China. Native Koreans' negative attitudes towards Korean-Chinese migrants are 
largely influenced by anti-communist/socialist sentiment, which is still pervasive in 
Korean society. Korean-Chinese migrants also expressed their experiences of 
unequal treatment compared to native Koreans in terms of narratives of ideological 
difference between `capitalist' Korea and `socialist' China. 
While I am working in Korea, the hardest thing is to cope with 
stress and strain. Because we are from a socialist country, we think 
that all people are equal. Koreans despise Korean-Chinese people. 
The people in a capitalist country are heartless and cold-blooded. 
But, I have to put up with all these humiliations without turning 
upon them because I have to stay in Korea to return to China with 
money. That's why I am feeling stressed. (Seok-Bok, live-in 
domestic worker, 7 years in Korea) 
55 Moon cites this observation made by Park (1996). 
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At first, it was hard for me to deal with Koreans who look down on 
us because we are from China. But now I just pay no attention to 
discrimination against us. Now, I understand a little why Koreans 
are treating us differently. China and Korea are two very different 
countries. While China is a country where you share rice in one pot 
with others, Korea is a country where you have to work and 
compete with others to get the rice. (Young-Sil, domestic worker, 6 
years in Korea) 
Castles and Davison (2000: 63) argue that both the social position and the 
consciousness of a minority ethnic group are always the result of complex 
interactions between self- and other-definition. 
If a group is marginalized by strongly negative other-definitions 
(that is, racist structures and practices), it may emphasize its 
cultural identity as a source of resistance. This can in turn reinforce 
the dominant group's fear of separatism, leading to even stronger 
discrimination (Castles and Davison, 2000: 63). 
The marginalisation of the Korean-Chinese from the dominant group have led the 
Korean-Chinese to construct some degree of collective consciousness based on their 
own belief in shared experiences, culture and history. Ironically, the racialisation of 
Korean-Chinese migrants has provoked strong ties among the group and formed the 
basis of a political struggle for the recognition of their Korean ethnicity. 
Korea's mythical national identity is now in a tangle. The country has 
reached a crucial juncture at which it is expected to recognise and realise the 
existence of diverse `others'. The boundaries of the national imagined community 
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and the narratives of cultural homogeneity are constantly challenged by the process 
of international migration. The gendered and racialised process of international 
migration has challenged and reconfigured boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. 
Bhabha (1990: 4) observes that: 
[t]he `locality' of national culture is neither unified nor unitary in 
relation to itself, nor must it be seen simply as `other' in relation to 
what is outside or beyond it. The boundary is Janus-faced and the 
problem of outside/inside must always itself be a process of 
hybridity, incorporating new `people' in relation to the body 
politics, generating other sites of meaning and, inevitably, in the 
political process, producing unmanned sites of political antagonism 
and unpredictable forces for political representation. 
However, it is important to note that the process of `incorporating new people' is not 
always progressive. One of the dilemmas that the Korean state is now facing is 
whether to include `foreigners' who are married to its own citizens. By looking at the 
issue of the citizenship of marriage immigrants, the next section will examine in 
what ways the process of inclusion implies another form of exclusion and 
racialisation based on gender and class. 
IV. Gender and Citizenship: a Case Study of Cross-border Marriage 
Immigrants 
Overview of Cross-border Marriage Migration in Asia 
Marriage is in general understood as an interpersonal and private domestic relation 
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between a man and a wife. The unequal and patriarchal nature of marital relations is 
however not only limited to personal relations at home, but is also related to social, 
economic and political structures. Furthermore, in the context of cross-border 
marriage, patriarchal gender relations transcend state boundaries and are constructed 
simultaneously with hierarchies of class and race. 
Gendered patterns of marriage migration are prevalent throughout Asia. The 
Philippines is a popular country of origin of marriage immigrants as well as of labour 
migrants. Of the 175,000 Filipinos engaged or married to foreigners between 1989 
and 1999, over 91 % were women (Constable, 2005). Following China's open-door 
policy, the number of Chinese cross-border marriages has increased dramatically 
since the mid-1980s, with 30,000 Chinese marrying abroad each year in the early 
1990s and almost 80,000 in 2001 (Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2002, cited in 
Constable, 2005). The majority of cross-border marriages between the Chinese and 
foreigners involve Mainland Chinese women and overseas Chinese men in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and elsewhere. In Taiwan, which is one of the main destinations of 
Chinese marriage immigrants, the total number of marriage immigrants in early 2004 
reached over 300,000 and 93 % of the marriages were between Taiwanese men and 
foreign women, mainly from China and Southeast Asia (Tsay, 2004). 
Korea is no exception to the visible inflows of marriage immigrants. While 
Korea now increasingly acknowledges the presence of recent cross-border marriage 
immigrants, existing conceptual boundaries of the `Korean-ness' locate these 
marriage immigrants at the margins of society. In a country like Korea, which defines 
itself as a non-immigrant (sojourn) country and in which the principle of the law of 
blood (jus sanguinis) defines membership of the nation, the preservation of mythic 
ethnic and cultural homogeneity - often conflated with issues of public order and 
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national security - is a key factor determining the country's policies towards the 
settlement and citizenship of marriage immigrants. 
Although there have been gradual increases in the number of women migrant 
workers in Korea, male migrant workers still outnumber their female counterparts 
overall. On the other hand, women constitute the overwhelming majority of the 
population of cross-border marriage immigrants. Since the early 1990s, the number 
of cases of cross-border marriage migration has been constantly increasing in Korea. 
Cross-border marriage has increased from 4,710 cases in 1990 to 35,447 in 2004, 
which means 11.4 % of total marriages for that year against 1.2 % in 1990 (National 
Statistical Office, 2006b). Of the 147,646 estimated population of total migrant 
women in Korea, marriage immigrants account for 17.3 % (25594) in 2005. Until 
1995, cross-border marriage was mainly between a Korean woman and a foreign 
man. For example, in 1990, the number of cases of cross-border marriage between a 
foreign woman and a Korean man was only 619 cases, comprising 13.1 % of total 
cross-border marriages. Nevertheless, the situation reversed remarkably after 1995 
and the common pattern of cross-border marriage is now between a foreign wife and 
a Korean husband. In 2005,72.3 % of total cross-border marriages (31,180 out of 
43,121 cases) were between Korean men and foreign women (National Statistical 
Office, 2006b) and these foreign wives are mainly from China, Japan, the Philippines 
and Vietnam. This reversed situation coincided with the significant inflow of the 
industrial trainees and migrant workers from developing countries in Asia since 1994. 
In particular, since 1993 along with the large influx of Chinese industrial trainees, the 
number of Chinese women (mostly the Korean-Chinese) married to Korean men 
have constituted over 50 % of the total population of marriage immigrants (National 
Statistical Office 2006b). The main factor of this change was the prominent change 
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of international relations after the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
Korea and China in 1992. 
Living as a `Foreign Bride' in Korea 
According to Constable (2005), cross-border marriage migration is often considered 
as `global hypergamy', a term building on the conventional anthropological 
definition referring to women marrying up into higher socio-economic groups. 
However, she correctly points out that hypergamy raises the question of how, for 
whom and in what sense such marriages represent upward mobility.. As already 
discussed in Chapter 4, contrary to popular assumptions, marriage immigrants are 
nor necessarily poor, nor do they marry men who are on the higher end of the socio- 
economic ladder. Moreover, apart from economic reasons, many marriage 
immigrants in this study stated that their major motivation for migration was based 
on social pressures relating to marriage in their home countries. While these marriage 
immigrants appear to be moving up - in a geographical sense - from a less 
developed country to a more developed one, this does not mean that they have 
moved upward on the socio-economic chain. In fact, many of women in this study 
have moved into an `unexpectedly' low standard of living and end up in poverty. 
Truong (1983: 538 cited in Piper 1997: 328) argues that the men who marry 
foreign women are those `who feel they are losing out in the power struggle between 
sexes and who need to restore their feelings of masculinity, but cannot find partners 
suitable to this end among peer groups. ' While this may require further systematic 
study on those men's reasons of cross-border marriage, as mentioned by Piper (1997), 
Truong's analysis partly explains a trend among certain Korean men who cannot find 
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Korean wives due to demographic and socio-economic changes. On the one hand, 
there are rapidly increasing numbers of independent working women, who are 
reluctant to get married or delay marriage due to the responsibility for social 
reproduction which are imposed on married women. On the other hand, men who 
suffer economic hardship, disability, or less desirable jobs - such as rural farmers or 
urban manual workers - often have difficulties finding Korean partners. As in many 
Asian countries, marital decisions and choice of marriage partners in Korea are often 
affected by the family's socio-economic status. Korean men who are located in lower 
social and economic positions often face difficulties finding local women who are 
willing to marry them. Furthermore, in Korea as in many Asian societies, being 
married and having a family at a certain age - early 30s - is considered to be a 
family obligation and a norm of social standing. Under these circumstances, many 
Korean men look for their marriage partners abroad. 
Cross-border marriage has become an increasingly institutionalised and 
organised business. The state, local governments and marriage intermediaries, 
including private agencies, are all involved in marriage between women and men 
from different regions of the world. For the Korean government, cross-border 
marriage has become one of the most significant measures to tackle the country's low 
birth rate and aging population. In particular, local governments in agricultural 
districts in the southern provinces of Korea are one of the central actors in cross- 
border marriage migration. Increasing numbers of farmers are facing difficulties 
finding spouses in the rural areas and this tendency is related to concerns over the 
56 declining rural population and its adverse impact on the rural economy in general. 
56 Freeman (2005: 80) notes that in Korea `the bride shortage in the countryside has reached the level 
of national crisis, brought to the attention of the public by the media and by the protest suicides of 
unmarried farmers'. 
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Accordingly, local governments in the rural area organise overseas `marriage tours' 
and arrange matchmaking services for farmers to meet prospective brides in 
countries such as China, Vietnam and the Philippines. In her study of Korean- 
Chinese [Choseonjok] marriage immigrants in Korea, Freeman (2005) argues that the 
Korean government has attempted to resuscitate the rural economy and repopulate 
the countryside by using the productive and reproductive labour of brides from China. 
She states that `when the government first initiated its programme of importing 
brides, the media portrayed Choseonjok women as saviours of the Korean 
countryside, "returning the sound of crying babies" to farming families and restoring 
"ethnic homogeneity" to a divided people' (Freeman, 2005: 84). 
On the other hand, as discussed in Chapter 4, the majority of marriage 
immigrants in this study got married through arrangements made by the Unification 
Church. The Unification Church - which provides all necessary arrangements for the 
couple, from a matchmaking service and a marriage ceremony to paperwork for entry 
visas for foreign brides - has become a less expensive alternative to private marriage 
agencies. When couples get married through cross-border marriage agencies or 
religious groups, the husbands pay for marriage expenses, such as air travel and 
paperwork for visa clearance. 
On the surface, this would seem to be an ideal situation for the bride. However, 
later this may take a psychological toll on the wife. Because of the costs incurred, 
Korean husbands tend to treat their foreign wives as purchased possessions rather 
than as equal partners. According to counselling data provided by the Women 
Migrants Human Rights Centre (2004), in many counselling sessions migrant women 
make complaints about their husbands' attitudes towards them, saying, "because I 
have paid for you, you have to obey me. " Two of the Filipina wives in this study 
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seriously suffered such contempt from their husbands and mother-in-law, and this 
caused discordant marital and family relations and left these women with emotional 
scars of indignity. 
I have a lot of pains and difficulties in my life because of my 
husband's family. My mother-in-law says that she bought me to be 
her son's wife. She says that she paid the Church to buy me. I know 
that many Korean husbands say this to their foreign wives. She said 
to me that she paid the Church 30,000,000 won (US$30,000) to 
bring me into Korea. But, that is not true. My husband showed me 
the receipts and she actually paid around 7,000,000 (US$7,000) for 
my flight ticket and the costs of our wedding. (Jogie, 27, Filipina) 
I don't go to the Sunday service in the Unification Church. I hate 
the Church! My husband always says to me that he paid 5,000,000 
won (US$5,000) to the Church to bring me from the Philippines. 
He says he bought me by paying the Church. So he tells me to pay 
him back when I earn enough money. I don't know whether it's his 
joke or he is serious. I don't want to go to the Unification Church 
because of what my husband is saying to me. The Church also lied 
to me about my husband before we got married. The reverend said 
that he had his own dry cleaner's, a house, a car and even a lot of 
money. But, nothing was true. They are so liars! I feel betrayed by 
the Church and my husband. (Lisa, 36, Filipina) 
While those women migrated to Korea because they wanted to settle down to a 
married life, settling down in a foreign country with a foreign husband was not 
simple for them. In his study of cross-border marriage immigrants in a Japanese rural 
village, Burgess (2004) points out that, as cross-border marriage immigrants 
encounter the limited range and status of their roles in married life, they often find 
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that the social resources they possessed in their country of origin have been lost in 
the move to Japan. Accordingly, `their lack of competence and knowledge about the 
new culture exacerbate this perceived loss of identity' (Burgess 2004: 234). With the 
shift from a working, independent and single life to a domestic and married life, 
these women have to adopt the different roles and the lifestyle associated with 
marriage migration. Moreover, when there is domestic discord, their weak language 
skills and knowledge about Korean culture tend to aggravate the problem even 
further. 
There were three common problems in the cross-border marital relations that 
were found in this study. First, marriage immigrants experienced difficulties in 
communicating with their husbands. Their husbands communicated with them 
mainly in Korean. While husbands insisted that marriage with a Korean man entailed 
learning the Korean language, for these women, learning a new language in a short 
period of time was one of the hardest challenges in their new life. They were too 
busy with full-time work and childcare to spare time for language lessons. 
Furthermore, there was lack of assistance from the government or the local 
community in the form of a Korean language programme for marriage immigrants. 
We communicate each other only in Korean. My husband cannot 
speak English - He only finished middle school. That's why we are 
fighting. It's been only four years since I came to Korea. My 
Korean is too short - I'm speaking Korean still like a baby. A 
language is a big problem in our relationship. (Carol, 40, Filipina) 
We communicate each other in body languages, Korean and 
English. I'm learning Korean by myself. I can speak a little bit 
Korean, just simple sentences and words. We often have a quarrel 
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because one misunderstands what the other person is saying. In the 
last year, I studied Korean on every Sunday, but since my factory 
work has got busy I cannot go to the class any more. (Marilou, 30, 
Filipina) 
Second, marriage with a Korean man often involves a patrilocal residence, in 
terms of which a bride is expected to move in with her husband's family. Under these 
circumstances, marriage immigrants found it hard to understand and cope with the 
gender role of wife or daughter-in-law in the patriarchal structure of the Korean 
family. 
My husband often complains about the dinner I cook. I just prepare 
basic dishes such as rice and soup for his dinner. I'm too exhausted 
to cook when I come home after work. He moans about food and 
compares me with other Korean wives. He is normally nice to me, 
but sometimes he is so mean. His words hurt me. He says words 
that I don't like to hear and I don't think he appreciates me. He is 
not accepting me as his respectable wife. He is not accepting me as 
the way I am. It takes time for me to learn the Korean way of life. 
He wants me to be a very typical Korean wife. But, how can I be? 
(Carol, 40, Filipina) 
My in-laws live close by. They live in the next door. Whenever I 
have argument with my husband, my mother-in-law interferes and 
talks to me "why are you fighting with your husband? " Then, I 
answer, "I am not a bad person. If I am a bad person, I would not 
have married with your son and have left him a long time ago. " I 
am not a bad person. Despite all the problems, I am still living with 
him! I don't have a friend near by. I am very lonely. There is no 
friend to share my feelings and problems. My mother-in-law 
doesn't like that I meet and talk to other Filipinas because she 
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thinks that they cause problems. She is afraid that I might talk 
about her family to my friend. (Zenaida, 28, Filipina) 
Third, most of the interviewees were struggling with financial difficulties 
owing to their husbands' unstable jobs and irregular incomes, and some of them, 
especially those living in a city, were in fact living on the poverty line. According to 
the survey data provided by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (2005), 52.9 % of 
marriage immigrants are living with household incomes less than the official 
minimum cost of living in Korea. Nevertheless, only 13.7% of these households are 
on social security benefits (Ministry of Government Administration and Home 
Affairs, 2007). Financial problems and poverty aggravate the pressures on women 
who have to manage households on a tight budget. 
We have financial difficulties - my husband has no money. Money 
is the biggest problem in our life at the time. We are in debt and 
only paying the interests to the bank. It is really hard. My 
husband's salary is only $1,200 and we have to pay the rent $450 
monthly. (Geraldine, 37, Filipina) 
At the moment, we are having a hard time because we don't have 
money even for my daughter's milk. We are living in a temporary 
accommodation illegally built on the public land. It is hard to live 
in this house. It is very hot in summer and cold in winter. We 
cannot get hot water in winter so I have to boil water in a kettle to 
take a shower. My husband and his family don't have any property. 
I was so shocked when I first arrived at here after the wedding. 
They have been living here for fifteen years and my mother-in-law 
says that they will live here until the government forces us to leave. 
(Zenaida, 28, Filipina) 
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Despite problematic situations, the marriage immigrants in this study did not 
completely reject the strict gender roles and expectations in the family relation. 
Rather, they seemed to put up with the problems and even accept them as cultural 
differences associated with the new way of life in Korea. For example, even though 
Carol responded to her husband's criticism of her cooking by saying "If you want 
something else, then you cook! ", she made an effort to learn Korean recipes for her 
husband. Lim (2005) argues that, for Korean husbands, `the cultural difference' 
becomes a code for the control measures imposed on their wives in the household. 
Foreign wives are expected to accept and adapt themselves to Korean culture and 
customs, which mean - in this context - the patriarchal conjugal relation. The 
subordinate relationship between a wife and a husband become justified under the 
name of `culture'. 
The Limits of the Citizenship of Marriage Immigrants 
Yuval-Davis (1991; 1999) argues that citizenship should not only be understood in 
terms of the narrow formalistic meaning of having the right to carry a specific 
passport, but also as a more total relationship between an individual and the state, 
inflected by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices 
and a sense of belonging. The popular notion of citizenship is based on the work of 
Marshall (1950), which views citizenship as full membership in a community based 
on civil, political and social rights and responsibilities. Nevertheless, Yuval-Davis 
(1991) questions the very concept of `the community' on which the notion of 
citizenship is based. As she rightly points out, in the vague notion of the community 
there is an assumption of `an organic wholeness', which sees the community as a 
284 
`natural social unit' (Yuval-Davis, 1991: 59). Therefore; the community is `out there' 
and `any notion of internal difference within the community is subsumed to this 
organic construction' (ibid. ). Yuval-Davis also adds that since the notion of the 
community assumes a `given collectivity', it does not see that boundaries, structures 
and norms are constantly changing as a result of processes of struggle and 
negotiation, which construct and reconstruct the collectivity. 
The notion of citizenship is ambiguous to the extent that it implies not only 
inclusion, but also exclusion. Lister (2003: 44) argues that it is crucial in a theory of 
citizenship to pay attention to `the symbiotic processes of inclusion and exclusion, 
which form the kernel of citizenship as a concept and a practice'. 
Whether the focus is the nation-state or the community, or 
particular groups within these localities, boundaries and allocative 
processes serve to include and exclude simultaneously. These 
boundaries operate both as visible physical borders and as less 
tangible structural and symbolic barriers (Lister, 2003: 44). 
Lister observes that the patterns of inclusion and exclusion are gendered and 
racialised, and these in turn generate different opportunities for and constraints on the 
exercise of agency. 
For those who are not born into `the organic community', exclusion is 
generated through the differential granting of rights by the state (Morris, 2002). 
Migrants are granted stratified rights in terms of immigration status, class, ethnicity, 
gender, and nationality. Morris (2002) explains that `civic stratification' becomes a 
device for governing immigrants, which forms the basis for differentiation as much 
as a foundation for inclusion. Civic stratification also codifies the racialisation of 
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migrant groups. As Morris (2002: 140) points out, `immigration statuses in practice 
represent a system of social structural division in terms of rights, raising the question 
of how this structure is `embodied' in terms of race and/or ethnic divisions'. The 
embodiment of rights is particularly perceptible in countries like Germany, Sweden 
and Korea, in which the right to citizenship is based on the principle ofjus sanguinis. 
In these countries, immigrants can be granted formal citizenship only through 
naturalisation. The exclusive nature of Korea's citizenship rules - which rely on 
`blood' based criteria - extensively limits the formal rights of immigrants and, even 
if these immigrants are granted formal rights, there are significant barriers to 
claiming substantive rights. 
The immigration rules and citizenship rights significantly determine the lives 
and choices of marriage immigrants. Unlike temporary labour migrants, marriage 
immigrants are likely to be permanent settlers and access to formal citizenship is a 
central issue for them and their children. Yuval-Davis (1991) argues that the state is 
not a neutral universalistic institution. She defines the state `in terms of a body of 
institutions which are centrally organised around the intentionality of control with a 
given apparatus of enforcement as its command and basis' (Yuval-Davis, 1991: 63). 
Immigration policy and practices restrict personal autonomy and increase 
dependency of a migrant woman on her husband. In Korea, a foreign wife has to be 
married to her Korean husband for at least two years in order to gain formal 
citizenship. When a migrant woman extends the duration of her residence visa or 
applies for formal citizenship, she is required to present a personal reference from 
her husband (or husband's family) and documents proving her or her husband's 
economic capacity for living. The husband's economic capacity for earning a living 
and support of a family is one of the key determinants of the naturalisation of a 
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foreign wife. It is specified that when a foreign wife submits the application she must 
be accompanied by her husband or her father-in-law. These regulations and practices 
implicitly prevent a foreign wife from acting as an autonomous legal agent. In this 
regard, conjugal and family relations in the private domain determine women's status 
as citizens within the public domain (Pateman, 1988; Walby, 1990). Immigration 
policies are gender-biased since they do not acknowledge the independent legal 
status of migrant women but presuppose them to be dependents of their husbands. 
Furthermore, immigration regulations are not only gendered, but are also based on 
certain notions of the family within the institutional setting of marriage (Piper and 
Roces, 2003). Immigration laws and citizenship are based on the normative values of 
marriage because marriage is regarded as an institution that reflects the collective 
values of society and, moreover, national identity. 
Under those circumstances, migrant women become vulnerable to economic 
and sexual exploitation and potential deportation (Anderson, 2000; Lister, 2003). 
According to counselling data provided by the Women Migrants Human Rights 
Centre (2004), most of human rights violations in the household of cross-border 
marriage take place prior to the naturalisation of a foreign wife. In many cases, 
migrant women are trapped in violent marriages, as their right to stay in a country 
depends entirely on maintaining marital relations with their husbands. When 
problems like domestic violence occur before the naturalisation, migrant women are 
compelled to tolerate the situation for fear of becoming undocumented and being 
deported. Some of the respondents in this study experienced domestic violence, but 
they put up with it. They did not only tolerate violence and verbal abuse of husbands 
and in-laws for the sake of their children or for religious reasons (e. g. being Catholic 
for Filipina migrants), but also for fear of jeopardising their legal status and the 
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consequent risks of with being deported and returning to their countries as a divorcee. 
Just one year after we got married, he started to beat me. He 
sometimes beat me until I got blood on my face. He was normally 
drunk when he was violent against me. For first three years since 
we got married, he never stopped drinking. I really wanted to leave 
my husband and go back to the Philippines with my son. If I had 
had enough money at that time, I might have left him. (Lisa, 36, 
Filipina) 
I lost my baby when I was three month pregnant because of my 
mother-in-law - she made me work in her farm for all day when I 
was pregnant. One day, we argued because she tried to confiscate 
my passport and an alien registration card. She worried if I would 
run away. When I refused to give them to her, she hit me and I 
pushed her back. I was sorry, but I had to defend myself. When my 
husband saw this incident, his mother shouted him to hit me for her. 
[Interviewer: Have you ever thought about going back to the 
Philippines? ] 
No. For me, when a woman is married to a man, it should last 
forever. I want to settle in Korea. This is my life. (Jogie, 27, 
Filipina) 
In some cases, a foreign wife's legal right to obtain citizenship is improperly 
obstructed by the husband or husband's family, out of fear that formal citizenship 
might give a woman freedom to leave. Lack of legal status and autonomy tends to 
put the foreign wife in a subordinated position in the marital relation. 
My husband and mother-in-law first wanted me to get Korean 
citizenship. But, once my sister-in-law said that if I get citizenship, 
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I would run away, my mother-in-law changed her mind about it. So, 
now she says that I have to wait for getting citizenship until I have 
a baby. (Jogie, 27, Filipina) 
Some of my friends don't have Korean citizenship yet, even though 
they've live here for a long time and have children, because their 
husbands don't want them to have it. Many Korean husbands think 
that if their Filipina wives have Korean citizenship, they would run 
away. (Lisa, 36, Filipina) 
Piper and Roces (2003) indicate that, notwithstanding arguments about the 
declining importance of national citizenship in the era of globalisation, national 
citizenship should not be underestimated in women's migratory experience (cf. 
Soysal, 1994; Sassen, 1996; 1998). Piper and Roces (2003) argue that Soysal's 
theory of postnational citizenship is derived from the European context and based on 
the overemphasised importance of international pressures in securing rights for 
immigrants. In practice, an international regime of rights for immigrants is `weak and 
nonexistent outside of Europe (where migrants' rights are also limited)' (Piper and 
Roces, 2003: 17). Given migrant women's vulnerable positions due to lack of legal 
status, formal citizenship is crucial for these women. In particular, social welfare and 
medical benefits strictly exclude marriage immigrants who are not yet naturalised 
because they are regarded as `foreigners'. Formal citizenship confers rights to 
benefits that are essential for those women living in difficult circumstances. 
Although they were married for more than two years, the majority of 
marriage immigrants in this study still lived with residence visas and longed to gain 
Korean citizenship. Many respondents complained about inconsistent administrative 
services associated with handling the application for formal citizenship. Formal 
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citizenship is an ascription of belonging (Christiansen and Hedetoft, 2004). The 
acquisition of a resident identity card and a Korean passport, which are symbols of 
citizenship, gives a migrant woman a sense of initial belonging and security. In this 
respect, it is interesting to observe the following case of Lisa, who was one of very 
few respondents granted formal citizenship. 
I've got Korean citizenship in May 2004. I was really happy when I 
got my resident card. [Proudly showing her resident ID card] 
Sometime, I wanted to leave my husband and go back to the 
Philippines with my son. But, since I've got Korean citizenship, I 
don't think that any more. I wanted to live and settle down here in 
Korea. I can visit my country whenever I can. I think that having a 
Korean passport gives you many benefits. I am really pleased to 
have it. 
Access to formal citizenship is, however, only a first step on the way to full 
membership of the host society (Castles and Davidson, 2000; Piper and Roces, 2003). 
Even with formal citizenship granting political and labour rights, the language 
barriers and cultural differences remain as obstacles to exercise these in practice. In 
her interview Lisa also stated that: 
although I am now legally a Korean citizen, I am not yet Korean 
because I cannot speak fluent Korean. If I speak Korean well, then 
I would think that I'm Korean. 
Furthermore, there is still the question of the substantive citizenship of immigrants. 
As Lister (2003) points out, substantive citizenship - which refers to the possession 
of full and equal rights and opportunities - does not automatically follow from 
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formal citizenship. Racial discrimination, harassment and the stigmatisation of 
immigrant women are processes of social exclusion that seriously undermine 
substantive citizenship. The marriage immigrants in this study showed particular 
concern for their children, who were the second generation of a cross-border 
marriage. They worried that their children might be bullied by their peers because of 
their inter-ethnic backgrounds. In particular, they were explicitly concerned about the 
skin colour of their children. One respondent even said, "I am so pleased because my 
children do not take after my dark skin. " One Korean-Chinese respondent, who was 
married with an eleven year-old daughter, mentioned that she had never visited her 
daughter's school, as she was worried that her daughter might be bullied by her 
friends because her mother was Korean-Chinese. 
According to the survey data provided by the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
(2005), 17.6 % of marriage immigrants (166 out of 945 foreign wives living in 
Korea) claimed that their children were bullied in school and 34 % of these were 
bullied because of their mothers' ethnicities. The children of migrant women in rural 
areas were found to be more likely to have such experiences than those in the cities. 
The same survey data also shows that 18.6 % of migrant women in rural areas had 
abortions due to serious concerns about raising their children in small rural 
communities. These examples illustrate that, even when marriage immigrants 
become legal citizens, this does not protect them from discriminatory discourses and 
practices that are deeply rooted in Korean society. 
The notion of exclusive national belonging based on ethnic and cultural 
homogeneity inheres in the system of laws and regulations in Korea. One distinctive 
example is that, until 2005, the state prevented male children born of inter-ethnic 
unions from enlisting for military service. The main reason for the restriction was 
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based on the idea that `the people with inter-ethnic background would not 
successfully adapt themselves to live in the barracks due to their physical 
differences'. In accordance with the 2005 amendment, children born of inter-ethnic 
unions after 1987 are now allowed to enter the military for the first time, but only on 
a voluntary basis. It is however too early to conclude that this initial change has 
practically dissolved prejudices and institutional discrimination against people who - 
because of phenotypic or cultural differences - are not considered to be `Korean 
citizens'. 
Economic Citizenship and the Paid Employment of Marriage Immigrants 
Walby (1994) argues that women's economic participation should be also included in 
the definition of social citizenship. Most of the participants in this study had full-time 
jobs in order to subsidise their household incomes, but their caring work in the 
family and the male-dominated household were major barriers to these economic 
activities. For example, despite financial difficulties, many husbands initially did not 
want their wives to engage in paid employment. The unsupportive attitudes of 
husbands towards the paid employment of their wives reflect stereotyped notions of 
gender roles, where it is naturally expected of a husband to be the breadwinner. 
Patriarchal discourses privilege male income and construct women's labour as 
appropriate to caring responsibilities in the household (Brah, 1996). Husbands often 
control financial affairs and the household budget, and do not want their wives to 
work or be involved in social activities outside the home. Some of the respondents 
eventually began to work, after much negotiation and persuasion. 
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My husband never gives me money. He never shows me the money. 
He puts all his salary in the bank. He's saying that he is saving his 
money for our son's future education. Well ... I understand. He 
is 
old - 49 years old and wants to save money for the future. But, he 
and his family also think that, if he gives me enough money, I 
would run away. This was also the reason why he didn't want me to 
work. (Lisa) 
My husband didn't like me working at first because he worried that 
other people might talk about him making his wife work. But I 
insisted and persuaded him. (Marilou) 
As the majority of marriage immigrants in this study had financial 
difficulties, they wanted to work to bring additional incomes to the family, and their 
earnings were an essential contribution to the income of their households. In Carol's 
case, her earnings were the main source of household income, as she earned far more 
money than her husband. For these women, who had been economically independent 
for most of their adult lives (for some, even since they were teenagers), it was 
difficult to accept being dependent on their husbands. The following interview with 
Zenaida shows how she feels about being out of work due to childcare. 
In the Philippines, because I worked and earned money I was 
independent. I could buy food and something I need. But, here in 
Korea, since I cannot work because of my daughter, I have to 
depend on my husband. I am reluctant to spend money given by my 
husband. My mother-in-law always checks where I spend the 
money. I want to work and earn my own money. I cannot stand to 
be dependent on my husband. I had always been financially 
independent. I finished high school and college by myself with my 
own earnings. (Zenaida) 
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Moreover, most of the respondents wanted to continue helping their families in the 
Philippines, as they had done before marriage. 
My husband salary is not enough for living. He is a daily labourer. 
So his income varies depending on the day. On good days he earns 
between 150,000 won ($150) and 250,000 won ($250). But, if there 
is no work, he could earn only 50,000 won ($50). Incomes from 
two people are better than it from one person. Since I got a job, I 
have sent $200 to my family in the Philippines in every month. I do 
it not because they need my money, but because I want to. I send 
them money for their comforts, such as medicine for my father. 
(Marilou) 
I started to work because I really needed money. Living in Korea is 
different from living in the Philippines. It is expensive. I needed 
money for myself and my family back home. I had always 
supported my family in the Philippines because I am the eldest 
daughter and had a responsibility to support them. Currently, I am 
only one in my family who is working in overseas. My parents 
don't have much money. My brothers are still in college. (Jogie) 
Lister (2003: 138) argues that paid work outside the home signifies `an 
important locus of social participation' and `a source of self-esteem', which is 
important for the fulfilment of women's potential as citizens. Paid work brings 
(partial or full) economic independence, which results in a sense of confidence and 
satisfaction. 
I think that the life here is better than it in the Philippine. I work 
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and earn money so that I can help myself and my family. I can buy 
something I need without asking my husband. Two years ago 
before I worked, the life was so miserable and I cried many times. 
Now, I feel that I'm free and independent. I'm happy now because I 
work. (Lisa) 
Paid work outside the home also creates an extensive social network beyond family 
and kinship. It is `an antidote to the boredom and isolation of staying at home' (Brah, 
1996: 140). Brah argues that `[w]omen talked about the joy of sharing a joke, teasing, 
engaging in casual banter, sharing out items of lunch brought from home, gossiping, 
offering sympathetic ear to workmates experiencing domestic or other problems, 
sharing "a moan" against employers, and so on' (1996: 140). 
I started to work after I got married because I was so bored. There 
was nothing to do in the house when my husband left for work. 
Only thing I was doing was watching T. V. and waiting my husband 
who returned home often late from work. So I became hysteric. 
Now, I'm happy that I'm working. I'm so happy that I can buy 
things and do whatever I want to do. I have also met several 
Filipina friends at the factory where I work. (Marilou) 
As a whole, leaving the domestic roles of wife, mother, and daughter-in-law 
and entering paid work in the public sphere is a focal point for immigrant women in 
reconstructing their identities outside the home (cf. Burgess, 2004). Lister (2003) 
rightly argues that paid work can be an important route to both social and active 
political citizenship. Women's paid work in the public sphere can `encourage 
politicisation and open up political processes' (Lister, 2003: 138). 
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Is Korea becoming a multicultural society? 
`Korea moving toward a multicultural society' was the headline of the special article 
by Professor M-C Kim, a Korean sociologist, which appeared in one of the English 
newspapers, The Korea Herald, in November 2007. In the introduction of his article, 
Kim states that: 
the idea of "multicultural Korea" seems to be more credible as we 
witness the growing number of restaurants selling international 
food. This multicultural thesis looks rather convincing if we 
consider the increasing number of interracial [sic] marriages. 
Recently, `multiculturalism' has become a buzz word in the media and policy 
documents in Korea. The government and NGOs have even launched a campaign for 
the adoption of the term `multicultural family' to denote cross-border marriage 
couples and their children. It is evident that the Korean government is aware of the 
increasing number of people with diverse ethnic backgrounds, and is trying to 
establish policies for the effective `integration' of these people into Korean society. 
Kim's observation nevertheless raises a serious question: does the mere visible 
presence of `new culture' and `new people' in the country suggest the transformation 
of the society towards a `multicultural' one? The excessive and ambiguous usage of 
the term `multiculturalism' leads us to examine the underlying implications of the 
`multicultural' and the `integration' policies in Korea. 
According to Castles (1994: 15), in a multicultural society `citizens 
simultaneously have equal rights as individuals and different needs and wants as 
members of groups with specific characteristics and social situations' (cited in Lister, 
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2003: 51). Lister (2003: 51) argues that key fundamentals are linguistic and cultural 
rights or `rights of recognition', `which denote equality of respect, [and] which in 
turn [enhance] human dignity and agency'. Importantly, in a multicultural society the 
majority population has a consciousness of difference and accepts cultural 
heterogeneity in the society. Accordingly, multiculturalism becomes a significant 
antidote to the assimilationist tendencies of the nation-state (Yuval-Davis and 
Werbner, 1999). It is a fundamental error to argue that a visible increase in the 
numbers of different cultures or different ethnic groups within a society, or the 
promotion of basic welfare policies providing material supports for immigrants, form 
the basis of a society multicultural. 
In 2006 the Korean government introduced `the policy measures for the 
social integration of the mixed-blooded [sic! ] and marriage immigrants' (Han and 
Seol, 2007). The policy measures consist of seven key tasks: preventing illegal cross- 
border marriages and protecting the victims; strengthening the supportive system for 
the settlement of victims of domestic violence; supporting immigrants' early 
acclimatisation and settlement in Korean society; supporting children of immigrants 
acclimatisation in schools; fostering a stable living environment for the immigrant's 
family; promoting a positive social perception of marriage immigrants and the 
education of government officials and social workers working closely with 
immigrants and their families; and establishing a system for implementing these 
tasks. Han and Seol (2007) argue that these policy measures constitute a significant 
part on the current discourse of a `multicultural society' within government, the 
media and NGOs in Korea. They suggest that this can be seen as a turning point for 
progressive policy towards migrants in general. 
However, the principal aim of these policy measures is to provide very basic 
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social security for marriage immigrants and their children, while the promotion of the 
fundamental rights of recognition, equality and diversity for the groups is missing in 
the main tasks. The main policy toward marriage immigrants of the Ministry of 
Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) also focuses on supporting those women's 
reproductive roles. Regarding its support programmes for marriage immigrants, the 
MOGEF states that: 
the programme was drafted to provide social support for difficulties 
these migrant women might face, such as family conflicts, 
language problems and fear experienced during pregnancy and 
childbirth in a foreign place. ... Maternity protection guides ... 
incorporate Korean family, customs and culture in the content and 
they will be utilised in family and childbirth guidance counselling 
(MOGEF, 2007). 
Material and educational support for immigrants are certainly essential for their 
settlement. However, in these policies marriage immigrants - who are mostly women 
- are merely embodied as reproducers in the private household. 
In fact, in its emphasis on `social integration' and the `acclimatisation' of 
immigrants into Korean society, the government policies toward marriage 
immigrants are more inclined to promote the assimilation of migrants, rather than 
multiculturalism. The Korean Arts and Culture Education Service (KACES) is a 
government-funded institute promoting `culture and art education programmes' for 
marriage immigrants. The following description of the programmes by KACES is 
posted in its English website: 
a system designed to help immigrants adjust to Korean society 
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needs to be established in order to help them understand Korean 
culture and the Korean way of life. Culture and arts education 
programmes at the national support level are also required to help 
female immigrants by marriage develop their potential ability as a 
member of society ... (KACES, 2007). 
The culture and arts education programmes entail assimilation projects that 
encourage marriage immigrants to learn `Korean culture and the Korean way of life' 
in order to successfully adjust to the country. As a consequence, this helps them 
`develop their potential ability as a member of society'. The central idea of the 
programmes is that cultural assimilation is a key condition for these migrants to 
become a `member' of Korean society. Certainly, cultural assimilation is one of the 
implicit criteria for the membership of Korean society, and this limits the full 
citizenship rights of migrants. 
Under the rhetoric of promoting Korea as a `multicultural society', the media 
and the local government eulogize marriage immigrants who successfully acculturate 
themselves to the Korean way of life and thus turn into `exemplary Korean wives or 
daughters-in-law'. The following article is posted on the official homepage of the 
Korean government, which is managed by the Korean Overseas Information Service 
(KOIS): 
On Monday (Oct. 2), around 100 foreign wives attended a Chuseok 
[Korean Thanksgiving holiday] class at the Korea National Folk 
Museum. The wives, who were from China, [the] Philippines, 
Vietnam and Uzbekistan, enthusiastically joined the class to learn 
about Korean customs and how to make traditional pottery and 
songpyeon, the rice cake eaten during Chuseok. The class, which 
was conducted in Korean, is part of efforts to make foreign wives 
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become more integrated in Korean society (KOIS, 2006). 
`Koreanising' marriage migrant women is closely related to the patriarchal and 
nationalistic ideology that pervades in Korea society. As marriage immigrants are 
represented as `mothers and wives of Korean citizens', they become `central in 
ethnic and national reproduction and transformation, not only as biological 
reproducers of the member of the group or central in the transmission of its cultural 
artefacts, but also as markers of the boundaries of collectivities' (Anthias and Yuval- 
Davis, 1992: 10). In Korea assimilation is a central national strategy to maintain 
cultural homogeneity by rendering the `others' invisible and incorporating migrant 
women and their children into the dominant cultural group. Without cultural 
recognition and respect for their individual liberal rights, these migrants are 
fundamentally excluded and marginalised in Korean society. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, gender, race and class are socially constructed and embedded in the 
institutional structure, which results in different experiences for different groups of 
migrant women. The experience of racism is heterogeneous and varies among 
different class, gender and ethnic groups. It has been argued that the gender aspect 
should not be considered `an additional base of division' but rather a simultaneous 
base along with racialisation. Migrant women are racialised and sexualised in the 
labour market. Gendered and racialised practices generate a gender- and racially 
stratified workforce in Korea. 
It has been emphasised that, for an adequate analysis of racism, institutional 
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racism also needs to be considered. The practices of the nation-state naturalise the 
hegemony of one collectivity to the exclusion of the `other'. It was also argued that 
the Korean nation-state is `an imagined political community' (Anderson, 2006) and a 
mythical unity constituted by the myth of `common origin' and imagined `pure 
blood'. As found in the case of Korean-Chinese migrants, there are ambiguities and 
contradictions in the political rhetoric of ethnic homogeneity in Korea. While in the 
nationalist discourse the Korean-Chinese are considered to be part of the Korean 
ethnic community sharing `blood' and `ancestry', as migrant workers, they are 
located in a disadvantaged social, economic and political position and constructed as 
`the other' in Korean society. 
This chapter has also noted that the social structural division in terms of 
citizenship rights is `embodied' in terms of gender, race and/or ethnic divisions. The 
differential granting of rights by the state - i. e. `civic stratification' (Morris, 2002) - 
signifies the interconnections of racialisation, nationalism, class and gender. The 
boundaries of the national imagined community and the narratives of cultural 
homogeneity have been challenged by the process of international migration. The 
discussion of the citizenship of marriage immigrants has noted how gendered and 
racialised transnational movements have challenged and reconfigured boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion in Korean society. 
The ostensible process of inclusion through the granting citizenship to 
immigrant women implies another form of exclusion and racialisation based on 
gender and class. The empirical data in this chapter have illustrated that the exclusive 
nature of Korea's citizenship rules - relying on `blood' based criteria - extensively 
limits the formal rights of immigrant women and, even when these immigrants are 
granted formal rights, there are racialised and gendered barriers to claiming 
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substantive rights. In the context of cross-border marriage, patriarchal gender 
relations exist across state boundaries and are constructed in terms of hierarchies of 
class and race. Women marriage immigrants are expected to accept and integrate 
themselves into the Korean culture and customs. In the patriarchal conjugal relation, 
the subordinate relationship of a wife to a husband becomes justified by cultural 
differences. These conjugal and family relations in the private sphere also determine 
women's status as citizens within the public sphere. Immigration laws and 
citizenship, which are based on normative notions of marriage, implicitly deny the 
status of an immigrant woman as an autonomous legal agency and thereby increase 
the vulnerability and dependency of the woman on her husband. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that racist discourses and practices, which 
are deeply rooted in Korean society, seriously undermine the substantive citizenship 
of immigrant women and their children. Under the rhetoric of promoting Korea as a 
`multicultural society', women marriage immigrants are `Koreanised' and implicitly 
forced to integrate into Korean society. It was argued that the assimilation project, 
which is disguised as `the policy towards a multicultural society', is closely related to 
a patriarchal and nationalistic ideology. Policies on women marriage immigrants 
focus merely on their reproductive roles as mothers and wives of Korean citizens. As 
these women become central to ethnic and national reproduction and markers of the 
boundaries of collectivities, the Korean state veils the cultural identity of those 
immigrants and incorporates them and their children into the dominant cultural group. 
Without cultural recognition and respect of their individual liberal rights, these 
immigrants are fundamentally excluded and marginalised. It is therefore misleading 
to claim that Korean society is `multicultural'. 
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Conclusion 
Maybe I'm a machine 
Absorbed in soldering subassemblies 
Swarming down the conveyor, 
Like a robot repeating, 
The same motions forever, 
Maybe I've become a machine. 
Maybe we're chickens in a coop. 
Neatly lined up on our roosts, 
Hand speed synchronised in dim light, 
The faster the music, 
The more eggs we lay, 
Maybe we've become chickens in a coop. 
They who extract and devour 
Our pith and our marrow, 
Maybe they are barefaced robbers, 
Turning humans into machines, 
Into consumables, 
Into things buyable and sellable. 
Maybe they are dignified 
And law-abiding barefaced robbers. 
Those gentle smiles, 
That refined beauty and culture, 
That rich and dazzling opulence, 
Maybe all of that is ours. 
(`Maybe' by No-Hae Park, 1984: 89-91, cited in Koo, 2001: 147-148) 
This poem was written by the well-known Korean worker-poet, Park No-Hae in 1984 
when the Korean labour movement was growing stronger under the authoritarian 
regime. The poem expresses Korean factory workers' feeling of alienation, 
grievances, resentment and anger under the intolerable conditions of physical labour. 
The 40 years of Korea's rapid industrialisation was not possible without these 
millions of urban factory workers, most of whom were recruited directly from the 
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rural areas and had no prior experience of wage employment. Koo (2001: 3) describes 
these workers as `the first generation of the Korean working class'. Today, this poem 
applies to half a million of the new generation of workers who have left their home 
countries amend come to Korea to fill the jobs rejected by the workers who once sang 
this poem on the shop floor. 
Focusing on the empirical research of migrant women in Korea, this study 
has attempted to unpack the process of international migration in historical, social 
and political contexts and to explore each process with a better integration of 
theoretical analyses, through a critical gendered lens. It examined the case of Korea, 
which since the early 1990s has become one of the major labour receiving countries 
in Asia, but which has received less attention in the English literature on migration 
studies. Focusing on the migration of women, it has also challenged the absence of 
the gender perspective in the study of migrant workers in Korea. By integrating an 
analysis of empirical data into critical theoretical analyses, it has shown how gender 
and race/ethnicity are significantly implicated in the structure of international 
migration and state institutions, and how the ostensibly gender-neutral process of 
migration is therefore gender specific, resulting in different migration experiences on 
the part of women and men. The theoretical framework of this study is based on the 
observation that theorising the multifaceted process of international migration - 
which takes place with various interrelated variables - requires multidisciplinary and 
multidimensional approaches. The migratory process does not end when people 
decide to move and successfully arrive at the country of destination, but continues 
with the employment of migrants in the labour market, their settlement, and 
consequential societal transformations in the host society. Therefore, this study is 
intended to provide a more nuanced understanding of the process of international 
304 
migration by exploring the three different migratory stages: migration decision and 
entry to the destination; modes of employment; and residence/settlement in Korean 
society. 
The `migration transition' of Korea has been influenced by economic, 
political and cultural/social changes that interlock with changes at the local and 
global levels. As noted in Chapter 2, Korea has passed through the migration 
transition as a result of industrial, demographic and international political transitions, 
and as a result of increasing cultural/social linkages between Korea and other Asian 
countries. The restructuring of the Korean economy has brought changes in the 
industrial structure and employment patterns in the labour market, all of which have 
subsequently relocated the country within the international division of labour and 
generated demands for migrant workers in certain sectors of the economy. Owing to 
the vigorous globalisation drive pursued by the state, Korea has been transformed 
from a labour-intensive to a capital- and technological-intensive industrial economy 
based on the service and high-tech industries and overseas foreign investment. We 
have seen that there is a close relation between the globalisation of production of 
Korean firms and the influx of Asian migrants, as many workers came from countries 
that were sites for the Overseas Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) of Korean firms. 
At the same time, as industrialisation and the vigorous labour movement have 
proceeded in Korea, domestic wage levels have risen and the manufacturing industry 
has experienced serious labour shortages due to the demographic transition -a low 
fertility rate and an ageing population - and job and skill mismatches in the labour 
market. The migration transition of Korea has also been affected by the changes in 
Korea's international relations in the post-Cold War era. The terminal stage of the 
Cold War during the period between 1989 and 1991 altered geopolitical relations in 
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East Asia and changed Korea's foreign policy, which resulted in the normalisation of 
diplomatic relations with China and Vietnam. This enhanced economic and cultural 
relationship between Korea and these countries has led to the increasing movement 
of people. The intensified movement of capital and goods has at the same time 
created significant cultural and social linkages, which connect Korea with other 
Asian countries and further stimulate flows of migrant workers into Korea. 
It is undeniable that Korea is now increasingly dependant on migrant labour 
from the poorer countries in Asia. Given the country's brief history as a labour 
receiving country, the influx of migrant workers presents various new challenges for 
the Korean state. As Westwood and Phizacklea (2000: 15) rightly observe, `crossing 
borders has profound effects upon individuals but also upon the ways in which 
national affiliations and the nation-state are understood'. Throughout this study, it 
was shown that political considerations and the strategic intervention of the state 
have prominently influenced the current state of international migration in Asia. 
More importantly, the empirical analysis of migrant women in this study has 
illustrated that, under these structural determinations, migrants also manoeuvre 
strategically to further her interests throughout the migratory process, from the 
decision of migration to the choice of occupations in the labour market and to 
settlement in Korea. Analysing the process of migration from a gendered perspective 
has enabled us to move between different levels of analysis and provide a more 
interactive account of structure and agency, of the private and the public, and of the 
local and the global in the international migration system. The following section will 
summarise the key findings of this study. 
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I. Key Findings 
Migrant Women as `Outsiders-Within'the International Migration System 
This study is based on the observation that gender is one of principal analytical 
factors for theoretical conceptualisation in the study of international migration. As 
argued in Chapter 1, for the gender-sensitive study of international migration the 
question should be not `why women are excluded', but `in what way gender relations 
are constructed and exercised in different areas in, society such as the family, the 
labour market and the state'. It is therefore necessary to expand earlier approaches to 
the migration of women that merely `add women' to existing theories of international 
migration. In this regard, while we must avoid a universalising view of patriarchy, 
Eisenstein's concept of `the capitalist patriarchal state' and Walby's. argument on 
`private to public patriarchy' are useful for an understanding of the gender relations 
in the migration process, particularly in the Asian context. Nevertheless, as argued in 
Chapter 1, it is crucial to take a dynamic view of patriarchy, which goes beyond the 
public and private dichotomy. As the empirical research in this study shows, the 
system of patriarchy has been extended to the global level through gendered labour 
migration and increasing cross-border marriages in the Asian region. More 
importantly, through the process of international migration, public and private 
spheres operate across state boundaries. This fact undermines the conventionally 
constructed dichotomy of public and private space, which institutionalises social 
practices. It is also important to consider that patriarchal gender relations are 
constructed simultaneously with hierarchies of class and racialised social relations. 
Above all, the gendered process of international migration demonstrates that 
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patriarchy is `a fluid and shifting set of social relations' and women bargain with the 
patriarchal gender relations in diverse ways by adopting different strategies and 
coping mechanisms in different historical, social and cultural contexts. This concept 
of `patriarchal bargaining' has been supported by the empirical analysis of women's 
decisions on migration, which can be understood as coping strategies for overcoming 
economic, social, or cultural problems at home. 
Gender-sensitive research on the process and structures of migration also 
goes further than simply explaining the implication of `gender' in terms of causes, 
types and figures of international migration. In order to expand existing approaches 
to the migration of women, which merely `add women, mix and stir' within existing 
theoretical frameworks of international migration, it is important to consider the 
process of knowledge production by looking at epistemological and methodological 
issues relating to the subject of the inquiry. Adopting a feminist standpoint of the 
outsider-within enabled us ' to move the lives of migrant women from the margin to 
centre of the analysis. The empirical study has shown that migrant women are 
`outsiders' who exist `within' the very core of the international migration system, in 
which they are nevertheless marginalised and silenced. A standpoint of the outsider- 
within locates the lives of these migrant women in valuable positions for 
understanding social relations that are not visible within the dominant androcentric 
accounts. As discussed in Chapter 3, the experiences of women are socially located 
in `a gender/class/race matrix'. The `matrix of domination' (Collins, 2000) organises 
oppression, which cannot be reduced to one fundamental type, but which takes 
particular forms at the intersection of gender, race and class. As further discussed in 
Chapter 7, acknowledging the heterogeneous nature of women's experiences is a 
significant aspect of this study, which deals with diverse groups of women - who 
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may share their positions in a host society as migrant workers, but whose experiences 
differ from each other in terms of race, ethnicity, or nationality. 
Migrant Women as 'Knowledgeable Agents' 
The importance of the link between structure and agency was highlighted in the 
analysis of the decision to migrate and the subsequent admission to the country of 
destination. As an explanatory framework for this migratory stage, the concept of the 
migrant institution was examined in Chapter 4. Paying attention to the 
`institutionalisation of migration' through personal and intermediary networks, Goss 
and Lindquist's concept of `the migrant institution' helps us to articulate between 
structure and agency in the process of international migration, particularly in Asia 
where the system of migration is highly institutionalised. 
Throughout the study, we have seen the crucial role played by the state in the 
process of international migration. As discussed in Chapter 4, the measures intended 
to control migrant labour have continuously changed in accordance with the interests 
of the state, the state apparatuses and businesses. Regardless of the demand for 
migrant labour in labour-scare industries, the Korean state has strictly prohibited 
unskilled migrant workers from entering Korea for the purpose of employment. In 
the form of the Industrial and Technical Training Programmes (ITTP), for 14 years 
the Korean state has utilised the migrant workforce to fulfil the serious labour 
shortage in the manufacturing and service sectors. While migrant trainees have 
constituted an indispensable workforce for essential industries in Korea, they have 
not been recognised as `workers' - owing to their legal status as `trainees' - and been 
denied all rights as workers. The unrealistic state policy on migrant workers has 
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failed to control the continuous flow of migrant workers and resulted in a great 
number of undocumented workers. After a series of attempts at policy reform, in 
2004 the government introduced the Employment Permit System (EPS), which 
allows employers in labour-scare sectors to hire unskilled migrant workers. However, 
under the EPS, workers are granted permission to work only in the designated 
companies with no right to choose or change workplace once they enter Korea. 
Alongside the EPS, the ITTP remains as one of main policy measures governing the 
migrant workforce. At the same time, the Korean state has imposed stricter rules and 
regulations, in an effort to control the entry of migrant workers in terms of a selective 
list of labour sending countries and an annual quota of migrant workers in each 
industrial sector. These measures further increase structural constraints. Nevertheless, 
as seen in the empirical study in Chapter 4, increasingly selective and restrictive 
measures to control immigration in Korea have not successfully controlled irregular 
migrants, but rather increased the likelihood of migrants seeking alternative 
migration routes. These alternative routes involve a higher risk of exploitation and 
place additional pressures on migrants to become undocumented. 
On the other hand, this study argues that despite those stringent structural 
restrictions, potential migrants undertake strategic action within the migration system. 
While the individual decision to migrate is partially driven by economic motives, 
migrant women in this study make strategic decisions by choosing Korea as the 
country of their destination. The strategic action of migrants is manifested in their 
calculation of the cost and accessibility to the country, the exploitation of social and 
family networks in Korea and the choice of occupations available in Korea. Apart 
from the economic reason, these women also decided on migration either to escape 
from social pressure or to overcome problems such as forced or broken marriages at 
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home. One distinctive motive that explains why ethnic Koreans in China tend to 
choose Korea as a destination was found in cultural and historical linkages to their 
`homeland' Korea. Their psychological links to `homeland' Korea have materialised 
since the development of diplomatic relations between Korea and China in 1992. 
They have been able to physically return to the homeland for which they have longed. 
At the same time, their successful `homeland' provides them with employment 
opportunities. For both reasons, Korea becomes one of the most attractive migrant 
destinations for the Korean diasporic group in China. 
As strict border control has made it more difficult to enter Korea through 
legal channels, in order to facilitate their decision on move migrants need to acquire 
knowledge of rules and access to resources, and this takes place through assistance 
from intermediaries who interpret the rules and who distribute the resources within 
the migrant institution. Both the potential migrants and recruitment agencies (or 
private brokers) draw selectively on institutional rules and resources and exploit 
them in pursuit of their own interests. Within the increasingly institutionalised 
migration system in Asia, international migration becomes a highly lucrative 
`business', and recruitment agencies and brokers are essential actors in the migration 
system. From the empirical analysis of migrants' use of available resources within 
migrant institutions, we can see that even though social knowledge and power are 
unequally distributed and may put individuals in a `weak' social position, individuals 
tend to maintain some sense of autonomy and capacity for strategic action. As a 
whole, the practices of migrants, intermediary agencies and the state become further 
institutionalised and inevitably reproduce the system of migration. 
While in the process of migration migrants act as `knowledgeable agents' 
who draw selectively on institutional rules and resources in pursuit of overseas 
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migration, it is important to avoid a holistic approach to the concept of 
`knowledgeable agents'. It is important to consider that allocative and authoritative 
resources available to individuals are differently distributed and structurally 
circumscribed. Even if the most marginalised interpret their situation and can 
mobilise available rules and resources, the modalities of the strategic use of rules and 
resources by agents could vary between individuals depending on their position 
within social institutions. Especially, when we consider differing knowledge of the 
rules and access to resources between women and men in their pre-migration stages, 
potential migrant becomes dependent on structurally conditioning factors which 
differentially distribute the capacity to facilitate outcomes. Therefore, unequal 
distributions of social knowledge and power as well as rules and resources between 
women and men make women opt for the different strategic use of resources. The 
particular examples of this examined in this study are young women's use of 
social/family networks as a `security blanket' and cross-border marriage as an 
alternative channel for the entry to Korea. Differently `sedimented' practices of 
women and men - who strategically draw on institutional rules and resources to 
facilitate migration - become institutionalised in a gendered way. This, in turn, 
influences the gendered process of international migration that is reproduced and 
transformed over time. 
The Transnational Sexual Division of Labour: Migrant Women's `Visible Bodies' 
and `Invisible Work' 
As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the analysis of modes of the employment of 
migrant workers in Korea illustrates the systematic link between international 
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migration and changing divisions of labour. A critical examination of the theory of 
the New International Division of Labour has led us to conceptualise a notion of the 
transnational division of labour (Cohen, 2006) that embraces changing aspects of 
divisions of labour in the developed as well as the developing countries and, more 
importantly, patterns of the movement of people. The notion of the transnational 
division of labour provides a valuable tool for an understanding of the changed 
position of the Korean economy in the global market and its relevance to the 
country's reliance on the supply of migrant workers from developing countries. 
While Cohen (2006) does not take a gendered perspective in his account, his concept 
of the transnational division of labour could be applied to the `feminisation' of the 
labour force at local and global levels and can be extended to include the notion of 
the transnational sexual division of labour, which has been intensified by the 
international migration of women workers. 
Furthermore, the process of international migration has not only 
reconfigured the international division of labour, but also deepened gender and 
racialised divisions of labour within the Korean labour market. The 
transnationalisation of capital and changes in production increasingly demand 
unskilled migrant labour in order to sustain the country's position in the global 
economy. Generating `the migrant labour market', migrant workers become `flexible 
labour' occupying the secondary labour market. Migrant workers are not widely 
dispersed across the occupations, but they are rather concentrated in certain 
occupations and niche industries at low wages, in precarious jobs - which local 
workers are reluctant to take on - and without proper labour protection. As the state 
regulation of the migrant labour force in Korea explicitly illustrates, the demand for 
migrant workers continues until the cyclical and seasonal jobs in the secondary 
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labour market are filled, but the demand declines in periods of economic slowdown. 
Just as the state controls the inflow of migrants, the labour market for unskilled 
migrant workers is strictly regulated by the state. Given limited labour protection and 
the flexibilisation of the migrant workforce in the labour market, Korea has been able 
to reduce possible economic and social costs and, at the same time, enjoy the benefits 
of the significant economic contribution of migrant workers. 
As we have seen in the empirical study, the migrant labour market is 
segmented by gender, class, race and age. Migrant women are mainly concentrated in 
archetypical `female' occupations, such as assembly work in the manufacturing 
sector and service work - which have traditionally been reserved for local women. 
The empirical study of gender relations and racial discrimination in the workplace, 
and conflicting state policies, draw attention to the unlawful treatment of women 
migrant workers owing to their `multiple vulnerability' as women, migrants and 
undocumented workers. 
In order to provide a complete picture of the dynamic and constantly 
evolving process of international migration, Chapter 6 examined paid reproductive 
work. The commodification of reproductive work has blurred the boundaries of work 
in the public and private spheres. As paid reproductive work involves the most 
feminised migrant workforce in many developed countries, the transnationalisation 
of care and service work have opened up debates around public and private work, 
drawing attention to the `global reshaping' of reproductive work. As seen in the 
empirical study of young Filipina migrant care workers, the tendency towards the 
commercialisation of care work - which is increasingly carried out by women 
migrant workers - has resulted in `global care chains', which have further intensified 
the inequality of social reproduction between rich and poor countries as well as the 
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transnational sexual division of labour. While the notion that private work is the 
unpaid service of a woman in the household is elided by paid domestic work, the 
conventional assumption that domestic work is a woman's responsibility remains. 
While the state encourages middle-class Korean women to pursue their careers in the 
productive economy to sustain the country's economic growth, the issue of who 
should be responsible for housework, and child and elderly care is resolved by tacitly 
attributing these duties to women. By maintaining the patriarchal idea that care and 
domestic work are women's personal responsibilities, the Korean state responds to 
the function of social reproduction by importing migrant women, rather than by 
providing appropriate state welfare provisions. In this regard, the `patriarchal capital 
state' manipulates both local and migrant women to fulfil its own need for sustaining 
economic and social development. 
The patriarchal nature of the state is also reflected in gendered and racialised 
state policies toward women migrant workers. While migrant women are `visible 
bodies' controlled by the state with regard to entry and the allocation of jobs in the 
labour market, they perform `invisible work' in the labour market. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, undocumented women migrant workers in Korea are essentially in a blind 
corner with respect to state policies. We have seen that the maternity protection for 
undocumented women workers is of no concerns to the Korean government. 
Moreover, the government refuses to consider migrant domestic workers as `workers' 
and to legalise paid domestic work, because the work is performed in the private 
domain. 
On the whole, the analysis of the changing divisions of labour in Korea gives 
a comprehensive account of how social, political, cultural and institutional processes 
are intertwined in the context of production and social reproduction. The 
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feminisation of labour migration has significant implications for the sexual division 
of labour in the private and public spheres. Given the occupational segregation by 
gender in the labour market, migration may simply transfer women from one form of 
patriarchy to another, leaving gender relations within the labour market of both the 
labour sending and receiving countries essentially unaltered. 
Gender, Racialisation and the Embodiment of Rights 
The final chapter of this study examined the migratory stage of residence and the 
settlement of migrants in the host society, which has been completely omitted in the 
dominant theories of migration. In this study, the social and political relations 
between migrants and the host society are considered as one of the significant parts 
of the migratory process. The analysis of the experiences of the residence and 
settlement of migrant women in Korean society involves not only examining the 
gendered structure of society, but also considering social and political relations in 
terms of race, ethnicity and class in the specific context of Korea. In this regard, a 
feminist integrative framework has been a useful tool for exploring how gender, race 
and class are socially constructed factors in the interlocking system of multiple 
discriminations experienced by migrant women. This integrated framework for the 
discussion of gender, race and class has been applied to the empirical analysis of the 
racialisation of migrant workers and the social structural division of citizenship rights 
in the specific context of Korea. 
Gender, race and class are socially constructed and embedded in the 
institutional structure, which results in different experiences for different groups of 
migrant women. Immigration status signifies the social structural division in terms of 
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citizenship rights, which are `embodied' in terms of race and/or ethnic divisions. In 
order to gain a proper understanding of the unequal and discriminatory treatment 
experienced by migrant women in Korea - which are generated through the 
differential granting of rights by the state - the interconnections between racialisation, 
nationalism, class and gender were considered. Unequal wages and unfair treatment 
between native and migrant workers within the same economic sector indicate the 
racially fractionalised nature of the working class in Korea. Furthermore, this study 
has shown that the gender is not an `additional base' of structural division, but a 
concurrent base along with racialisation. Migrant women are racialised and 
sexualised in the labour market. As seen in Chapter 5, a clear example of gendered 
and racialised practices in Korea is the case in which phenotypical difference and 
gender are decisive factors in the employability of migrant workers in the service 
sector. 
It is also important to consider institutional racism. The case study of Korea 
demonstrates that the practices of the nation-state naturalise the hegemony of one 
collectivity to the exclusion of the `other'. The Korean nation-state is `an imagined 
political community', which is based on a mythical unity constituted by the myth of 
`common origin' and shared `pure blood'. Ambiguities and contradictions in the 
political rhetoric of ethnic homogeneity in Korea are clearly reflected in the 
politicisation of ethnic Korean migrants from China. While in the nationalist 
discourse the Korean-Chinese are considered as part of the Korean ethnic community 
sharing `blood' and `ancestry', as migrant workers they are located in a 
disadvantaged social, economic and political position and constructed as `the other' 
in Korean society. 
The boundaries of the national imagined community and the narratives of 
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cultural homogeneity in Korea are nevertheless challenged by the process of 
international migration. The country has reached a crucial juncture at which it is 
required to recognise the existence of diverse `others'. The discussion of the 
citizenship of marriage immigrants has highlighted the extent to which the gendered 
and racialised process of international migration has challenged and reconfigured 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in Korean society. However, the limited 
citizenship rights of marriage immigrants indicate that the process of `incorporating 
new people' into Korea is not progressive. The ostensible process of inclusion, 
through the granting citizenship to immigrant women, implies another form of 
exclusion and racialisation based on gender and class. The empirical data in Chapter 
7 showed that the exclusive nature of Korea's citizenship rules - relying on `blood' 
based criteria - limits the formal rights of immigrant women. Even when those 
immigrants are granted formal rights, there remain racialised and gendered limits to 
claim for substantive - i. e. social, economic and cultural - rights. In the context of 
cross-border marriage, patriarchal gender relations are deterritorialised and 
constructed with hierarchies of class and race. Women marriage immigrants are 
expected to accept and integrate themselves into the Korean culture and customs. In 
the patriarchal relation within the family, the hierarchical relationship between a wife 
and a husband becomes justified by cultural differences and is engendered by the 
race and class of the immigrant wife. These conjugal and family relations in the 
private sphere also determine women's status as citizens within the public sphere. 
Legal and political regulations on citizenship, which are based on normative and 
cultural notions of marriage, deny the immigrant woman autonomous legal agency 
and thereby increase the vulnerability and dependency of the woman with respect to 
her husband. 
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Furthermore, this study suggests that racist discourses and practices, which 
are deeply rooted in Korean society, seriously undermine the substantive citizenship 
of immigrant women and their children. Under Korea's rhetorical promotion of a 
`multicultural society', women marriage immigrants are forced to integrate into 
Korean society by being `Koreanised'. The policy towards `a multicultural society' in 
Korea should therefore be regarded as an `assimilation' project, which is closely 
related to a patriarchal and nationalistic ideology. The government policy measures 
focus only on the reproductive roles of marriage immigrants. Treated as mothers and 
wives of Korean citizens, these women become central to ethnic and national 
reproduction, as well as markers of the boundaries of collectivities. In this way, the 
Korean state veils the cultural identity of these immigrants and incorporates them 
and their children into the dominant cultural group. Without cultural recognition and 
respect of their substantial citizenship rights, those immigrants are deeply excluded 
and marginalised in Korean society. 
II. Implications of the Study for Further Research 
Clearly, spatial dichotomies are being reconfigured in the current process of 
international labour migration. The transnational division of labour has transcended 
state boundaries, thereby blurring the dichotomy between `global economy' and 
`local agency'. As a result of the transnational movement of people, the core and 
periphery of the world system have come to co-exist within a single country and 
even a single metropolitan area. It is however too hasty to posit the 
`deterritorialisation' of nation-states in an increasingly globalised world. This study 
has demonstrated that international migration has not weakened, but rather 
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engendered the governance of the national territories of states. Although migrants 
transcend spatial boundaries by crossing geographical borders, they are bound by a 
series of state-based legal and political controls. The strict regulatory systems 
associated with a border control and the domestic labour market are designed to 
prevent the permanent settlement of migrant workers and their families, and cultural 
diversity created by new ethnic groups. However, trends towards long-term residence 
and the permanent settlement of migrants are beginning to emerge, as seen in the 
Korean case. It is questionable whether many Asian countries, like Korea, can avoid 
repeating the precedent of the unsuccessful attempts of Western European countries 
to reduce migrant populations in the 1970s. 
Even though many societies are now experiencing foreign cultures and a 
burgeoning number of migrants crossing borders for business, labour and marriage, 
this does not necessarily lead to a `multicultural' society or the elimination of 
racialised prejudice and social bias toward migrants. The tendency towards 're- 
territorialisation' has become apparent in the host society. The imagination of cultural 
homogeneity and the naturalisation of the cultural hegemony of the dominant ethnic 
group have resulted in the political and social exclusion of migrants. Progressive 
changes will not be made, unless we confront the unjust social relations that 
marginalise women migrant workers who perform `invisible work' that sustains the 
host country's economy and society. By untangling the multifaceted process of 
international migration through a gendered lens, this study may provide a starting 
point for change. 
The migratory experiences of migrant women discussed in this study direct 
our attention to women's agency and empowerment, which require further research. 
This can begin by looking at the ways in which migrant women are constructing their 
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identities and resisting unequal power relations, through the negotiation of their roles 
and positions in the private and public spheres. As migrant women make strategic 
choices when making a decision to migrate, there is a great possibility that these 
seemingly powerless women could carve out `spaces of control' to organise 
collective power to redress exploitation and inequality. The considerable number of 
NGOs - mostly led by religious groups - working for migrant rights in Korea 
indicates growing concerns in civil society with social justice for migrants. However, 
the empowerment of migrant women cannot be achieved without allowing these 
women to speak for themselves. Alliances and solidarity among NGOs, individuals 
and migrant women are vital for moving towards effective political action. 
In addition, international migration is a gendered process shaped in multiple 
ways by dynamic gender relations. In order to expand our understanding of 
international migration with a `gendered' lens it is important to consider how gender 
relations in a migration process are reconstructed and transformed in different ways 
by looking at both women and men. Migrant men should also be examined as 
gendered individuals. Gender relations shape migratory patterns and experiences of 
men, which are different from those of women. It is also important to explore 
dynamic gender relations among different migrant groups in each stage of the 
migratory process. Further research is therefore required to explore ways in which 
international migration produces new challenges and opportunities for change in both 
women's and men's behaviours, and changes gender relations in both countries of 
origin and destination. 
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Appendix 
List of Interview Participants 
1. Profiles of Migrant Workers 
Name Nationality Age 
Korean 
Bong- (former 
Sun nationality- 
Chinese) 
Period of Current Current 
Residence job Legal Status 
52 13 years 
Brenda Filipina 37 11 years 
Choon- 
Ja 
Restaurant 
staff 
Domestic 
worker 
Naturalised 
(through a 
marriage with 
a Korean 
citizen 
Employment 
permit for a 
domestic 
worker hired 
by foreign 
professionals 
(FI) 
Type of 
Initial 
Entry Visa 
A family 
visit (F-1) 
Tourist 
(C-2) 
Marriage 
Status 
Married 
Married 
Domestic 
A family 
Chinese 66 6 years worker 
Undocumented Visit Married 
(F-1) 
Dani Chinese 25 2 years Waitress 
A family visit 
(F-1) 
Trainee 
(D-3) 
and 
re-entry Single 
with a 
family visit 
(F-1) 
Naturalised 
Korean (through a Hae- (former 
l 27 3 years Waitress marriage with 
Residence 
(F-2) Married Hwa ity - nationa a Korean Chinese) 
citizen) 
Hee-Ok Chinese 56 10 years 
Domestic 
worker 
Undocumented 
A family 
visit F-1 
Married 
Hong Vietnamese 26 5 years and Factory Undocumented 
Trainee Married 
Sam 6 months worker (D-3) 
Unmarried 
Factory Business (cohabiting Jenny Filipina 34 14 years worker 
Undocumented (C-2) with a long-term 
partner) 
Jo Filipina 45 
4 years and Factory Undocumented Tourist Married 6 months worker C-1 
Jung- Chinese 57 4 years Cleaner Undocumented 
family A Married Hee l visi t 
Lakshika SriLankan 27 3 years 
Factory 
worker 
Trainee (D-3) Trainee 
(D-3) 
Married 
Le Vietnamese 31 5 years 
Factory 
worker 
Undocumented Trainee (D-3) Married 
Marcy Filipina 31 6 years 
Factory 
worker 
Undocumented Trainee D-3 Single 
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Age Period of Current Current Type of Marriage 
Name Nationality (years) 
Residence job Legal Status Initial Status (years) Entry Visa 
Trainee 
Non- (D-3) and 
professional re-entry Myung- Chinese 22 2 years Waitress employment with a non- Single Hwa 
work permit professional 
(E-9) employment 
work permit 
(E-9) 
Non- 
Nina Indonesian 41 2 years and Factory 
professional 
employment 
Tourist Married 4 months worker work permit 
(C-1) 
(E-9) 
Non- 
Factory professional Tourist 
Sandra Indonesian 37 3 years worker employment (C-2) 
Married 
work permit 
(E-9) 
Seok- Chinese 61 7 years 
Domestic Undocumented A family Widow Bok worker visit F-1 
Unmarried 
Factory Trainee (cohabiting Shilani SriLankan 30 7 years worker 
Undocumented (D-3) with a 
long 
term 
partner) 
Part-time 
domestic 
Shin- Chinese 55 4 years worker Undocumented 
A family Married Keum and visit (F-1) 
restaurant 
staff 
Soon- Chinese 70 11 years 
Domestic Undocumented A family Married Hee worker visit F-1 
Private 
Soon- 
Kuem Chinese 48 8 years 
care 
worker for 
Undocumented Business (C-2) Married 
the elderly 
Soon- 
Sun Chinese 43 
5 years and 
8 months 
Thuy 
Vietnamese 29 8 years Duong 
Young- 
Sil Chinese 55 6 years 
Part-time 
domestic 
workers Undocumented 
and 
cleaner 
Business 
(C-2) Married 
Factory Undocumented Trainee Married 
worker (D-3) 
Domestic Business 
worker 
Undocumented (C-2) Married 
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2. Profiles of Marriage Immigrants 
Name Nationality 
Age Years of 
Current 
Legal umber of 
N Current job 
Husband's 
job and (years) marriage status 
Children 
age (years) 
Carol Filipina 40 4 years 
Residence Two Domestic Engineer (F-2) worker (50) 
Geraldine Filipina 37 3 years 
Residence 
(F-2) Two 
English 
teacher in a 
Delivery 
man (45) nursery 
1 year and 7 
Manual 
Hyang- months Residence One Kitchen 
worker in 
the 
Lim 
Chinese 39 under ( (F-2) (in previous staff 
in a construction divorce marriage) restaurant industry 
proceedings) 50s 
Jogie Filipina 27 2 years and Residence None (one Factory Farmer (31) 4 months (F-2) miscarriage) worker 
Korean 
Lisa (former 36 years 5 Naturalised One 
Factory Dry cleaner 
nationality worker (49) 
- Filipina) 
Marilou Filipina 30 3 years 
Residence None Factory Engineer (F-2) worker (36) 
Unemployed parking lot 
Zenaida Filipina 28 2 years and Residence One (one (previously assistant 6 months (F-2) miscarriage) domestic (40) 
worker) 
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3. List of Government Officials and NGO Workers 
H-J. Jeong 
J. W. Hong 
T. H. Choi 
Rev. G-B. Lim 
Rev. K-Y. Han 
S-H. Kang 
Deputy Director, 
Family Policy Division, 
Ministry of Gender Equality & Family 
Deputy Director, 
Foreign Work-Force Policy Division, 
Ministry of Labour 
Deputy Director, 
Human Resource Development, 
Office of the Prime Minister 
Director, 
Welfare Mission Centre for Korean-Chinese. 
Director, 
Women Migrants Human Rights Centre 
(WMHRC) 
Deputy Director, 
Women Migrants Human Rights Centre 
(WMHRC) 
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